NTSB Factual Report

HISTORY OF FLIGHT

On July 7, 2011, about 1928 Pacific daylight time, a Mooney M-20F, N7759M, was substantially damaged when it impacted a parking lot and a building shortly after takeoff from Watsonville Municipal Airport (WVI), Watsonville, California. The private pilot and the three passengers were fatally injured. The personal flight was operated under the provisions of Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed, and no flight plan was filed for the flight.

The airplane was co-owned by the pilot and another individual. According to the co-owner, the airplane was based at WVI. Relatives reported that the pilot, his wife, and their two children planned to travel to Groveland, California, for the weekend. Lockheed Martin Flight Services (LMFS) information indicated that the pilot contacted LMFS by telephone about 1023 on the day of the accident, and again about 1417, to obtain weather briefings. The pilot informed the LMFS representative that his intended destination was Pine Mountain Lake Airport (E45), Groveland.

According to multiple information sources, a fog bank/stratus layer that moved inland (towards the airport) from the Pacific Ocean, and was typical for that locale during that time of year, was located just southwest of the airport at the time of the takeoff. That cloud phenomenon was often referred to as the "marine layer." According to information provided by several eyewitnesses, the airplane departed from WVI runway 20. One pilot witness reported that the airplane climb path was shallow, and that the airplane would not clear the stratus layer. Two other witnesses, one of whom was a pilot, in two other separate locations, reported that the climb angle after takeoff appeared "steep." Both observed the airplane commence a very rapid left roll when it was approximately 500 feet above the departure end of runway 20. The airplane appeared to roll until it was "nearly inverted," and the nose "dropped," so that it was pointing towards the ground. It descended rapidly, and completed about two "tight turns" or "spirals" before it appeared to begin to recover, and then disappeared behind trees. Both witnesses observed fire and smoke immediately thereafter.

Ground scars indicated that the airplane first impacted a parking lot about 700 feet southeast of the departure end of runway 20, traveled about 130 feet east-southeast, and struck the building. Parallel slash marks in the pavement were consistent with propeller strikes from an engine that was developing power. The airplane structure was severely deformed by the impact, and portions were consumed by post impact fire.

PERSONNEL INFORMATION

According to Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) records, the pilot was issued his private pilot certificate, with an airplane single engine land rating, on March 17, 2011. His most recent FAA third-class medical certificate was issued in July 2010.

The pilot did not pass his first private pilot practical examination on February 11, 2011, at which time he had a total flight experience of 57.4 hours. He also did not pass his second private pilot practical examination on March 1, 2011, at which time he had a total flight experience of 69.0 hours. One of the segments on the second examination that the pilot's performance was determined to be unsatisfactory was "Performance Maneuver - Steep Turns." However, he was retested on that and other aspects on March 17, and his performance was satisfactory, in compliance with applicable FAA requirements.

The pilot's original flight logbook was not located. The airplane co-owner provided copies of some pages of the pilot's logbook that he had obtained previously; the most recent entry in those copies was dated April 24, 2011. According to those records, as of that date, the pilot had accrued a total of 151.5 hours of flight experience. Based on the available records, it appeared that the pilot had accrued all but about 15 hours of his experience in the accident airplane.

AIRCRAFT INFORMATION

According to FAA information, the airplane was manufactured in 1974, and was equipped with a Lycoming IO-360 series engine and a McCauley 3-blade propeller. The airplane was first registered to the pilot and co-owner on November 24, 2010.

The most recent annual inspection was completed in August 2010. At that time, the engine/airframe had a total of 3,902.0 hours, and the engine had 303.4 hours since major overhaul.

According to the co-owner, on an unspecified date before April 2011, one of the main landing gear doors was damaged while the pilot was taxiing the airplane on an unspecified taxiway at WVI. That door was subsequently repaired. On April 6, 2011, two main landing gear doors were damaged when the pilot landed on an unprepared strip in Mexico. Those two doors and two other main landing gear doors were removed at some point thereafter, and had not been repaired or reinstalled at the time of the accident. No record of the removal was located in the maintenance records. The co-owner reported that there "was never any noticeable flight performance deterioration due to the removal of the doors."

METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATION

Pilot Weather Briefings

According to information and recordings provided by LMFS, on the day of the accident, the pilot called LMFS on two separate occasions to obtain weather information. During the pilot's first call at 1023, he stated that he planned to fly VFR (visual flight rules) from WVI to E45, and had a planned departure time of 1800, which was nearly 1 1/2 hours earlier than his actual departure time. The LMFS briefer informed the pilot that there was an AIRMET for IFR (instrument flight rules) conditions (specifically low ceilings) along the coast that was valid until 2000, and that VFR from the departure airport was not recommended. The briefer told the pilot that there were currently ceilings "as low as 400 feet in the surrounding area." However, the briefer noted that 2000 was "a long way out" from the current time, that the forecast conditions might not occur, and that the forecast update cycle provided for one more update prior to the pilot's planned departure time.

The pilot's second call to LMFS at 1417 was initially for an "abbreviated briefing." He again indicated that he was planning an 1800 departure. The previous weather forecast had been revised, and the new forecast called for scattered clouds at 1,000 feet, with the marine layer moving inland about 2100. This briefer noted that there was a "very strong marine layer along the coast," that the "immediate coast was socked in" from about 120 miles north to 100 miles south of WVI, and advised the pilot to "check back in right before you go." The pilot then asked about the forecast for a departure the next morning (Saturday), and was informed that the marine layer was expected to affect WVI until at least 1100.

Meteorological Detection Equipment and Observations

WVI was equipped with a segmented circle, a wind sock, and an automated surface observation system (ASOS). The segmented circle/wind sock was situated about 500 feet southwest of the intersection of the two runways. The ASOS sensors were located about 200 feet west of the north end of the paved surface of runway 2, near the northern boundary of the airport.

According to the National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration web site, the ASOS system detects significant meteorological changes, disseminating hourly and special observations via predetermined networks. ASOS routinely and automatically provides computer-generated voice observations directly to aircraft in the vicinity of airports, which is also available via a telephone and data links. ASOS transmits a special report when conditions exceed preselected weather element thresholds.

The WVI ASOS included detection and recording of such parameters as sky condition (cloud height and amount) up to 12,000 feet, visibility, and obstructions to vision such as fog and haze.

The ASOS ceilometer was a Vaisala Model CT12K, which utilized laser transmission and reflection to determine cloud height. The ceilometer beam width is confined to a divergence of ± 2.5 milliradians, so that at 12,000 feet the beam’s sample area is a circle with a diameter of 60 feet. The ceilometer beam is aimed perpendicular to the local horizontal (i.e., 'straight up'), and does not pivot or sweep. Processing algorithms are used to determine cloud coverage quantifications such as few, scattered, etc.

The WVI 1853 (35 minutes before the accident) ASOS observation included winds from 190 degrees at 6 knots; visibility 10 miles, clear skies; temperature 14 degrees C; dew point 12 degrees C; and an altimeter setting of 29.91 inches of mercury.

The WVI 1953 (25 minutes after the accident) ASOS observation included winds from 200 degrees at 4 knots; visibility 10 miles, clear skies; temperature 16 degrees C; dew point 12 degrees C; and an altimeter setting of 29.91 inches of mercury.

Eyewitness Reports

Multiple witnesses reported that the layer of stratus clouds that was typical for the region during that time of year was present just southwest of the airport. One witness, who was a pilot, and who was leaving the airport at the time of the accident, reported that the boundary of the stratus layer appeared to be coincident with California Highway 1, which ran perpendicular to runway 2/20, just west southwest of the departure end of runway 20.

Photographic Evidence

Photographs taken by first responders in the period between 20 and 26 minutes after the accident show the stratus layer to the south and east of the accident site. Although a qualitative assessment only, the stratus layer appears to be quite close to the accident site.

Airport Manager Information

The airport manager, who was also a certificated flight instructor (CFI), described the WVI weather conditions as follows:

"Standard Central Coast [weather]; characterized from May to September with coastal stratus in the morning, clearing by noon with the potential to roll back in during early evening or on occasion remain clear till late evening, then slowly building up."

He also noted that the local WVI "pilot community is aware of these conditions and the departure/arrival options if you are VFR only…. CFIs take great pains in flying with students during this time to reinforce that the fog is insidious and deceptive." He also noted the importance for local pilots to obtain and understand temperature/dew point spread, cloud clearance, and cross-wind runway information.

Refer to the docket associated with this accident for additional meteorological information.

AIRPORT INFORMATION

WVI was a non-towered airport situated about 2 miles northwest of Watsonville, and about 3 miles east-northeast of the Pacific Ocean. Airport elevation was 163 feet above mean sea level (msl). WVI was equipped with two paved runways, designated as 2/20 and 8/26. Runway 2/20 measured 4,501 feet by 150 feet, while runway 8/26 measured 3,999 feet by 100 feet. The full length of each could be used for takeoff.

Runway 2/20 was oriented approximately perpendicular to the local shoreline, and therefore aligned approximately towards the source of the stratus layer. All runways were designated as left traffic, and runway 20 was designated as the "preferred calm wind runway" in the noise abatement guidance published by the airport. The guidance also stated "no turns before crossing the freeway" [California highway 1] for departures from runway 20. Highway 1 was located about 1/4 mile beyond (west-southwest) the departure end of runway 20; the accident site was approximately abeam the departure end of runway 20. The guidance prohibited departure turns below 900 feet above ground level (agl), and advised pilots that "Safety always supersedes noise abatement procedures."

According to one witness, a Piper Archer had departed runway 20 just prior to the accident airplane, but the investigation was unable to determine whether any other aircraft departed or arrived in the period surrounding the accident time.

According to the airport manager, some pilots avoid using runway 8 due to the deteriorated condition of the taxiway normally used to access it. The investigation was unable to determine whether the previous landing gear door damage incurred by the accident pilot during taxi occurred on this taxiway, or elsewhere on WVI. In July 2013, the manager reported that an approximate 8-year effort to obtain required approvals to repair the taxiway had recently been successful, and that the repair project was moving ahead. That recent approval was not related to, or influenced by, the accident.

The airport manager noted that due to an attempt by the City of Watsonville to close runway 8/26, the pilots increased its utilization, particularly when the fog/stratus layer was approaching the airport. He also noted that "recently" (prior to the accident) although runway 8/26 is designated as left traffic, the "fog was forcing a right pattern."

WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATION

The airplane impacted a parking lot and then a building of an annex of Watsonville Community Hospital. The initial impact location was 677 feet, on a true bearing of 131 degrees, from the center of the departure end of runway 20. The initial impact point was about 130 feet from the building, and the building impact point was on a bearing of 113 degrees true from the initial impact point. Ground scars were consistent with the airplane striking the parking lot in a relatively level, upright attitude. Pavement scars and markings were consistent with the main landing gear being in the retracted position at ground impact, and the engine developing significant power.

A fire erupted after impact, and damaged or consumed portions of the airplane, which remained partially embedded in the building.

The engine mount, cowl, and propeller were severely disrupted by the impact. The engine was essentially intact, but had sustained crush damage in the aft and up directions. Several engine accessories were fracture-separated from the engine. No abnormal oil deposits or streaking were observed on the internal engine compartment areas, or on the airplane exterior surfaces.

The propeller hub was highly fragmented, and none of the three blades was retained in the hub. All three propeller blades exhibited significant bending/twisting deformation, scoring, and gouging. There was no evidence of any pre-impact failures or malfunctions of the engine or propeller that would have precluded continued normal operation and flight.

The fuselage was found on its left side, with the inboard section of the left wing located under the airplane, and the outboard section of the left wing fracture-separated from the airplane. The right wing was completely separated from the airplane at the wing root, and was found outside the building. The fuel cap for the right wing tank was absent from its receptacle, and was not located on site, despite multiple searches. A ground search of WVI did not locate the fuel cap. However, sooting patterns on the cap receptacle in the wing were consistent with the cap being in place for at least a portion of the sooting period. The flaps were determined to be retracted at the time of impact. No main landing gear doors were located on scene

The empennage was partially intact, with the left horizontal stabilizer fracture-separated from it, and the vertical stabilizer bent about 90 degrees near the mid span station. The as-found extension of the pitch trim actuator was consistent with a normal take-off trim setting.

All primary and secondary aerodynamic and flight control surfaces, and their balance weights, were located at the accident site. Partial control continuity was established for the right aileron, right elevator, and rudder. Damage precluded additional control continuity determination.

The cockpit/cabin was severely deformed by the impact, and was almost completely separated from the wing structure. The two front seats remained partially attached to their cabin floor attach points, but the rear bench seat was separated from the cabin floor, and was found forward of the front seats. The pilot and young

NTSB Probable Cause

The pilot's decision to take off toward a nearby low cloud layer and the subsequent turn, stall, and spin during the pilot’s attempt to avoid the cloud layer. Contributing to the accident was the pilot's failure to avoid the stall. His ability to avoid the stall was hindered by an inaudible stall warning system of questionable accuracy.