NTSB Factual Report

HISTORY OF FLIGHT

On November 15, 2011, at 0837 mountain standard time, a restricted category Williams Helicopter Corporation, UH-1H, N502AW, experienced a loss of main rotor transmission power, made a hard landing, and came to rest on its right side about 3 miles northwest of the Valle Airport (40G), Grand Canyon, Arizona. The pilot operated the helicopter under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 as a business flight. The pilot, the sole occupant, was seriously injured; the helicopter sustained substantial damage. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed for the local area flight that was departing at the time of the accident. The flight was destined for Hualapai Hilltop, Supai, Arizona.

The pilot reported to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) accident coordinator that he was flying about 500 feet above ground level (agl), approximately 1/4 mile from power lines, when the Master Caution warning came on, which had been tripped by the "transmission low oil pressure." He made an immediate left turn away from power lines and set up an approach to land the helicopter. The pilot stated that as the helicopter descended, at altitudes of 50 feet and 30 feet agl, it yawed approximately 30 degrees to the left and right. About 10 feet agl, and almost zero airspeed, the main rotor speed slowed and then stopped. The helicopter fell the remaining distance to ground impact. The pilot was able to cut himself out of his seatbelt, called 911 from his cell phone, and waited for rescue crews to arrive.

According to the pilot the engine continued to operate after impact with the ground. The pilot estimated that the engine continued to operate for an additional 10-15 seconds after he regained situational awareness.

A witness at the airport stated that he heard the helicopter takeoff about 0830. A few minutes later he heard a change in the sound of the engine, which he attributed to possible power changes. He did not view the accident.

AIRCRAFT INFORMATION

According to the helicopter logbook on October 18, 2011, a 25/50-hour inspection was performed. At that time, the helicopter total time was 4,854.7 hours, and a Hobbs hour meter of 408.5 hours. The annual inspection was due in November 2011. In August 2011, a logbook entry noted that the main rotor assembly, mast, and main transmission assembly were removed. The four main mounts were removed and replaced with new mounts, three new boots were installed, a fifth mount was removed and replaced, and new bolts were on all the mounts that were installed. Overhauled dampers were installed on both the left and right hand side of the main transmission. The main rotor assembly, mast, and main transmission assembly were reinstalled and a ground run and leak check were performed with no discrepancies noted.

The helicopter was powered by a Honeywell T53-L-703 turbine engine, serial number LE10115Z. A data plate on the engine indicated that the engine had been overhauled on August 30, 2005, by CAPPSCO INT CORP #X02R027O.

PILOT INFORMATION

The pilot, age 57, held a commercial pilot certificate with ratings for airplane single and multi-engine land, and a rating for helicopter, as well as an instrument rating for airplane and helicopter. The pilot also held a helicopter instructor rating.

A review of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) airman records indicated that the pilot was issued a second-class medical certificate with no waivers or limitations on January 11, 2011. The pilot reported on his medical application that he had a total time of 27,000 hours with 450 hours logged in the past 6 months.

WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATION

FAA inspectors responded to the accident site. The helicopter impacted flat desert terrain; the ground scar was about 15 feet. The helicopter came to rest on its right side on an estimated heading of 350 degrees. The landing gear skid crossover tubes had been shoved into the underside of the helicopter, which crushed the lower section of the fuselage and flight control rods and linkages. The aft crossover tube remained attached to the skids; however, it separated from the fuselage. All of the fuel bladders remained in their respective mounting locations with the exception of the left aft fuel bladder, which came to rest on top of the belly of the fuselage. Fuel was noted as leaking from the fuselage; the separated fuel bladder remained uncompromised and half full of fuel.

The tail rotor separated from the tail boom, and came to rest about 180 feet from the main wreckage. The tail rotor drive shaft between the 42-degree gearbox and the 90-degree gearbox had separated and a section of the drive shaft was located under the vertical stabilizer.

The main rotor blades, transmission assembly, and mounts were separated from the fuselage; however, the assembly remained in the helicopter in its normal relative position. Both main rotor blades were intact with damage to the lower surface of the blades consistent with ground damage; there was no leading edge damage evident.

The main rotor transmission remained intact but separated from the fuselage. The drive shaft between the engine and transmission separated and came to rest about 30 feet from the main wreckage. The K-flex couplings at both the engine and transmission locations were fractured. All flight controls, with the exception of the collective rod and pitch horn for one of the main rotor blades, were intact from the swashplate up to each of their respective mounting locations. The tail rotor output quill coupling gear was exposed due to the separation of the tail rotor coupling at the transmission.

Visual examination of the engine revealed no other obvious signs of damage; there was a band of discoloration around the circumference of the transmission in the area of the oil jets in the vicinity of the main rotor reduction gear assembly; also noted was localized peeling of paint. The FAA inspectors noted that a bolt was missing from the mounting flange of one of the oil jets at the main external oil line assembly; however, there was no obvious oil stains or residue on the transmission case. A detailed on-scene report is attached to the public docket for this accident.

TESTS AND RESEARCH

An aircraft inspection was performed on the engine at Air Transport in Phoenix, Arizona, on May 8, 2012. The helicopter sustained impact damage to the entire fuselage. The cockpit roof had been crushed in toward the floor board more so on the left forward portion of the airframe. The transmission mounts separated from the airframe. In order to remove the transmission from the helicopter, the hydraulic line was cut; hydraulic fluid streamed out of the line. The oil tank sustained impact damage; there was no oil in the tank when observed from the sight-glass on the side of the tank or the filler port.

A portion of the k-flex coupling remained attached at the engine output drive shaft. Rotation of the output drive shaft produced rotation of the power turbine spool with no binding evident. Aircraft sheet metal was present in the engine inlet housing with damage to the variable inlet guide vanes. The inlet guide vane actuator could not be manipulated due to debris in the inlet. There was also damage to the first stage compressor blades, and metal spray on the second stage power turbine stator vanes. There was no metallic debris adhering to the accessory gearbox chip detector and oil was in the gearbox.

The transmission was disassembled. When the accessory plate was removed, there were large pieces of metal in the cavity along with oil. The oil pump was removed and disassembled; there was no damage to the pump, and oil was present in the cavity with some debris and scoring was evident in the housing. The oil pump drive shaft spline and shaft were intact. The gears driving the hydraulic pump and the tail rotor drive were intact.

Visual inspection of the transmission showed heat signatures on the planetary gear casing, but there was no other obvious external damage. The freewheeling unit was not free to move in the normal drive direction. The planetary casing contained 3 oil jets; each oil jet had two retaining bolts. Each oil jet was missing one of two retaining bolts.

The swashplate mast assembly was removed; the mast bearing was oil coated, and the mast itself had metal debris the length of the mast. However, there was no scoring of the mast. When the top case cover of the transmission was removed, molten metal pieces were located in the upper planetary gear area between the planetary gears and the ring gear. The planetary gears and the ring gear appeared to be intact. The upper planetary case was removed exposing the sun gear, which contained a large amount of metal transfer in the gears, and the gear teeth were smeared in a clockwise direction, which indicated that the transmission was under power at the time of the accident. Investigators also reported that the lower planetary gear assembly had sustained significant damage.

The sun gear quill assembly was removed to gain access to the main input drive quill. The housing area was filled with debris and the main input quill alignment housing had cracked on both sides. The oil jets remained intact, and the lower mass bearing rotated. A castellated nut was found in the lower housing area along with oil. The lower planetary gear retaining cap nut was also located in the main input drive housing. The oil lines and pressure regulator were free of debris.

The transmission oil manifold and chip detector were shipped to the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) Materials Laboratory, in Washington, D.C., for further examination. The materials engineer that examined the components noted that the components were received wrapped in cloth, and when the cloth was unwrapped, loose particles were identified. A borescope was used to examine the passages and interior of the transmission oil manifold; there was no evidence of blockage in the accessible passages. There were some particles on the interior surfaces, which were removed using a cotton swab for additional examination. The materials engineer reported that the particles were similar in size and appearance, but varied in color. Two of the largest particles from the chip detector were measured; the first particle measured 0.20 inch long with an aspect ratio of 4, and the second particle measured 0.09 inches with an aspect ratio of 1.

The materials engineer identified and measured two of the largest particles from the transmission oil manifold. The first particle measured 0.1 inch long with an aspect ratio of 1.5, the second particle measured 0.07 inch long with an aspect ratio of 1.

The composition of the particles was analyzed using energy dispersive x-ray spectroscopy. Results from the analysis revealed the particles had different compositions, which included compositions consistent with low alloy steel, a magnesium alloy, and a brass alloy. A detailed report is attached to the public docket for this accident.

The internal configuration of the oil system component was documented through the use of radiographic images and the resultant computed tomography (CT) images were examined and analyzed by the NTSB. A review of the images determined that there were no indications of any completely blocked passages. It did determine; however, that there were medium and high density materials in several locations within the component, and that there were high density particles in several areas around the relief valve. The images also revealed no indications of damage to either the thermocouple or pressure sensor/switch. A detailed report is attached to the public docket for this accident.

A representative from Bell helicopter reviewed photographic evidence of the transmission, and reported that it appeared that the transmission seized as a result of an over-temperature due to a lack of lubrication. The representative further indicated that both the main and tail rotor blades had stopped prior to impact, which indicated that the transmission oil system had stopped providing lubricant.

According to UH-1H flight manual Emergency Procedures section, when the pilot receives a Master Caution light, they are directed to check the CAUTION panel and to land as soon as possible. For a transmission oil pressure and/or transmission oil hot lights, the pilot's corrective action in both cases is to land as soon as possible, and to reference paragraph 9-19. Paragraph 9-19 stated in part that if a transmission oil-hot or low pressure lights illuminate, the limits have been exceeded. It directs the pilot to land as soon as possible and to perform an emergency shutdown of the engine after landing.

NTSB Probable Cause

The loss of main rotor power due to a main rotor transmission failure from a lack of lubrication.