NTSB Factual Report

HISTORY OF FLIGHT

On July 3, 2007, about 0606 Pacific daylight time, a Beech E90, N47LC, collided with power lines during takeoff from McClellan/Palomar Airport, Carlsbad, California. Southwest Consulting Group, Inc., was operating the airplane under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 91. The private pilot and the private pilot rated passenger were killed; the airplane was destroyed. The cross-country personal flight was departing Carlsbad with a planned destination of Tucson, Arizona. Instrument meteorological conditions prevailed, and an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan had been filed.

Investigators identified no witness at the airport that observed the takeoff or collision with the wires. A groundskeeper at a golf course under construction off the end of the runway heard the airplane, and observed a fireball as it collided with the wires. The airplane scattered debris as it traveled up a fairway, and sprayed the groundskeeper with what he believed was fuel.

PERSONNEL INFORMATION

A review of Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) airman records revealed that the 57-year-old pilot held a private pilot certificate with ratings for airplane single-engine land, multiengine land, and instrument airplane.

The pilot had a third-class medical certificate issued on November 4, 2004. It had no limitations or waivers.

An examination of the pilot's logbook indicated that the pilot had a total flight time of 1,177 hours as of June 21, 2007. He logged 30 hours in the last 90 days, and 3 in the last 30 days. He had an estimated 286 hours in this make and model. He completed a multiengine check ride on October 8, 2005. The logbook indicated that the pilot had a total instrument flight time of 268 hours as of June 21, 2007. In the 90 prior days he had flown 11 hours in actual instrument conditions and logged 20 insturment approaches

AIRCRAFT INFORMATION

The airplane was a Beech E90, serial number LW-64. A review of the airframe logbooks revealed a total airframe time of 9,032.2 hours at the completion of a phase 1 inspection on August 15, 2006.

The engines were on a Condition Monitoring Engine Maintenance Program in accordance with the "Maintenance on Reliable Engines (M.O.R.E) Program for Pratt & Whitney PT6A-28 engines."

The left engine was a Pratt & Whitney Canada PT-6A-28, serial number PCE-50496. Total time recorded on the engine at the last Phase 1 inspection was 8,972.8 hours and 8,973 cycles.

The right engine was a Pratt & Whitney Canada PT-6A-28, serial number PCE-52497. Total time recorded on the engine at the last Phase 1 inspection was 8,972.8 hours and 8,973 cycles.

METEOROLOGICAL CONDITIONS

An aviation routine weather report (METAR) for Palomar (KCRQ) was issued at 0553 PDT. It stated: winds calm; visibility 1/4 mile, fog; skies 100 feet obscured; temperature 17/63 degrees Celsius/Fahrenheit; dew point 17/63 degrees Celsius/Fahrenheit; altimeter 29.93 inches of mercury. The elevation of the weather observation station was 331 feet msl.

AIRPORT INFORMATION

The Airport/ Facility Directory, Southwest U. S., indicated that Palomar runway 24 was 4,897 feet long and 150 feet wide. The runway surface was asphalt.

WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATION

The airport was on a plateau, and the surrounding terrain was lower than the runway. After departing runway 24, the airplane collided with the top line of a telephone line. The first identified point of contact (FIPC) was downed power lines an estimated 2,500 feet from the departure end of the runway. The airport elevation was 331 feet; the estimated elevation of the line was 245 feet. The debris path was along a magnetic bearing of 270 degrees.

The airplane traveled another 50 feet before colliding with the bottom two lines on a transmission tower. The tower sustained damage to several support beams and cross members. A piece of the right wing was immediately in front of the tower; the right aileron with a section of aileron and the bellcrank remained impaled on the tower about 30 feet up.

San Diego Gas & Electric reported that the lines were 230,0000 volt lines that were 1 1/4 inch in diameter. The power lines were about 40 feet above ground level (agl).

The airplane came to rest about 300 yards from the transmission tower with the two transmission lines wrapped around the propeller blades of both engines. The wires were continuous to the wreckage. The exhaust stack of the left engine exhibited electrical arching. The orientation of the fuselage was 180 degrees.

The main wreckage consisted of the fuselage, vertical stabilizer and rudder, and the left horizontal stabilizer and left elevator.

Except for the floor, fire consumed the cabin structure from the aft end of the pressure bulkhead to the nose, and the left and right wing sections from the nacelles inboard.

MEDICAL AND PATHOLOGICAL INFORMATION

The San Diego County Coroner completed an autopsy on the pilot. The report noted that there were sharp and blunt force injuries consistent with an occupant of a mishap aircraft, who was facing forward, seated, and restrained. There were also extensive thermal injuries. The Coroner listed the cause of death as multiple sharp and blunt force injuries due to an aircraft mishap, and the manner of death was an accident; a contributing factor was thermal injuries with carbonization. The coroner’s toxicology report contained no findings for alcohol and tested drugs; they did not have a suitable specimen to test for carbon monoxide.

TESTS AND RESEARCH

Investigators examined the wreckage at Aircraft Recovery Service, Pearblossom, California, July 12, 2007.

Engines

The engine manufacturer submitted a written report, which is part of the public docket, regarding examination of the engines. The report noted that both left and right engines displayed contact signatures to their internal components that were characteristic of the engines producing power at the time of impact. The engines’ housings displayed relatively little impact deformation, limiting the severity of the contact signatures, and precluded definitive assessment of the power level at the start of the impact sequence. There were no indications of any pre-impact mechanical anomalies or dysfunction to any of the components.

Airframe

Post accident examination revealed that the left outboard flap actuator measured 3 inches, which the airframe manufacturer’s investigator said equated to 12 degrees down. None of the other actuators were identifiable. The left elevator trim actuator measured 1-3/16 inches, which equated to neutral. The left aileron actuator measured 1.5 inches, which equated to 12 degrees tab (left wing) up. The rudder trim actuator extended about 9 inches, which equated to 4 degrees tab left. The fuel selector valves were not identifiable.

The rudder, left horizontal stabilizer, and left elevator remained together. Investigators established control continuity for the rudder from the control surface to the front floor area.

Investigators established control continuity for the left elevator from the control surface to the bellcrank. The right horizontal stabilizer and elevator separated at the root. The fracture surfaces were angular and irregular. The left elevator separated from the stabilizer and fuselage into two pieces. The separation point was just outboard of the inboard hinge; it separated along an angular and jagged path. It was inverted on top of the inboard right wing section; it was fused to the wing piece by globs of molten metal that were beneath the position of the lead counterweight, which was not identifiable. Investigators established continuity for the down elevator cable from the bellcrank to the front floor area. The up elevator cable separated at the pulley aft of the pressure bulkhead. The aft end cable necked down at the separation point. Investigators traced the other end of the cable from forward of the pulley to the crushed front floor area.

Investigators established control continuity for the left aileron forward cable to the mid cabin area where the cable separated in a broomstraw pattern. They established continuity for the aft cable to the right side of the fuselage where the cable separated in a broomstraw pattern. A portion of the right aileron, its bellcrank, and wing piece were about 30 feet up in the transmission cable support tower. The aileron was connected to the bellcrank. Both control cables remained connected to the bellcrank. Both cables separated in a broomstraw pattern about 4 feet from the bellcrank. The center cabin area sustained severe thermal damage, and investigators could not identify the center bellcrank and cables that went forward to the pedestal.

The control column central post and left and right branches separated as a unit. The operating chains were around the gears, but all connectors separated at the turnbuckles with molten metal remnants on the turnbuckles.

The pitot tubes were clear. The left pitot tube was in the debris field; the right pitot tube was near the main wreckage.

The fuel selector valves were not identifiable.

The airframe manufacturer’s representative measured the left main gear actuator at 22 inches, the right main gear actuator at 9.5 inches, and the nose gear actuator at 3-4 inches.

NTSB Probable Cause

The pilot's failure to maintain clearance from wires during an instrument takeoff attempt. Contributing to the accident were fog, reduced visibility, and the low ceiling.