NTSB Factual Report

HISTORY OF FLIGHT

On August 2, 2002, at 1415 Pacific daylight time, a Beech 58TC, N2102L, impacted a berm and fell down a cliff during a landing overrun on runway 4 at Catalina Airport (AVX), Avalon, California. The pilot/owner operated the airplane under the provisions of 14 CFR Part 91. The airplane was destroyed in the post impact fire. The multiengine-instrumented rated private pilot and one passenger were fatally injured. Instrument meteorological conditions prevailed for the cross-country flight, and no flight plan had been filed. The flight departed Phoenix Deer Valley Airport (DVT), Phoenix, Arizona, at 1100 the morning of the accident, with an intended destination of AVX. The wreckage was located at global positioning system (GPS) of 33 degrees 24.55 minutes north latitude and 118 degrees 24.56 minutes west latitude.

According to the AVX airport operations supervisor, the conditions at the airport were clearing enough for the pilots to see the airport, and then the next moment the sky would become overcast again. He described it as a "donut style" overcast layer where it was clear over the airport, but the overcast layer circled the circumference of the airport. Two airplanes that landed prior to the accident airplane used runway 22. The airport operations supervisor reported that the airplanes circled over the airport for 20 minutes before landing.

The airport operations supervisor stated that sky conditions became obscured again for runway 22, and the accident airplane circled to land on runway 4. Reported winds at the time were variable at 4 to 6 knots. Prior to landing, he advised the pilot to go around due to the airplane's speed and altitude. The airport operations supervisor also heard another pilot contact the accident pilot and tell him to go around.

Airport personnel observed the airplane touchdown midfield abeam the tower, which equated to 1,800 feet down the 3,000-foot runway. They observed smoke from the brakes for an additional 300 feet down the runway. They saw the airplane skid down the runway, and hit a berm just beyond the departure end of the runway. Airport personnel then saw a cloud of black smoke.

A relative of the accident pilot witnessed the accident. The relative had landed prior to the accident on runway 22. He was watching the accident pilot on the approach and advised him to go around. He saw the airplane land in the first quarter of the runway and then saw smoke emanating from the brakes. The relative observed the airplane veer to the right of centerline, correct back to centerline, and then hit a berm at the departure end of the runway. He reported that the airplane "catapulted" off the berm, in a "wings-level" attitude. He then heard the engines "power up," and saw the airplane's nose drop. The relative stated that the airplane went over the edge and then he heard and saw an explosion.

PERSONNEL INFORMATION

A review of Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) airman records revealed the pilot held a private pilot certificate with ratings for single and multiengine land and instrument airplanes.

The pilot held a third-class medical certificate issued on July 3, 2001, with limitations to wear corrective lenses.

No personal flight records were located for the pilot. The aeronautical experience listed in this report was obtained from a review of the FAA airman medical records on file in the Airman and Medical Records Center located in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. These records indicated a total time of 1,290 hours with 50 hours logged in the last 6 months. The pilot indicated on his medical application that he had a current prescription for Niacin.

AIRCRAFT INFORMATION

The airplane was a Beech 58TC, serial number TK-22. A review of the airplane's logbooks revealed a total airframe time of 3,638.0 hours at the last annual inspection. An annual inspection was completed on March 1, 2002. The Hobbs hour meter read 2,120.0 at the last inspection.

A Teledyne Continental Motors (TCM) TSIO-520-L engine, serial number 508215, was installed on the left side. Total time on the engine at the last annual inspection was 3,638.0 hours. Firewall Forward, Inc., Loveland, Colorado, completed an engine overhaul on July 27, 1994; time since overhaul recorded at the last annual inspection was 827.8 hours.

A Teledyne Continental Motors TSIO-520-L engine, serial number 508221, was installed on the right side. Total time on the engine at the last annual inspection was 3,638.0 hours. Ly-Con Rebuilding Company, Visalia, California, completed an engine overhaul on July 11, 1996; time since overhaul recorded at the last annual inspection was 654.0 hours.

A Hartzell propeller assembly model PHC-J3YF-2UF, serial number ED3670A, was installed on the left engine. Warner Propeller and Governor Company, Tucson, Arizona, completed a major overhaul of the propeller on January 22, 2000. An annual inspection was completed on March 1, 2002; time since overhaul was 163.9 hours.

A Hartzell propeller assembly model PHC-J3YF-2UF, serial number ED-25H1, was installed on the right engine. A major overhaul of the propeller was completed on February 9, 1996. An annual inspection was completed on March 1, 2002; time since overhaul was 654.0 hours.

METEOROLOGICAL CONDITIONS

A routine aviation weather report (METAR) issued for AVX at 1404, reported few clouds at 100 feet; visibility 2.5 statute miles, with haze; winds from 240 degrees at 8 knots; temperature 64 degrees Fahrenheit; dew point 59 degrees Fahrenheit; altimeter setting 29.97 inHg.

The AVX METAR issued at 1412, reported a vertical visibility (indefinite ceiling) as 100 feet; visibility 3/4 statute miles, with haze; winds from 240 degrees at 8 knots; temperature 64 degrees Fahrenheit; dew point 59 degrees Fahrenheit; altimeter setting 29.96 inHg.

AIRPORT INFORMATION

The Airport/ Facility Directory, Southwest U. S., indicated Catalina Airport runway 4 was 3,000 feet long and 75 feet wide. The runway surface was composed of asphalt.

Runway 4 has a hump about 1,000 feet from the approach end, and has a downward 1.7 percent slope from the hump to the departure end. Skid marks from the accident airplane were observed midfield, abeam the tower. The skid mark length, from the first observed mark to the departure end of the runway, measured approximately 1,200 feet in length. The wheel marks then continued another 50 feet beyond the pavement end to a berm. The 3-foot berm was located at the airport boundary.

WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATION

Investigators from the National Transportation Safety Board, the FAA, and Raytheon Aircraft Company examined the wreckage at the accident scene.

The accident area was located on the northeast side of the airport, and was part of the Catalina Island Conservancy. The airport was situated on a mesa, at an elevation of 1,602 feet mean sea level (msl). The accident site was 600 feet below the airport in flat terrain, in an area covered with small trees and brush, at an elevation of 1,002 feet. The majority of the airplane had been thermally consumed in the post-impact fire. The debris path was along a magnetic bearing of 070 degrees. The airplane came to rest on a magnetic bearing of 200 degrees, facing back towards the airport.

The control surfaces remained connected to the fuselage. Flight control cables were continuous and routed in their approximate normal geometry to allow for establishing flight control continuity on scene. The representative from the airplane manufacture measured the trim actuators for the elevator, rudder, flaps, and aileron (left side) and established the following measurements.

Elevator: 1-1/16 inches - indicated 5-degrees nose down

Rudder: 3-9/16 inches - indicated 10-degrees nose right

Flaps: 6.22 inches - indicated 30-degrees of flaps down

Aileron: 1-1/2 inches - indicated 0-degrees, neutral position

The first identified point of contact (IPC) were both engine propeller assemblies located about 15 feet to the south of the main wreckage. The distance between the two propeller assemblies was 12 feet. According to the airplane manufacturer, the distance between the two propeller assemblies was dimensionally similar to their relative positions on the airplane. The crankshafts of both engines were fractured between the nose case and the propeller flange displaying angular granular fracture surfaces that were smeared and exhibited a blue discoloration. Both sets of propeller blades and propeller flanges remained attached to their respective propeller hubs, and were buried about 1-foot in the ground. The tips of the propeller blades were not buried and visible. Both the left and right propeller blades exhibited S-bending, and leading edge gouging with chordwise scratching.

The seatbelt webbings were thermally consumed in the post-impact fire. The buckles remained connected; however, a determination could not be made as to where the associated seats the buckles came from. The fuel selectors were thermally consumed.

MEDICAL AND PATHOLOGICAL INFORMATION

The Los Angeles County Coroner conducted an autopsy on the pilot on August 5, 2002. The FAA Toxicology and Accident Research Laboratory, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, performed a toxicological analysis from samples obtained during the autopsy. The results of the analysis of the specimens were negative for carbon monoxide, cyanide, and volatiles.

The report contained the following positive results under the tested drugs section; atenolol was present in the urine.

TESTS AND RESEARCH

Both engines were transported to Teledyne Continental Motors, Mobile, Alabama. It was noted that both engines sustained extensive thermal damage. Both engine teardowns were completed on April 23, 2003, under the supervision of a Safety Board investigator. No discrepancies were noted with either engine that would have prevented normal operation and production of rated horsepower. Continuity was visually established via each engine's gear trains.

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

The IIC released the wreckage to the owner's representative.

NTSB Probable Cause

the pilot's misjudged distance and speed during the landing approach, which resulted in an overrun of the runway. Also causal was the pilot's failure to conduct a go-around during the approach, or abort the landing when an overrun became obvious.