NTSB Factual Report

1.1 HISTORY OF FLIGHT

On April 12, 2006, about 1500 mountain standard time, a Velocity XL-RG, N732RA, descended into desert terrain near Pearce, Arizona. Raytheon Missile Systems (RMS) was operating the airplane under the provisions of 14 CFR Part 91. The airline transport pilot, the sole occupant, sustained fatal injuries; the airplane was destroyed. The local test flight departed from Tucson International Airport, Tucson, Arizona, at 1438. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed and a flight plan had not been filed.

The operator reported that the purpose of the accident flight was for the pilot to execute a 3-hour mission around the Tombstone Military Operations Area (MOA). RMS employees all stated that the flight test protocol that the pilot was to follow encompassed a series of predetermined maneuvers.

A RMS representative stated that the accident flight was the first test plan out of a series of planned test flights. The purpose of the first test plan flight was to perform an operational check of the data recording equipment on the airplane, which included the video recorders and attitude sensors. A secondary objective of the flight was for ground operations to determine if they could receive a signal from the telemetry equipment onboard the airplane. The flight was not to exceed 3 hours. The second test plan to occur later in the week was the flight in which the telemetry data would be tested.

1.1.1 Witnesses

Several witnesses reported observing the airplane prior to impact. One witness, who was also a pilot, stated that when he initially spotted the airplane it was fairly high. As the airplane approached his location, he began to hear the engine sputter; it would momentarily stop for several seconds and then start again. The engine continued the sputtering pattern and the airplane began a clockwise spiral. As the engine continued to sputter, the airplane completed two full 360-degree revolutions (spirals) while descending. During the third revolution, the airplane maneuvered into a wings level configuration and descended toward terrain. The airplane disappeared from the witness's line of sight but he subsequently observed black smoke; he could no longer hear engine noise.

A National Transportation Safety Board investigator interviewed a Lieutenant Colonel with the United States Air Force who was the commander of the Fairchild-Republic A-10 squadron that was operating in the Tombstone MOA the day of the accident. He stated that the accident pilot contacted the squadron about 2 weeks prior to the accident with regards to coordinating operations in the Tombstone MOA. The accident pilot specifically asked if it was possible for the RMS airplanes to utilize the MOA if prearranged with the Air Force. Several days later the squadron replied to his request stating that, as the schedule permitted, the accident pilot would be able to coordinate a shared utilization of the airspace.

The Lieutenant Colonel further stated that on the day of the accident, the accident pilot had requested to share the Tombstone airspace. The accident pilot had arranged that he would maneuver at 9,000 feet mean sea level (msl) and below, and the A-10 pilots would operate at 10,000 feet msl and above. The Lieutenant Colonel, call sign Atlas-1, arrived with a wing commander (flying another A-10) in the Tombstone airspace and both were expecting to hear a radio call from the accident pilot. As part of his normal procedures, the Lieutenant Colonel was simultaneously monitoring the tactical UHF (ultra high frequency) and the AM VHF (very high frequency). During the flight, he neither heard nor made visual contact with the accident pilot or airplane. He did, however, observe black smoke in the distance during his flight, that he believed to be from a burning farm field.

The Lieutenant Colonel reported that the accident pilot was an experienced A-10 pilot and would know all of the radio frequencies in the area; he additionally possessed an in-flight guide of the area. The Lieutenant Colonel expected the accident pilot to make a radio call about 5 to 10 miles before reaching the boundary of the Tombstone MOA airspace in an effort to make a deconflicting entry. He also believed that the accident pilot would have known to contact him on the AM VHF when entering the MOA.

1.1.2 Radar and Communications

Air Traffic Control (ATC) communication audiotapes from the Tucson Air Traffic Control Tower (ATCT), Tucson Terminal Radar Control Facility (TRACON), and the Albuquerque Air Route Traffic Control Center (ABQ ARTCC) were provided to the Safety Board investigator for review. The initial transmission made by the accident pilot occurred at 1423, when he contacted clearance delivery at Tucson International Airport. The pilot was given a discrete beacon code of 0411 and subsequently transferred to ground control followed by the local control frequency. At 1430, an ATC controller cleared the pilot for takeoff. The pilot contacted Tucson TRACON about 1436 while transitioning from 4,700 feet msl to 9,500 feet msl. The pilot stated that his intended destination was the Tombstone MOA. Tucson TRACON terminated radar service at 1446, and the pilot was instructed to change his beacon code to reflect the common visual flight rule (VFR) squawk (1200) and contact ABQ ARTCC.

The pilot contacted ABQ ARTCC at 1447, indicating he was located 40 miles east of Tucson. The controller issued the pilot a discrete beacon code of 0702 for flight following services. A minute later, the pilot confirmed with the controller that he would remain on ABQ ARTCC frequency rather than share the military frequency. The pilot additionally requested traffic advisories regarding the military operated A-10 airplanes within the MOA. He assured the controller that traffic coordination had already been made with the "Atlas 1" (A-10) airplane in the vicinity. At 1452, the controller issued a traffic warning of an A-10 airplane in his vicinity operating at 12,500 feet msl. The pilot stated that he had a previous agreement with the A-10 airplanes in the area where they would occupy the airspace at or above 10,000 feet msl, and he would remain below 10,000 feet msl. At 1459, the controller stated that radar contact had been lost due to the aircraft being below radar coverage.

Recorded radar data covering the area of the accident was supplied by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) in the form of a National Track Analysis Program (NTAP) printout from the ABQ ARTCC. The radar data was examined for the time frame, and both 0411 and 0702 beacon codes were observed that matched the anticipated flight track of the airplane en route from Tucson to the Tombstone MOA. ABQ ARTCC radar data consisted of equidistant radar returns from 1445:02 to 1449:48, and from 1454:10 to 1458:56. The data indicated that the airplane was flying in a southeasterly direction towards the Tombstone MOA.

The radar target was first identified at 1445:02 on a Mode C reported altitude of 9,800 feet msl. During the proceeding 7 minutes, radar returns disclosed a gradual descent to 9,000 feet msl. Radar returns revealed a slight increase in altitude at 1456:21 to 9,300 feet msl before radar contact was lost at 1458:56. The radar plot stretched over a distance of approximately 13.52 nautical miles (nm) in 11 minutes 19 seconds, equating to a radar-derived ground speed of about 72 knots. The last radar return was recorded southwest of the accident location, approximately 0.58 nm from the accident location on a true course of 106 degrees.

1.2 PERSONNEL INFORMATION

According to FAA Airman and Medical Certification records, the pilot held an airline transport pilot certificate with airplane ratings for single and multiengine land; he held a type rating for the Boeing 737. His certificate also was endorsed for commercial privileges for airplane single engine land. The pilot's most recent first-class medical certificate was issued without limitations in November 2004.

The pilot was a former United States Air Force fighter pilot with 22 years experience in various capacities. During his time as an Air Force Officer, the pilot accrued over 4,500 hours of flight time. The pilot's most recent personal logbook covering the period from March 15, 2006, to the date of the accident, indicated that he had amassed a total of 5.4 hours of flight time during three flights in the Velocity. The last recorded flight in the logbook was 2.3 hours and occurred on March 29, 2006; the remark section of the logbook indicated that it was an airplane familiarization and company checkout flight. On March 15, 2006, an instructor signed the logbook stating that the accident pilot had completed 3.0 hours of Velocity flight transition training ground school.

According to a RMS employee, the accident pilot had flown one prior flight with RMS where he and another test pilot flew a different Velocity as an airplane familiarization flight. He stated that the accident pilot was the chief pilot and head of flight operations for the program the accident airplane was involved in. In that capacity, the accident pilot had developed the test plans and sequence in which the program was to operate. The accident pilot developed the accident flight test plan.

A Safety Board investigator interviewed two certificated flight instructors (CFI) that were employed by Velocity, Inc. They stated that four pilots from RMS enrolled in a transition training course in mid March 2006. One CFI conducted the initial flight portion of the training with the accident pilot encompassing 2.3 hours in a Velocity 173 FG. He recalled that, although the pilot had limited experience with piston engine airplanes, he was a "very good pilot" and classified him as "better than average." The CFI also reported that once airborne, the accident pilot had conveyed his interest of seeing the limitations and capabilities of the airplane in-flight.

The other CFI provided ground school for the accident pilot and additionally conducted a training flight. The flight, totaling 0.8 hours in the Velocity XL-RG, was given on the same day as the pervious flight and provided to train the pilots on the model they were going to be flying. The CFI stated that the accident pilot had a good attention to detail. The pilot told him that he wanted to practice lazy-eight and chandelle maneuvers in an effort to feel the airplane's flight characteristics. They performed several such maneuvers and did a 2-g recovery pull-up.

1.3 AIRCRAFT INFORMATION

Velocity, Inc., sold the canard airplane as a kit, which was mostly composed of structure glass, electrical glass, and carbon fiber. The original builder of the Velocity, Inc., XL-RG airplane, serial number 3RX085, purchased the kit on April 17, 2000, and thereafter, constructed the airplane at the Velocity, Inc., facilities in Florida. The airplane was subsequently issued an experimental airworthiness certificate on August 05, 2000, by a Designated Airworthiness Representative (DAR). The operation limitations set forth by the DAR required that the amateur-built airplane complete 40 hours of flight to show that the airplane was safe for flight, before the experimental airworthiness certificate would be issued.

The airplane was equipped with a 260-horsepower Textron Lycoming reciprocating IO-540-D engine, serial number L-247-48. Attached to the engine was a MT CS wood three-blade propeller.

The most recent annual inspection, airframe and engine, was recorded as accomplished on March 01, 2006, at a Hobbs time of 454.1 hours (about 17 flight hours prior to the accident). At that time, the engine had accumulated about 4651.4 hours, and 454.1 since the last major overhaul. Review of the operator's aircraft status sheet and maintenance department records disclosed that there were no unresolved discrepancies at the time the pilot flew the airplane.

A Safety board investigator interviewed the pervious owner of the accident airplane, who was additionally the builder. He stated that he flew the airplane regularly from the time of conception to when he sold it to RMS in the latter part of March 2005.

1.3.1 Configuration

A Safety Board investigator both interviewed and gathered written statements from several RMS engineers that had knowledge of the accident airplane and the systems installed in it. Most helped with the installation and implementation of the equipment in the accident airplane.

The employees stated that, for the purposes of classified research, the airplane was modified. The aft left seat was removed and equipment, primarily a laptop computer, was installed in its place. An additional pitot-static tube was installed on the nose of the airplane. There was a block camera mounted in the front of the airplane in lieu of the removed landing light; the camera was powered by the same wiring that was previously used for the light. Inside the cockpit, a video camcorder was installed on the top of the cabin, positioned to obtain, footage of the instrument panel from the pilot's perspective and an outside view.

For data collection purposes, the airplane was equipped with a Piccolo II autopilot, which was connected to the newly installed pitot-static tube. The Piccolo unit was to serve only as a data recording device for the accident flight. The unit, which had telemetry capabilities, contained sensors that would transmit information on the position, orientation, and status of the airplane over a UHF of 900 megahertz. The telemetry data could only be received about 8 to 10 miles line-of-sight from the ground station.

A laptop computer was powered via an A/C power inverter to the cigarette lighter in the airplane. The laptop was recording the image data from the block camera, as well as recording the information from the hard wired Piccolo unit. The systems were powered from the airplane's 12-volt battery in the front nose baggage area. Both systems were routed to a circuit breaker that was previously used for a stereo and DVD system, which had been removed.

The pilot was to turn the overhead camcorder "on" when beginning the test card maneuvers in an effort to use the 60 minutes of video time appropriately; this was to be the only equipment the pilot would have interacted with during the accident flight.

1.3.2 Center of Gravity (CG)

The operator provided a Safety Board investigator with the accident airplane's weight and balance information. A RMS representative reported that an evaluation of the ranges of weight and balance were performed when the airplane was received in April 2006. Prior to departure on the accident flight, the airplane was weighed, with the pilot on board, via a three-scale weighing system (i.e. one scale positioned beneath each landing gear). Subsequent to the initially weighing, the airplane was fueled to maximum capacity and the final weight and balance was equated to:

-Total Gross Weight: 2,328 pounds

-CG: 134.4 inches

The accident pilot was presented the calculated weight and balance data, which he approved as being acceptable for the flight test.

The Velocity Owner's Flight Manual, "Limitations" section provides the following CG limits: FORWARD: 127.0 inches and AFT: 134.0 inches. Velocity, Inc., developed a CG box to establish these numbers by utilizing flight testing and aerodynamic calculations. The manual states that ideally, the CG should allow for the airplane to maintain a 2:1 loading on the canard wing versus the main wing. With the canard wing situated at a greater angle of attack than the main wing, a stall will first be induced from the canard wing.

In written correspondence with a Safety Board investigator, the Vice President of Velocity, Inc., reported that the accident airplane was typical of other Velocity XL-RG models in its assembly and design configuration. Aside from variations in the accident airplane's operating weight and balance, it would be expected to exhibit similar flight handling and stall characteristics to other Velocity XL models.

Velocity, Inc., recommends 2,700 pounds as the maximum gross takeoff weight. Using the nose of the airplane as the datum point,

NTSB Probable Cause

a departure from controlled flight for undetermined reasons, resulting in a collision with terrain.