NTSB Factual Report

HISTORY OF FLIGHT

On August 31, 2000, about 0505 Alaska daylight time, a Cessna 172G airplane, N4411L, was destroyed after colliding with an aircraft hangar at the Juneau International Airport, Juneau, Alaska. The airplane was being operated as a visual flight rules (VFR) personal flight under Title 14, CFR Part 91, when the accident occurred. The airplane was owned and operated by the pilot. The pilot received fatal injuries. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed.

Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Automated Flight Service Station (AFSS) personnel at the Juneau Airport reported that the pilot contacted the Juneau AFSS on the common traffic advisory frequency (CTAF), and stated: "Juneau Radio, Cessna 4411L is taxiing to runway 10 for departure." The AFSS specialist replied that there was no runway 10 at Juneau, and then provided an airport advisory that included a report of calm winds, and an altimeter setting of 30.02 inHg. The specialist then provided runway and taxiway closure information that affected the west end of the airport. The pilot replied "roger, Cessna 11L." The specialist then advised Juneau airport field maintenance personnel of the departing airplane on what the specialist said he believed to be runway 08.

Juneau Airport field maintenance personnel monitored the radio conversations between the AFSS and the pilot, and observed the airplane depart on runway 08 from taxiway B. According to the maintenance personnel, the airplane appeared to climb to about 400 feet above the ground in a nose high attitude. The airplane then began to roll to the left and right, and then descended sharply to the left, toward the left (north) side of the runway. The airplane pulled up slightly while still turning to the left. It collided with the top 4 feet of a 30 feet high spruce tree, next to a creek between taxiway A, and a service road located along the north side of the taxiway. The airplane then collided with the south side of a hangar about 20 feet above the ground, and fell onto the hangar apron.

OTHER DAMAGE

The airplane struck the side of a metal hangar. The hangar is owned by Silver Bay Logging Inc., 8429 Livingston Way, Juneau.

PERSONNEL INFORMATION

According to airmen FAA records on file in the Airman and Medical Records Center located in Oklahoma City, the pilot applied for a private pilot certificate on February 27, 1975. He was issued a notice of disapproval after failing the entire flight portion of the exam. After additional training, the pilot was issued a private pilot certificate with an airplane single-engine land rating, on March 4, 1975. On December 3, 1989, the pilot was involved in an airplane accident in Kent, Washington. As a result of the accident, the FAA required that the pilot undergo a reexamination of his pilot proficiency with an FAA inspector, on March 16, 1990. The pilot failed the reexamination. The pilot voluntarily surrendered his pilot certificate to the FAA, pending his rescheduling of another pilot proficiency examination. His certificate was returned to him on August 30, 1990, but he was still required to complete the second reexamination. The pilot failed to reschedule a reexamination.

On January 2, 1991, the pilot was involved in an aviation incident with a Cessna 180 floatplane in Renton, Washington. While taxiing, the right float submerged and the airplane sank. On January 10, 1991, the FAA issued an emergency notice of suspension for the pilot's certificate, and the pilot surrendered his pilot certificate the following day. The pilot scheduled a pilot proficiency examination with an FAA inspector on January 29, 1991, but the pilot failed the examination. The pilot was issued a temporary airman certificate, valid for 30 days, with the limitation that the certificate was valid only for dual instructional flights, and flight checks conducted by an FAA inspector. On February 26, 1991, the FAA issued a notice of proposed certificate action, planning to revoke the pilot's certificate. On March 29, 1991, the FAA issued a notice of revocation of the pilot's certificate.

The most recent third-class medical certificate issued to the pilot, was on November 12, 1992, and contained the limitation that the pilot must wear corrective lenses for near and distant vision. A third-class medical certificate is valid for 24 months.

No personal flight records were located for the pilot and the aeronautical experience listed on page 3 of this report was obtained from a review of the airmen FAA records. On the pilot's application for medical certificate, dated November 12, 1992, the pilot indicated that his total aeronautical experience consisted of 480 hours, of which 4.4 hours were accrued in the previous 6 months.

AIRCRAFT INFORMATION

No maintenance records were located for the airplane. The airplane had been inspected for the last two years by Wingnut Aviation, Juneau. Maintenance personnel at Wingnut Aviation reported the airplane had previously been in Gustavus, Alaska, and the pilot flew the airplane to Juneau about 3 years before the accident. The airplane had been tied down on the Juneau airport ramp since that time. The pilot told the maintenance personnel that the original logbooks were lost. The pilot produced copies of logbook pages and maintenance work orders that had historical records referenced to the recording hour meter (tach) within the RPM gauge. The records produced by the pilot contained the following data:

March 6, 1987 - Annual inspection, tach time, 1375.5. March 24, 1987 - Installation of a supplemental type certificate (STC) for the use of automotive gasoline. April 22, 1988 - Annual inspection, tach time, 1577. November 30, 1988 - Replacement of the carburetor heat cable, tach time, 1627. September 25, 1989 - Annual inspection, tach time, 1719.0.

Wingnut Aviation personnel regenerated an engine logbook, and completed an annual inspection of the airplane on February 10, 1999. At that time, the tach time was 1906, and the engine time was estimated at 1,000 hours since a major overhaul. The mechanic documented that the engine time was within 100 hours, plus or minus, of the actual time. The most recent annual inspection was accomplished on April 22, 2000, when the tach meter was indicating 1907.2.

METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATION

At 0453, an Aviation Routine Weather Report (METAR) at Juneau was reporting, in part: Wind, calm; visibility, 5 statute miles in mist; clouds and sky condition, few at 300 feet, 7,000 feet scattered; temperature, 44 degrees F; dew point, 44 degrees F; altimeter, 30.02 inHg. Remarks, thick bank of stratus clouds,

Witnesses reported that an area of fog was visible toward the east end of the airport, but the runway environment, where the accident occurred, was clear.

COMMUNICATIONS

The FAA provided a tape recording of the radio communications between the pilot and the Juneau AFSS facility. In addition, the AFSS specialist provided a written statement about communications with the pilot. The recording of the communications between the pilot and the Juneau AFSS contained the initial radio contact where the pilot said he was departing runway 10. It did not contain additional conversations mentioned in the specialists written statement. The written statement provided by the specialist states, in part: "Approximately one minute later (after the first radio contact) N4411L stated again that he was entering runway 10 for departure at intersection Bravo. I again reiterated that there was no runway 10, and that there was only runway 08 and 26 here at Juneau. I then proceeded to verify that he wanted to depart runway 08 to the east. N4411L acknowledged by double clicking the microphone."

A copy of the communications tape recording is included in this report.

AERODROME AND GROUND FACILITIES

The Juneau International Airport is equipped with a single hard-surfaced runway on a 080 to 260 degree magnetic orientation. Runway 08 is 8,456 feet long by 150 feet wide. At the time of the accident, the air traffic control tower was closed. An automated flight service station (AFSS), located at the airport, provided traffic advisories to the pilot.

WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATION

The National Transportation Safety Board investigator-in-charge (IIC) examined the airplane wreckage at the accident site on August 31, 2000. The top 4 feet of a 30 feet high spruce tree was found at the base of a line of trees, located next to a creek. The creek is located between taxiway A, and a service road located along the north side of taxiway A at the Juneau Airport. The distance from the line of trees to the accident site is about 330 feet, on a magnetic heading of 355 degrees. The trees are about 410 feet north of the north edge of runway 08. (All heading/bearings noted in this report are oriented toward magnetic north.)

The airplane came to rest on an asphalt apron on the south side of an aviation hangar. An opening in the side of the hanger was observed about 20 feet above the airplane. All of the airplane's major components were found at the main wreckage area. The empennage was lying flat and upright on the ground, facing the hangar. Just aft of the rear seat, the airplane was folded upward and aft 180 degrees, with the cabin and wings oriented away from the hangar, lying inverted to the left of the empennage. The fuselage, forward of the front door post, was crushed aft and upward about 35 degrees.

The right wing was lying inverted, flat on the ground, and remained attached to the fuselage. The left wing was inverted and fractured at the inboard end. It was displaced aft and bent downward about 45 degrees, positioned over the tail of the airplane, just forward of the vertical stabilizer. The right wing had extensive spanwise leading edge aft crushing from the lift strut attach point to the inboard end. The crushing was oriented more to the underside of the wing. The left wing had similar aft spanwise leading edge crushing. Both lift struts remained attached to their respective wing and lower fuselage attach points.

The vertical stabilizer and rudder had minor denting. The leading edge of the right horizontal stabilizer had aft, spanwise crushing oriented to the underside of the stabilizer. The right elevator had minor dents. The left horizontal stabilizer and elevator were curled upward about 40 degrees at the outboard end.

The flight control surfaces remained connected to their respective attach points. Due to the impact damage, the flight controls could not be moved by their respective control mechanisms. The continuity of the flight control cables was established to the cabin/cockpit area.

The airplane had a rectangular-shaped 28-gallon plastic fuel tank strapped into the rear seat of the airplane. The tank was secured to the rear seat cushion by two cargo straps. A flexible rubber hose was routed from the tank, through an automotive fuel filter, then into and out of an automotive style 12 volt fuel pump. The pump was activated by plugging a cigarette lighter adapter into a power outlet on the instrument panel. A hose from the pump was attached to an aluminum fitting which was attached to the left wing fuel supply line, located below the floor of the cockpit, under the left front seat. The tank was full of gasoline, and did not rupture during the accident.

The baggage compartment contained soft luggage, a folding bicycle, oil containers, a tool set, and two, five-gallon plastic containers of gasoline.

The propeller assembly remained connected to the engine crankshaft. One propeller blade had leading edge gouging, chordwise scratching, and "S" bending. The second blade was bent aft 180 degrees about mid span, and had torsional twisting. About 8 inches of the end of the blade was extensively twisted and broken from the propeller, and was located on the ground next to the airplane. The propeller spinner was crushed aft and had slight rotational folding.

About an 8-inch long, spiral shaped portion of aluminum hangar material was located next to the airplane. The airplane's nose wheel assembly separated from the fuselage and was located inside the hangar building.

The engine sustained impact damage to the underside and front portion of the engine. The nose of the engine case had rotational scoring adjacent to the propeller attaching bolts. The engine oil sump had upward crushing and a hole torn in the sump. The crankshaft could be rotated by the propeller. Gear and valve train continuity was established when the crankshaft was rotated by hand. Sounds of compression were heard when the engine was rotated by hand.

The engine oil screen was free of contaminants. The vacuum pump's drive gear was intact, and the pump could be rotated by hand.

One magneto was broken from the engine case. The other magneto remained attached. Both magnetos produced spark upon hand rotation. The starter was broken from the engine case.

The massive center electrode sparks plugs were clean and dry, and had a gray appearance.

The carburetor was broken from the engine and sustained impact damage to the butterfly. The metal float was undamaged. The venturi was intact and unobstructed. Gasoline was found in the accelerator port. The carburetor inlet fuel screen was slightly crushed, but was free of contaminants. Gasoline was found in the gascolator, and the screen was free of contaminants.

MEDICAL AND PATHOLOGICAL INFORMATION

A postmortem examination of the pilot was conducted under the authority of the Alaska State Medical Examiner, 5700 E. Tudor, Anchorage, Alaska, on September 1, 2000. The examination revealed that the cause of death for the pilot was attributed to massive blunt force injuries.

A toxicological examination of a blood sample was conducted by the Alaska State Medical Examiner. The examination revealed the presence of 0.044 gm/dl of ethanol in blood.

Fluid and tissue samples, harvested by the medical examiner, were examined at the FAA's Civil Aeromedical Institute (CAMI) on October 13, 2000. The FAA's examination was negative for carbon monoxide or cyanide in the blood, and was negative for ethanol or drugs in the urine. On January 12, 2001, the NTSB IIC requested additional testing of samples retained by CAMI. On February 14, 2001, CAMI personnel reported that no ethanol was found in samples of blood, brain tissue, muscle tissue, or in vitreous samples.

WRECKAGE RELEASE

The Safety Board did not take custody of the wreckage. No parts or components were retained by the Safety Board.

NTSB Probable Cause

The pilot's inadvertent stall/mush. A factor in the accident was the pilot's lack of certification.