NTSB Factual Report

HISTORY OF FLIGHT

On June 14, 2001, at 0923 Pacific daylight time, a Piper PA-46-350P, N70SL, experienced a loss of engine power while on final approach for runway 29R at the Stockton Metropolitan Airport (SCK), Stockton, California. The airplane was destroyed after it collided with an airport perimeter fence during an attempted forced landing. The pilot/owner was operating the airplane under the provisions of 14 CFR Part 91. The certified flight instructor (CFI) and the private pilot were not injured. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed for the local area instructional flight, and no flight plan had been filed. The airplane was landing at the time of the accident.

According to the CFI's written statement to the Safety Board, they started flying at 0919 the morning of the accident. The first maneuver of the day was a short field takeoff and return for landing. They noted no discrepancies during that portion of the flight. Before starting the next maneuver, he reviewed the maneuver and sequence of events with the pilot prior to contacting SCK tower. When they contacted SCK tower, they requested a simulated engine failure on climb out with a planned return to runway 11L. The tower cleared them for the maneuver and they took off.

The CFI stated that as they began the right crosswind turn at 700 feet above ground level (agl), he made the first power reduction from 42 inches of manifold pressure (MAP) to 35 inches MAP. He continued to reduce the power to simulate the engine failure, as the pilot flew the airplane back to the runway. The CFI stated that the "engine appeared to [windmill] normally." During the approach he noted a work crew and vehicle at the blast fence. The CFI instructed the student to select [landing] gear and flaps as needed for landing. The student selected 10vdegrees of flaps down, and extended the landing gear.

On short final, 400 feet above ground level (agl), the CFI advised the student that the sink rate would not allow them to cross over the concrete blast fence. Both pilot's agreed to "power up" the engine and go around to try the maneuver again.

The CFI stated that he guarded both the flight controls and engine control levers. He placed his hand over the students' hand to advance the throttle to the full forward position. At this point there was no corresponding response from the engine. He informed the student that they would have to continue with the glide to avoid a "stall / spin event." The CFI guarded the yoke with his right hand, and the engine control levers with his left. He scanned the appropriate switches, levers, circuit breakers, and the fuel selector position to verify that they were in the correct position. Everything appeared to be set correctly.

The CFI and student maneuvered the airplane to avoid the blast fence and work crew, choosing an open space between the Instrument Landing System (ILS) antenna and blast fence. The CFI stated that they did not retract the landing gear and flaps, as they were concerned with a further loss of altitude.

During the descent the left wing struck a light standard pole and the airplane yawed to the left at a 45-degree angle over a road. The CFI stated that the airplane came to rest inverted.

According to the private pilot, he began his recurrent training with the CFI on June 12, 2001. His insurance provider required the recurrent training. On June 12th, they did ground work that consisted of airplane systems and procedures, and practiced instrument flight rules (IFR) flight, as well as normal procedures. He resumed training on June 14th. Prior to leaving his home base of Hayward, he refueled the airplane with 100 gallons of fuel (50 gallons per side).

On the day of the accident they reviewed some ground material, and discussed the maneuvers that they were going to do that day. Prior to doing the simulated engine out, they discussed the maneuver. The student stated that the CFI would be responsible for the throttles during the maneuver.

The crew noted no discrepancies with the takeoff or the initiation of the maneuver. At 400 feet agl the student lowered the landing gear. He and the CFI discussed the rate of descent and decided that they would not be able to make the runway. They decided to go around and try the maneuver again. The student stated that they both went to apply power, but there was no response. He continued flying the airplane as the CFI continued to instruct. He verified that the fuel boost pump was in the on position, and the airplane continued to descend.

After the airplane came to rest, the student noted a hydraulic leak. He turned off the battery, alternator, and magnetos.

According to the San Joaquin County Airport Police incident report, the left wing struck a 14-foot-high street light at the 8-foot mark.

PERSONNEL INFORMATION

A review of Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) airman records revealed that the CFI held a commercial certificate with ratings for airplane single engine land, multiengine land, and instrument airplane. The CFI also held a certified flight instructor certificate with ratings for airplane single engine land, multiengine land, and instrument airplane. The CFI held a second-class medical certificate that was issued on April 4, 2001. It had a limitation that the pilot must have available glasses for near vision. His medical also contained a waiver for color.

The CFI submitted a Pilot/Operator Aircraft Accident Report (NTSB form 6120.1/2). He indicated an estimated total flight time of 8,927 hours. He logged 163 hours in the last 90 days, and 42 hours in the last 30 days. He had an estimated 598 hours in this make and model, with 92 hours in the last 90 days, and 23 hours in the last 30 days.

A review of FAA airman records revealed that the owner/pilot held a private pilot certificate with ratings for airplane single engine land and instrument airplane. He held a second-class medical certificate that was issued on November 29, 1999. It had no limitations or waivers.

The private pilot submitted a Pilot/Operator Aircraft Accident Report (NTSB form 6120.1/2). He indicated an estimated total flight time of 746 hours. He logged 33 hours in the last 90 days, and 14.8 hours in the last 30 days. He had an estimated 156 hours in this make and model.

AIRCRAFT INFORMATION

The airplane was a Piper PA-46-350P, serial number 4622084. A review of the airplane's logbooks revealed a total airframe time of 1,588.1 hours at the last annual inspection. An annual inspection was completed on January 5, 2001. On February 23, 2001, maintenance technicians performed routine maintenance to replace the engine driven fuel pump in accordance with Textron Lycoming Airworthiness Directive 98-18-12. They performed an operational check of the fuel boost pump system and fuel selector valve in accordance with the maintenance manual Chapter 28-00-00, with no defects or malfunctions noted. Total airframe time at that inspection was 1,624.6 hours.

The airplane had a Textron Lycoming TIO-540-AE2A engine, serial number L-9060-61A, installed. Total time on the engine at the last annual inspection was 763.5 hours since major overhaul, and zero hours since top overhaul.

TESTS AND RESEARCH

Investigators examined the airframe and power plant at Plain Parts, Sacramento, California, on June 26, 2001. The New Piper Aircraft Company and Textron Lycoming were parties to the investigation.

Investigators completed an external examination of the airframe with no discrepancies noted. The left wing separated outboard of wing root area. There was a semicircular impression dimensionally similar to the light pole. The right wing separated from the fuselage at the wing root. The vertical stabilizer and rudder remained attached to the fuselage. The nose section partially separated from the fuselage. Investigators functionally tested both fuel boost pumps and encountered no mechanical anomalies.

Investigators conducted an external examination of the engine. They removed the engine. All fuel lines and fittings were secure at their respective locations on the engine. Fuel was in the fuel lines during their removal from the engine. They established throttle control and mixture control continuity from the cockpit controls to the respective components on the engine. The engine was sent back to Textron Lycoming, Williamsport, Pennsylvania, after investigators determined that an engine run could be conducted.

Textron Lycoming conducted an engine run at their facilities on September 20, 2001. Technicians removed the top spark plugs, which were clean with no mechanical deformation. The spark plug electrodes were gray in color, which corresponded to normal operation according to the Champion Aviation Check-A-Plug AV-27 Chart. A borescope inspection revealed no mechanical deformation on the valves, cylinder walls, or internal cylinder head.

The crankshaft flange was bent rearward. In order to install the club propeller for the test run, Lycoming personnel straightened the crankshaft with the use of heat. Technicians established mechanical continuity throughout the engine. Crankshaft rotation produced thumb compression in each cylinder, with accessory gear and valve train continuity established. They removed the oil suction screen, and it was clear of debris.

The technicians installed the engine onto the test stand. The engine started with no problems and they ran it for 44 minutes at various test points. The engine was unable to maintain a post-impact idle setting; however, they conducted an acceleration response test by manually establishing an idle at 450 rpm with the throttle. Technicians rapidly advanced the throttle to the full open position, and the engine accelerated with no hesitation. A second acceleration response test produced the same results. According to Textron Lycoming there were no discrepancies that would have precluded the engine from being capable of producing power.

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

The IIC released the wreckage to the owner's representative.

NTSB Probable Cause

a loss of engine power for undetermined reasons. Also causal was the inadequate supervision of the flight by the CFI for allowing a simulated emergency maneuver to continue below an altitude which would not allow for recovery contingencies.