NTSB Factual Report

HISTORY OF FLIGHT

On June 18, 2014, about 1424 central daylight time, an Israel Aircraft Industries (IAI) 1124A, N793BG, impacted terrain during an attempted takeoff from Huntsville International Airport-Carl T. Jones Field (HSV), Huntsville, Alabama. The FAA-authorized Pilot Proficiency Examiner (PPE), airline transport rated pilot, and airline transport pilot-rated passenger were fatally injured. The airplane was destroyed by impact forces and a post-crash fire. The airplane was registered to and operated by SynFuels Holdings Finance LLC, under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 91 as a pilot proficiency check flight. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time and no flight plan was filed for the flight, which was originating at the time of the accident.

According to the company's Chief Pilot, the purpose of the flights that day was to conduct pilot-in-command (PIC) proficiency checks for two company contract pilots, as required by 14 CFR Part 61.58.

Earlier that day, the flight departed from Birmingham-Shuttlesworth International Airport (BHM), Birmingham, Alabama, for a proficiency check of one pilot. After takeoff, airwork was performed for about 30 to 45 minutes, followed by instrument airwork. The flight was then vectored for an instrument landing system (ILS) approach to runway 18 right at HSV, which terminated with a landing and subsequent increased noise that was recorded by the cockpit voice recorder (CVR). After landing the CVR recorded the sound of two "click clacks," similar to stowing the piggy back levers of the thrust reversers, followed by a discussion by the flight crew about the aircraft's brakes.

The CVR recorded the PPE advising the ground controller at 1415:06, that they were "…going back for another [stammer] round." The ground controller issued taxi instructions, but at 1415:18, the CVR recorded the PPE advising the ground controller they wanted to stop on the taxiway to change pilots. The controller informed the flight crew where to position their airplane and while taxiing, the CVR recorded more conversation between the PPE and pilot about the brake system. The airplane was brought to a stop, and at 1417:57, the CVR recorded the PPE's request to let the other pilot into the cockpit. The CVR recorded multiple sounds including those from seatbelt usage consistent with a pilot change, and at 1419:16, the CVR recorded the PPE stating, "okay. call it one-twenty. ah one-eighteen one twenty one, and ah one-seventy five", to which the new pilot responded, "all…alright [stammering]." The CVR recorded the PPE stating that the V2 speed would be 121 knots, and at 1419:58, the PPE advised the ground controller that they were taxiing. The flight crew was advised by the controller to contact the tower when ready, and at 1420:19, the PPE stated, "before takeoff check. I got it right here." The PPE indicated the airspeed bugs were set, the lift dumps are off, reversers are on, annunciator panel was clear, engine anti-ice and windshield heat are on with the simultaneous sound of two clicks, and battery with the sound of a click and press. The PPE then stated "line up check" followed by, "we got the. the ignition. pitot heat's on. ignition's on, and ah…" followed by, "and the ah [sound of click] the reversers will be armed." The PPE advised the pilot that they will be ready at the end when he was ready, to which he replied in the affirmative.

The CVR recorded the PPE asking the pilot if he wanted to perform instrument approaches to start, or perform airwork first, to which he replied, "oh whatever you think. ah." The PPE then told the pilot they would perform instrument approaches first, to which the pilot replied "okay. that'll be fine." The pilot asked the PPE how to get the heading bug over followed by, "well okay. we've got flaps and", but the PPE indicated, "checklist is completed. except for the ignition and the arming of the reversers." The then stated, "okay. we're ready for takeoff I guess" to which the PPE replied "alright." The PPE then told the pilot to "pull up here and stop."

At 1422:33, the CVR recorded the PPE advised the local controller that they were ready to depart and that they wanted to perform instrument approaches before departing the area. The controller asked the flight crew to confirm they wanted to execute a couple ILS approaches, to which the PPE replied, "…we want two ILS's and then we'll depart back towards uhm Birmingham." About 1423, the controller cleared the flight for takeoff runway 18R, and provided the wind as from 280 at 5 knots, which was acknowledged by the PPE. At 1423:11, the CVR recorded the sound of multiple clicks over the next 7 seconds, and a comment from the pilot that, "…lights coming on."

Airport security video depicted the airplane taxiing onto the runway at the approach end of runway 18R, and beginning the takeoff roll; the video clearly depicted the left side of the airplane during the takeoff roll. The CVR recorded a sound of increased noise similar to engine power increasing, followed by multiple thumps similar to the nose wheel travelling over runway centerline lighting. At 1423:51, the CVR recorded the pilot stating, "airpseed's alive, followed by the PPE stating, "(split) power," followed by the pilot indicating, "power's set." At 1423:57, the CVR recorded the PPE call out 80 knots, and about 1 second later, acoustic analysis of the CVR recording indicated that both engines' N2 readings stabilized at 96 percent. About 1424:04, the PPE called, "v-one rotate", and according to data from the Enhanced Ground Proximity Warning System (EGPWS), the airplane had reached 118 knots calibrated airspeed (KCAS). At that point the airplane was about 2,051 feet down the runway and slightly right of runway centerline. About 1424:07, while on the ground at about 130 KCAS, acoustic analysis indicateed a divergence of N2 speeds, though it could not be conclusively determined whether the left or right engine N2 rpm was decreasing. It was noted that the opposite N2 speed remained nearly stable for the remainder of the recording.

Data from the EGPWS indicated the airplane accelerated to about 135 KCAS when a change in radio altimeter at about 1424:09 depicted a climb and the acoustic analysis indicated the N2 speed of one engine continued to decrease. The air traffic controller who cleared the flight for takeoff later reported seeing the airplane rotate about half way down the runway. While climbing 18 feet above the runway and 148 KCAS, at 1424:11, the CVR the pilot commanded gear-up. Less than 1second later, about 1424:11.8, while at 149 KCAS (the highest recorded airspeed by the EGPWS) and 33 feet radio altitude in a wings level attitude, the CVR recorded a rattling sound beginning which continued until the end of the recording. Acoustic analysis of the sound indicated it was consistent with thrust reverser deployment. At 1424:13.3, while in a left bank of 0.7 degrees and 147 KCAS at 53 feet, the PPE asked what happened, followed by a peak in background noise increase about 1.5 seconds later. At that same time the acoustic analysis indicated one engine was operating at 96 percent N2, and the other engine had decreased to 92 percent N2. The CVR recorded the pilot exclaim, "…ohh-hh" followed by a slight decrease in background noise.

The controller who cleared the flight to takeoff stated that when the flight was about 50 feet above ground level, he noted, "…the airplane's right wing [dipped] a little but the pilot seemed to correct the airplane." About 11 seconds after the first EGPWS recorded data point, or about 1424:16, a right roll of 0.7 degree was noted; the airplane at that time was 83 feet above the runway centerline about 4,650 feet down the runway at 142 KCAS. At 1424:17.7, while at 88 feet flying at 139 KCAS, in a 7 degree right bank with the landing gear extended, with one engine at about 96 percent N2 and the other engine at about 91 percent N2, the pilot to asked, "what'd you do. what happened (to us)", to which the PPE replied in a strained voice, "I don't know." The airplane continued to climb while drifting to the right of the runway centerline.

At 1424:20.2, one engine was operating at about 96 percent N2 and the other engine was operating at about 84 percent N2, while at 104 feet and a right bank of 8.4 degrees at 137 KCAS. Due to the level of ambient noise, no further analysis of the decelerating engine and its N2 speed could be performed. At this time the PPE to indicated in a strained voice to get the gear up; the EGPWS data indicated the landing gear was retracted 1 second later. The airplane climbed to a maximum altitude of 108 feet while drifting to the right, and then 1 second later while at 1424:22, the flight was over the western edge of the runway at 107.5 feet in a 20-degree right bank, flying at 132 KCAS with one engine indicating 96 percent N2. The right bank angle continued to increase from this point to the end of the EGPWS recorded data, while slight airspeed variation occurred.

At 1424:24.5, while west of the western edge of the runway in a right bank of 26 degrees at 132 KCAS and about 86 feet, the CVR recorded a bank angle warning. About 1 second later, the background noise was noted to increase until the end of the recording, and the second to last data point of the EGPWS depicted a right roll value of 38.7 degrees, while the last data point depicted the pitch as negative 9.1 degrees. At 1424:26.9, the CVR recorded another bank angle warning, followed about 1.5 seconds later by the sound of impact.

There were no distress calls made by any occupant of the airplane. The controller who witnessed the impact called an Alert 3.

Witnesses on the airport reported seeing the airplane climb to altitudes estimated between 50 and 200 feet above ground level (agl), with the landing gear retracted. Both flight crewmembers of an airline flight that was on final approach to runway 18R later reported seeing the airplane climb steeply after becoming airborne, then observed the airplane rolling to the right. The first officer (F/O) of the airline flight (pilot not flying) reported the right bank angle was between 70 and 90 degrees. By all witness accounts, the airplane was observed to roll to the right to about a 90-degree right bank, and impact west of the runway. The F/O of the airline flight also reported the airplane impacted the ground with the right wing first while in a 45 degree nose-low attitude. He immediately saw black smoke, and a billowing cloud of dust, smoke and flames. First responders responded to the accident site and extinguished the fire.

PERSONNEL INFORMATION

The PPE, age 70, held an airline transport pilot (ATP) certificate with airplane single and multi-engine land, airplane single engine sea ratings, with type ratings in 25 different make and model aircraft including the IA-JET, which was the type designation for the accident airplane make and model airplane, as well as for the Aero Commander 1121 Jet Commander and Commodore Jet 1123. He last obtained a type rating in an IA-1125 (IAI Astra) on April 18, 2013. He held a commercial pilot certificate with glider and rotorcraft helicopter ratings, and a flight instructor certificate with airplane single and multi-engine, and instrument airplane ratings. He also held a ground instructor certificate with basic rating, and an mechanic certificate with airframe and powerplant ratings. He held a second-class medical certificate issued November 11, 2013, with a limitation, "Must wear corrective lenses." On the application for this last medical certificate, he listed a total flight time of 20,000 flight hours, and he weighed 225 pounds.

Review of the PPE's FAA Blue Ribbon airman file, revealed he obtained type ratings in AC-1121 and CJ 1123 airplanes (current type designation IA-JET) at the commercial pilot level on the same day in January 1975. A review of the application for the add-on ratings indicated at that time he had 2,000 flight hours as pilot-in-command. On July 30, 1986, he obtained an airline transport pilot certificate with airplane multi-engine land rating, and also type designation IA-JET. On the application for the rating he indicated having 3,500 hours in that make and model aircraft.

According to information from the PPE's website, obtained the day of the accident, he listed a total flight time of 28,421 hours, 14,830 hours in multi-engine turbo propeller and jet aircraft, and 1,816 hours in IA-JET aircraft.

The PPE was designated as an Orlando, Florida FAA Flight Standards District Office (FSDO), Pilot Proficiency Examiner on February 1, 1999. As part of the recent renewal of designation process, an annual briefing and observation were required. According to documents from the Orlando FSDO, the PPE's annual observation check performed on July 24, 2013, and resulted in a disapproval with resulting suspension of his PPE. On August 28, 2013, he was retested, approved, and his PPE privileges were restored. According to the program manager, the PPE was unfamiliar with the avionics package of the aircraft used for the July 2013 test. His most recent Certificate of Authority Letter (COA) from the Orlando FSDO Manager was issued February 24, 2014; the letter indicated he was authorized to act as PPE in 7 different airplanes, including the IA-JET.

The pilot, age 68, held an ATP certificate with airplane multi-engine land rating. He also held a commercial pilot certificate with airplane single engine land rating. At the ATP level, he was type rated in 9 different make and model aircraft including IA-JET. He also held a flight instructor certificate with airplane single and multi-engine, instrument airplane. He held a second-class medical certificate with a limitation, "Must wear corrective lenses" issued on July 1, 2013. On the application for this most-recent medical certificate he listed 19,900 flight hours, and he weighed 165 pounds. There was no record of enforcements, accidents, or incidents. His last recurrent ground and flight testing in an Israel Aircraft Industries (IAI) 1124A (Westwind II) occurred on May 28, 2013; the training was performed by the same PPE.

Review of the pilot's FAA Blue Ribbon airman file, revealed he obtained type rating in AC-1121 (current type designation IA-JET) at the airline transport pilot level in June 1988.

The operator's chief pilot, who had flown the airplane since 2003, reported that he had been given PIC proficiency checks by the accident PPE, in the accident airplane. During those flights the PPE would be seated in the right seat. In his experiences, the PPE would give an engine cut after V1 speed was attained, when the flight was in a positive rate of climb either between 10 to 15 feet agl, or 20 to 30 feet agl. During those times, he would ease the thrust lever back. The chief pilot reported to an FAA inspector that the PPE would reach down to raise the landing gear, and then would retard the right thrust lever. He also indicated that since owning the airplane, there have been no issues with the thrust reverser system of either engine.

AIRCRAFT INFORMATION

The airplane was manufactured in 1983 by Israel Aircraft Industries Ltd., as model 1124A, and was designated serial number 392. An export Certificate of Airworthiness issued on November 27, 1983, specified that the airplane was examined, tested, and found to conform to the type design approved under the FAA Type Certificate No. A2SW. It was powered by two Honeywell TFE731-3-1G turbofan engines rated to 3,700 pounds of thrust, both of which were equipped with an independently operated thrust reverser system designed by Grumman Aircraft Engineering Corporation for ground use only.

Each hydraulically-powered thrust reverser (T/R) consisted of upper and lower clamshell doors attached to the aft engine nacelle. The doors pivoted near the nacelle centerline and rotated aft to form a target deflecting the exhaust forward, producing reverse thrust. An accumulator in the reverser system permitted one complete cycle of the reversers in case of aircraft hydraulic system failure. The reverser on each engine was separately controlled by an electrical system, provided with safety features. Indicator lights were provided in the f

NTSB Probable Cause

The flight crew's inability to maintain airplane control during initial climb following deployment of the right thrust reverser for reasons that could not be determined because postaccident examination of the airframe and engine thrust reverser system did not reveal any anomalies. Contributing to the accident was the excessive thrust from the right engine with the thrust reverser deployed for reasons that could not be determined during postaccident examinations and testing.