NTSB Factual Report

HISTORY OF FLIGHT

On April 9, 2000, at 0715 hours Pacific daylight time, a Fouga 6 CM 170, N495F, was destroyed when the aircraft impacted terrain in an open, level pasture, 3 miles north of San Joaquin, California. No flight plan was filed and visual meteorological conditions prevailed. The personal flight was operated by the owner under 14 CFR Part 91. The commercial certificated pilot and the student certificated second pilot were fatally injured. The aircraft departed from Fresno-Chandler Downtown Airport, Fresno, California, at 0700.

A witness, who observed the aircraft from about 1 mile north of the accident site, said his attention was attracted to the aircraft because the sun angle was low and the airplane was "shiny like a mirror." From his position he was looking up at a 45-degree angle. As he watched, the airplane performed two complete loops, then one horizontal roll, and then another roll while coming toward him from south to north. As the plane was just coming out of the second roll he thought "something happened" because the airplane entered a spin and fell "like a piece of paper" to the ground. This witness said the engine noise was "real loud, roaring like a rocket" as the aircraft spun to the ground. He thought the aircraft was going almost straight down during the spin.

Another witness was standing in the front yard of his home about 1/4-mile southeast of the accident site. The sun had risen but was low in the east. The sky was clear and the visibility was good. As he looked to the northwest his attention was attracted to the aircraft because it "glistened" high in the sky. He estimated that the aircraft was about 2,000 feet agl going straight down and rolling to the left. The engine noise was "screaming," and he estimated the aircraft continued that way for 10 seconds. Then the roll stopped and the nose of the plane started to level. The witness thought the pilot would "swoop on out." The airplane continued to level for about 5 seconds; however, during this time the engine noise was quiet. The aircraft then rolled abruptly to the right, opposite the previous direction of roll, the nose dropped, and the airplane completed two rolls to the right before impacting the ground. During the two rolls, the flight path angle was about 45 degrees down and the aircraft was traveling in a northerly direction. The engine noise was quiet.

A third witness, who observed the accident from about 1/2 mile east of the accident site, said his attention was attracted to the airplane by the loud engine roar that he compared to the reverse thrust roar jet airplanes make after landing. When he first saw it, the airplane was about 2,000 feet and spiraled down to about 200 feet, where he thought the pilot was "pulling out," and then the airplane spun again to the ground. When he first saw the airplane he thought it was diving nose first, straight down, and then changed to a nose low, upright attitude. At 200 feet the turning stopped, the nose came up, then the nose dropped, and the aircraft spun to the ground.

The second pilot's fiancee said that he was learning to fly and he was very excited about it. She was excited for him. She said that he had met the pilot at the Chandler airport about 1 week before the accident. He again talked with the pilot the evening before the accident (Saturday evening, April 8, 2000), and arranged to go for a flight in the Fouga the following morning. She said that he told her that night that they were going out to perform "maneuvers, top gun type of stuff." He was to pay the cost of gas and they went that evening and he drew out $800 cash because "that's how much it's going to be." He had the $800 in cash with him when he left her the morning of the accident.

PERSONNEL INFORMATION

The pilot had been a U.S. Army Warrant Officer who flew helicopter and fixed-wing utility aircraft. He was discharged in October 1999. No pilot logbook was located following the accident, and the hours shown in the Pilot Flight Time Matrix are from U.S. Army records. The requirements for issuance of the pilot's commercial pilot certificate and his biennial flight review were met on the basis of military competency.

The pilot was trained in the Fouga on February 25 and 26, 2000, in about 6 hours of flying. The instructor pilot said the pilot was well qualified, flew the plane well, and seemed to be safety conscious. The instructor said that the pilot had owned the aircraft for about a year and followed it through rebuilding and repainting. He had previously taxied the aircraft and knew the systems. The instructor issued a letter to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) on March 8, 2000, recommending the pilot be issued a Letter of Authority subject to no aerobatics and no formation flying being approved because they had not trained in either. At the pilot's suggestion, they did not train in aerobatics. The pilot told the instructor that he would fly the plane and get used to it, and then they would get together again in April (2000) and train in aerobatics.

The instructor pilot said the checkout was "basic day, VFR." They performed stalls, steep turns, and recovery from unusual attitudes (visually), including vertical diving flight. They performed a lot of takeoff and landing (pattern) work because the pilot was aware of the relatively short runway at Chandler airport where he intended to base the aircraft. The pattern work included no flap landings and several simulated flame out landings. They also performed single engine approaches, single engine go-arounds, and engine failures on takeoff. They performed one takeoff and two landings at Chandler airport while delivering the aircraft there.

A Letter of Authority to operate the Fouga 6 CM 170 was issued to the pilot by the FAA's Fresno Flight Standards District Office on March 17, 2000. The Letter prohibited the pilot from flying in formation flight or performing aerobatics in airshows.

AIRCRAFT INFORMATION

The Fouga 6 CM 170, called the "Magister," is a French-built military training aircraft with seating for two pilots in tandem cockpits. The twin jet-engine aircraft has been surplused by the French government, and some of the airplanes have been imported into the United States where they are privately owned and operated in the "Experimental" airworthiness category.

Experimental category Operating Limitations were issued to the pilot/owner by the FAA's Riverside (California) Flight Standards District Office (FSDO) pertaining to operation of the aircraft while based at the Chino Airport in Southern California (attached). The limitations required that, if the aircraft's base of operation was changed, the new area FSDO be notified and new Operating Limitations be issued. According to inspectors from the Fresno FSDO, the pilot had contacted them regarding obtaining revised Operating Limitations for operation of the aircraft while based at Fresno-Chandler, however, the revised limitations had not been issued.

The instructor pilot who trained the pilot in the airplane said it was mechanically sound and "one of the best running Fouga's I've flown." There were no parachutes in the airplane and the type aircraft never had ejection seats.

The instructor said the Fouga is a very benign handling aircraft. Because the aircraft is centerline thrust, engine failures are easy to handle. The aircraft stalls gently, with natural (aerodynamic) buffet, and has no inherent tendency to spin. It does not have any stall warning system. When it is intentionally spun, it recovers "more easily than a Cessna 150." The spin recovery procedure is to idle the engines, stop the turn with opposite rudder, and release the back pressure. The spin stops and the aircraft recovers in 1/4 turn. However, he added, the aircraft spins in a fairly nose low attitude (about 45 degrees), rotates about 3 or 4 seconds per revolution and loses altitude quickly. With the nose low, after recovery, the aircraft accelerates quickly. One engine inoperative spins and spin recovery are no different. The instructor added that there is a flight manual requirement for intentional spins that the tip tanks be empty. According to the instructor pilot, if the accident occurred 15 or 20 minutes after takeoff from Chandler and the aircraft departed fueled to capacity, the tip tanks would have still been approximately 1/2 full. This would have made it more difficult for the pilot to stop the rotation of the spin prior to recovery.

A mechanic, who assisted with the ground power unit during engine start, was not aware of the fuel load aboard the aircraft at departure; however, according to an airport facility directory, no jet aircraft fuel is available at Chandler airport.

WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATION

The accident site was in an open, level, and sparsely vegetated pasture in the west-central San Joaquin valley about 3 nautical miles north of the town of San Joaquin. The location was about 300 yards northeast of the intersection where Placer Road (north-south) turns northeast across the Fresno slough and becomes American Avenue (east-west). The latitude was 36 degrees 39.22 minutes north and the longitude was 120 degrees 10.32 minutes west (GPS). The elevation was approximately 170 feet msl. Within 3 miles is level agricultural land.

All of the aircraft was present at the accident site and there was a postcrash fire. The wreckage was distributed in a south-to-north direction over about 120 feet with some small debris as far as 300 feet. There was an irregularly shaped area of fire-damaged grass from the southern end of the debris field fanning out to the north over about 80 feet.

At the southern end of the debris area was a hole about 6 feet in diameter and 1 foot deep containing the (fire damaged) nose wheel assembly and components identifiable with the nose and cockpit area of the aircraft. Extending to the right (east) from the hole was a fresh mark on the surface which corresponded dimensionally approximately to the thickness and span of the wing, and which had a circular mark about 1 foot in diameter at the east end. To the southwest of the hole about 10 feet was a section of the canopy rail, and there were many pieces of Plexiglas, typically 6 inches in size, within 100 feet. The right inboard flap was 75 feet southwest of the hole.

About 10 feet north of the hole, and 5 feet to the left, was additional cockpit debris, principally wiring, control linkages, and instrument and avionics chasses. To the right, about 10 feet, were another canopy rail and the left, outboard flap. The instruments and flight control linkages were destroyed.

About 35 feet north along the debris path was the wing assembly, upright, pointing east. The spoilers were deployed about 1 inch and the landing gear was retracted. Only the right, outboard flap remained attached to the trailing edge. The wings inboard of the flap-aileron juncture remained attached to the center section. Both outboard wing panels were severed at the flap-aileron juncture. The outboard section of the right wing was lying on the ground, upright, behind the inboard right wing. The tip tank exhibited crushing damage oriented 90 degrees to its longitudinal axis, over about 75 percent of its length. The outboard section of the left wing remained attached to the inboard section by elements of the structure; however, the tip section was inverted with the leading edge pointing aft (west). The left tip tank was separated and was located about 95 feet along the wreckage path. The entire right wing leading edge, the wing center section, and the inboard section of the left wing exhibited crushing damage aft to the front wing spar. The left outboard wing, although damaged along the leading edge, did not exhibit similar crushing damage.

At 60 feet along the wreckage path was the fuselage aft of the engine compartment and the empennage control surfaces with the number 2 engine attached by wiring and control linkages. At 80 feet along the wreckage path, and 10 feet to the left, was the right aileron, while 10 feet to the right of center was the number 1 engine. Both engine tailpipes were bent upward about 30 degrees.

At 95 feet along the wreckage path and 25 feet to the right of center was the left tip tank. When viewed lengthwise from above (filler cap up), the forward one-third of the tank exhibited crushing damage from the left front along a 45-degree plane.

At 100 feet along the wreckage path, and 10 and 30 feet to the right of center respectively, were the left aileron and the left inboard flap. At 120 feet, and 10 feet to the right of center, was a hydraulic pump broken from the nose of the number 1 engine. Beyond 120 feet as far as 300 feet was miscellaneous small debris in a fan-shaped pattern.

The accessory case and compressor housing were broken from the number 1 engine. Two blades of the axial compressor were bent over. The tips of the remaining compressor blades and the circumference of the centrifugal compressor did not exhibit rotational scoring. The inlet of the number 2 engine was partially obstructed by deformed material, and only about 5 blades of the axial compressor were visible. The visible blades did not exhibit tip damage.

Flight control continuity was destroyed except at the empennage control surface where the flight controls were continuous. The engine and other cockpit control linkages were destroyed.

MEDICAL AND PATHOLOGICAL INFORMATION

Toxicological analyses were performed by the FAA's Civil Aeromedical Institute, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. Autopsies were performed by the Fresno County (California) Coroner's Office, cases 00-04-020 and 00-04-021.

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

The aircraft wreckage was released to Mr. Rob Cheek, insurance adjustor for Universal Loss Management, on April 26, 2000.

NTSB Probable Cause

The pilot's intentional performance of aerobatic maneuvers that resulted in the aircraft stalling and entering a spin from which he did not recover. A factor in the accident was the pilot's lack of experience in the aircraft.