NTSB Factual Report

HISTORY OF FLIGHT

On December 15, 2003, at 1300 Pacific standard time, a Cessna 182P, N1595M, collided with terrain after experiencing a loss of engine power at the Watsonville Airport, Watsonville, California. The airplane was operated by the owner under the provisions of 14 CFR Part 91. The private pilot and single passenger received minor injuries; the airplane was destroyed. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed and a visual flight plan had not been filed. The flight originated at Watsonville Airport at 1300.

The pilot reported in the Pilot/Operator Accident Report (NTSB Form 6120) that the engine was running a little rough on the first run up but it smoothed out on the second run up. He performed a normal takeoff and climb. The engine was running smooth then quit suddenly between 200 and 300 feet above ground level (agl). Because of houses directly beyond the end of the runway he entered an immediate left descending 90-degree turn and leveled the wings before impacting the ground. Witnesses helped extract him and his passenger. There was no fire.

PERSONNEL INFORMATION

The pilot obtained his private pilot certificate on April 14, 1967, with a single engine land rating. He has approximately 4,000 flight hours in single engine airplanes and his last biannual flight review was on October 19, 2003, in a Cessna 172. He received a third-class medical certificate on April 25, 2002.

AIRCRAFT INFORMATION

The four seat, high-wing airplane was powered by a 235-horsepower Continental O-470 engine. The airplane underwent its last annual inspection on August 1, 2003, at an aircraft total time of 4,672 hours. The last annual engine inspection entered in the engine logbook was July 1, 2002; however, shop maintenance documents show the engine undergoing regular maintenance in August, 2003. Total time since engine overhaul was 1,109 hours, as of August 2003. The airplane received a Supplemental Type Certificate (STC) for automotive gasoline on July 11, 1984, and the engine received the automotive gasoline STC on June 26, 1984.

The airplane had been delivered to the Watsonville airport by the pilot in July for its annual inspection and to be placed for sale. The airplane remained tied down outside the majority of the time during its stay in Watsonville.

WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATION

The wreckage was located about 300 feet to the north of runway 08 near the departure end, at the coordinates 36 degrees 56.263 minutes north latitude and 121 degrees 46.980 minutes west longitude. The airplane was resting vertically on a some elevated terrain with the airframe oriented on a bearing of 223 degrees magnetic. The firewall was imbedded in the ground, fuselage upright, and the tail scorpioned to the airplane's right side. The engine was detached from the firewall and rotated 90 degrees to the left. The propeller spinner was crushed aft with no recognizable twisting. One propeller blade was bent slightly aft with minor chordwise scratches.

The left wing was detached at the root but still in position. The left flap was deployed 30 to 40 degrees. Starting outboard from the fuel tank the wing was bent aft about 15 degrees with the last 3 feet of the wings leading edge crush aft. There was a 10-inch diameter semicircular indentation within the wing tip crushed area. The left main landing gear strut was bent up so that the wheel was parallel to the middle of the cabin door.

The tail was detached just behind the aft window along the airplane's local vertical rivet line. The detached section of tail was folded over to the airplane's right and laying parallel to the right wing.

The right wing flap was deployed 30 to 40 degrees. The last 3 feet of the right wing tip was crushed and resting imbedded into the ground.

The cockpit was intact. The flap lever was in the full down position. The start key was in the both position. All circuit breakers were in. The carburetor heat control was fully extended out. The engine mixture, throttle, and propeller condition lever were full forward. All flight control cables were in place and the flight control surfaces responded to cockpit control inputs.

Two ground scars were identified aligned together on a bearing of 334 magnetic. An approximately 12-foot-long disturbed area was about 24 feet from the airplane cockpit and contained the nose wheel and strut. A smaller, approximately 6-foot-long, disturbed area was on the same bearing but about 42 feet from the airplane's cockpit. At a 90-degree angle bearing of 268 magnetic, and 15 feet away, was a 3-foot-long disturbed area.

TESTS AND RESEARCH

Fuel Samples:

While on scene three fluid samples were taken. One sample each from the following sources; the right wing sump tank, gascolator, and carburetor fuel bowl. One ounce of pale yellowish fluid was obtained from the right wing fuel tank. One ounce of pale yellowish fluid was obtained from the gascolator. Five ounces of blue and pale yellowish fluid was obtained from the carburetor bowl. Using a Kolor Kut water testing paste all three samples proved positive for water. Of the 5 ounces of fluid found in the carburetor, 2 ounces was water, and water was identified in the carburetor accelerator pump. Water droplets were also noted on the carburetor butterfly valve.

AD 83-12-01:

Maintenance records show that Airworthiness Directive (AD) 83-12-01 was last complied with in July 2002. AD 83-12-01 dictates that a placard stating "CAUTION Leaking fuel caps can cause loss of fuel and erroneously high fuel quantity indications" be placed adjacent to the fuel quantity gauges. Additionally, it indicates that the fuel caps, seals, and filler ports should be inspected for indications of improper sealing or leaking.

Examination of the cockpit revealed no such placards were present, adjacent to the fuel quantity gauges, as required by AD-83-12-01.

Examination of the fuel filler cap o-rings revealed hardened and cracked o-ring material.

Examination of the fuel tank filler ports showed rust stains around the interior perimeter of the port and rust corrosion on the interior filler flanges.

NTSB Probable Cause

a loss of engine power due to water contamination of the fuel system and the pilot's inadequate preflight inspection. A contributing factor was the pilot/owner's failure to comply with the appropriate Airworthiness Directive.