NTSB Factual Report

HISTORY OF FLIGHT

On February 25, 2010, about 0927 eastern standard time, a Hawker Beechcraft Corporation C23, N180ED, registered to Skyway Leasing, Inc., and operated by Tailwheels ETC, Inc., had a loss of engine power during the takeoff climb and impacted the ground approximately .6 statute mile west-northwest from the center of Winter Haven’s Gilbert Airport (GIF), Winter Haven, Florida. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time and no flight plan was filed for the 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 91 personal flight from GIF to Lakeland Linder Regional Airport (LAL), Lakeland, Florida. The airplane sustained substantial damage and the certificated private pilot and one passenger were killed. The flight originated from GIF about 0925.

The operator reported that the pilot was allowed to fly the airplane and only had to reimburse them for the fuel cost.

Numerous witnesses at the operator’s facility saw both occupants before takeoff. One witness reported the passenger came into the building and asked to borrow a fuel sample device. Another witness saw the passenger check the right wing fuel tank, while a witness who is a student pilot heard an engine accelerate consistent with an engine run-up, but he walked inside the building and did not pay attention. The airplane was observed to taxi to the approach end of runway 29, and was noted to be airborne before the first intersection.

A pilot-rated witness who was outside near the departure end of runway 29 reported that he first saw the airplane when it was over the departure end of runway 29. At that time he thought the airplane was at 150 feet above ground level (agl) in a wings level normal Vy climb attitude. Approximately 5 seconds later while the airplane was at an estimated altitude of 200 to 300 feet agl, the engine “just stopped” as if an occupant had pulled the mixture back. The nose pitched down an estimated 5 degrees in his opinion in order to gain airspeed, and the airplane banked to the right an estimated 30 degrees. He didn’t think the nose was low enough to maintain airspeed. He knew the airplane was too low to return and perceived the airplane was flying slow. He lost sight of the airplane behind trees then heard the impact. He reported there was no sputtering, no smoke, and the engine suddenly went from running to quitting. Had it sputtered he would have been able to hear that. He also said that he did not see any parts separate from the airplane. After hearing the crash he drove to the scene and when he arrived there, sheriff’s office personnel were already on-scene tending to the occupants.

Another pilot rated witness located at the operator’s facility reported looking outside the window and saw the airplane in a nose-high pitch attitude and right bank estimated to be between 60 and 70 degrees. The witness then reported that the airplane began “dropping fast” to the right. He kept watching but the airplane disappeared behind trees.

PERSONNEL INFORMATION

The pilot, age 45, held a private pilot certificate with airplane single engine land rating issued January 1, 2000, and held a 2nd class medical certificate issued October 7, 2009.

Review of the pilot’s pilot logbook revealed the first flight logged was March 5, 1999, and the last flight logged was January 11, 2010; he logged a total time of 468.9 hours. There were no logged flights between November 22, 2003, and October 4, 2008. He only logged flying the accident airplane five times lasting a total of 5.7 hours. All flights in the accident airplane were logged as pilot-in-command. The five flights occurred between December 6, 2009, and December 16, 2009. There was no record of a sign off by a certified flight instructor for instruction in the accident airplane, although the operator reported it was their standard operating procedure to require a checkout.

The pilot’s last flight review in accordance with 14 CFR 61.56 occurred on October 16, 2009.

AIRCRAFT INFORMATION

The airplane was manufactured in 1974 by Beech Aircraft Corporation as model C23, and was designated serial number M-1622. It was powered by a 180 horsepower Lycoming O-360-A4J engine and equipped with a Sensenich fixed pitch propeller.

Review of the maintenance records revealed the airplane was last inspected in accordance with an annual inspection on April 10, 2009, and the last 100-Hour inspection was performed on August 12, 2009. The airplane total time at the annual and 100-hour inspections were recorded to be 5,841.8 and 5,939.79 respectively. The airplane total time at the time of the accident was approximately 6,003 hours.

Further review of the maintenance records from the first entry related to certification after manufacturing, to the last entry dated February 23, 2010, revealed no direct entry indicating the fuel selector valve was removed and replaced or repaired. The manufacturer of the valve reported there is no required overhaul interval; the part is an on condition part.

METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATION

A surface observation weather report taken at GIF at 0853, or approximately 34 minutes before the accident indicates the wind was from 330 degrees at 13 knots, clear skies existed. The temperature and dew point were 7 and minus 2 degrees Celsius respectively, and the altimeter setting was 30.09 inches of Mercury.

WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATION

Examination of the accident site revealed that the airplane first ground contact was located on a grass median between the east and westbound lanes of 92. The next ground contact was noted to be with concrete curbing on the south edge of the westbound lanes. A ground scar on the two westbound lanes was oriented on a magnetic heading of 045 degrees. Two parallel oriented ground scars consistent with propeller blade contact were noted in beginning area of the road ground contact location. The distance between the two was noted to be 57.5 inches. The airplane came to rest approximately 103 feet from the concrete curb contact location.

Examination of the wreckage revealed the airplane came to rest in a ditch located on the north side of the westbound lanes of 92. The right wing was separated at the wing root and also at the outboard edge of the fuel tank; the left wing remained connected by one aileron flight control cable, electrical wires and the brake line. The fuselage was resting on its left side, and the aft fuselage was separated approximately 4 feet 6 inches aft of the main spar. The firewall with attached engine mount, engine, and propeller were separated but found in close proximity to the main wreckage. All components necessary to sustain flight were found in close proximity to the main wreckage. Examination of the flight control system for roll, pitch, and yaw revealed no evidence of preimpact failure or malfunction. No obstructions of the fuel supply system were noted from either fuel tank to the engine compartment, and no obstruction of the fuel vent system was noted. The flaps were retracted.

Examination of the cockpit revealed the ignition switch was in the both position, and the short end of the fuel selector handle which points to the tank selected was in the off range. No air could be blown thru the valve in the as-found position of the valve. The fuel selector valve, handle, plastic shroud and guard were retained for further examination. The throttle quadrant which separated from the structure was examined and the throttle cable was separated from the end fitting at the throttle quadrant. The other end of the cable remained secured to the carburetor. The throttle cable was retained for further examination. The carburetor heat was cold, and the mixture control was 2 inches back from full rich. The mixture and carburetor heat control cables remained secured to their respective attach points in the engine compartment.

Visual examination of the engine revealed the carburetor bowl contained approximately 1 ounce of blue colored fuel consistent with 100 low lead (100LL). All engine controls remained attached to their respective lever arms. The throttle valve, mixture control, and carburetor heat controls were found in the mid-range position. Examination of the spark plugs exhibited gray color combustion deposits. The top spark plugs exhibited advanced wear, while the bottom spark plugs exhibited slight wear. The gap settings for all spark plugs were normal. Borescope examination of each cylinder revealed no anomalies. Crankshaft, camshaft, and valve train continuity was confirmed. The engine with attached engine mount was placed on a test stand for an attempted engine run and a test club propeller shorter in diameter than the accident propeller was installed. The engine was started and operated. During the test run a magneto drop of 200 rpm was noted from one of the magnetos. The top spark plugs from the Nos. 2 and 4 cylinders were replaced and the engine was restarted. The magnetos were checked and the left and right decreased 150 and 200 rpm, respectively. The oil pressure was normal during the engine run and the idle was smooth at 650 rpm. Both magnetos were retained for further examination.

Examination of the propeller revealed one blade was bent aft approximately 180 degrees and exhibited course chordwise scratches on the blade tip. The other blade was bent aft approximately 30 degrees with leading edge twist towards low pitch, and chordwise scratches at the tip. The blade also exhibited spanwise scratches inboard of the tip.

MEDICAL AND PATHOLOGICAL INFORMATION

Postmortem examinations of the pilot and passenger were performed by the Office of the District Medical Examiner, Winter Haven, Florida. The cause of death for both was listed as “Blunt Impact to Head and Torso.”

Forensic toxicology was performed on specimens of the pilot by the FAA Bioaeronautical Sciences Research Laboratory (CAMI), Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, and also by the University of Florida Diagnostic Reference Laboratories (University of Florida). The toxicology report by CAMI indicated the results were negative for carbon monoxide, cyanide, and volatiles. An unquantified amount of Atropine was detected in the liver and blood specimens. The toxicology report by University of Florida was negative for volatiles and the comprehensive drug screen.

Forensic toxicology was performed on specimens of the passenger also by CAMI and University of Florida. The toxicology report by CAMI indicated the results were negative for carbon monoxide, cyanide, and volatiles. Unquantified amounts of atropine, etomidate, and midazolam were detected in the liver specimen, and an unquantified amount of atropine was also detected in the blood specimen. Etomidate (0.03 ug/mL) was detected in the blood specimen, and varying amounts of Fentanyl were detected in the lung, kidney, muscle, and blood specimens. Midazolam (0.015 ug/mL) was detected in the blood specimen. The toxicology report by University of Florida was negative for volatiles. Laudanosine and lidocaine were detected in the comprehensive drug screen.

TESTS AND RESEARCH

Examination of the throttle cable was performed by the Safety Board’s Materials Laboratory located in Washington, D.C. The examination determined that the end fitting in the area of the throttle quadrant was bent approximately 10 degrees. Inspection of the ends of the wire strands of the separated cable revealed all were tightly wound together and the ends of each strand were cut in a manner consistent with an anvil cutter. Comparison of the crimp of the end fitting near the carburetor and at the throttle quadrant revealed no perceptible differences in the amount of crimping; the failure mode was consistent with the cable pulling from the end fitting at the throttle quadrant during separation of it from the airplane.

The airplane was last fueled at GIF by Winter Haven Air Services on January 28, 2010. A total of 17.8 gallons of 100 low lead (100LL) fuel were added. The president of Winter Haven Air Services reported that on the same day they also fueled 21 other airplanes dispensing a total of 533.5 gallons; there were no fuel related problems reported. Additionally, the operator of the airplane reported that they had not experienced any issues related to the quality of the fuel they received from Winter Haven Air Services.

A pilot and mechanic who flew the accident airplane the day before reported that during the preflight inspection the fuel tanks were noted to be within 1 inch of being full. They flew in the traffic pattern; the flight duration was between .3 and .5 hour. That flight was performed with the fuel selector positioned to the left tank and it was not moved during or after the flight. A CFI with the operator visually looked into both fuel tanks before the accident flight departed and noted the level of fuel in both was within 2 inches from the top of the tank.

Testing of an exemplar airplane by a representative of the airframe manufacturer was performed in an effort to determine the reported fuel level in each tank before engine start of the accident flight. The testing revealed that each tank contained approximately 22.1 gallons usable fuel.

Weight and balance calculations were performed using the latest airplane empty weight (1,602.5 pounds), the weights of the pilot and passenger per the autopsy reports (228 and 338 pounds respectively), and the amount of fuel in each tank determined by testing of an exemplar airplane (22.1 gallons usable fuel). The airplane weight and center of gravity were calculated to be approximately 2,434 pounds and 112.66 inches aft of datum. The airplane type certificate data sheet indicates that the gross weight is 2,450 pounds, and the center of gravity limits at approximately 2,434 pounds are approximately 114.2 to 118.3 inches aft of datum for a normal category operation.

Examination of both magnetos was performed with Safety Board oversight at a Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) certified repair station. The internal timing of the left magneto was correct. The magneto was placed on a test bench as received with a slave ignition harness and 5 mm gaps. The impulse coupling operated normally, and the magneto was noted to operate intermittently at 400 rpm. No other intermittent firing was noted during which time the magneto was operated between 643 and 4,204 rpm and noted to spark at all 5 mm gaps. The contact spring heights of all positions was measured and found to be .422 inch (specification is .422 inch). The e-gap measured 10 degrees (specification is 6 to 14 degrees). The contact points were pitted; because of this the point gap could not be checked. The distributor gear was missing 1 tooth, but this did not affect the timing. The carbon brush and the distributor gear electrode were unremarkable. The distributor block was checked for carbon tracks; none were found. The capacitor checked .3 microfarads (specification is .34 to .41 microfarads). The coil primary resistance tested .3 ohms (specification is .2 to .6 ohms), and the coil secondary resistance tested 14,000 ohms (specification is 12,000 to 16,000 ohms).

Examination of the right magneto revealed the internal timing was correct. No missing teeth were noted on the distributor block. The magneto was placed on a test bench as received with a slave ignition harness and 5 mm gaps; the impulse coupling operated satisfactory. The magneto was operated between 643 and 4,204 rpm and noted to spark at all 5 mm gaps; intermittent firing was noted at 643 magneto rpm. The points were visually inspected and appeared satisfactory. The e-gap measured 12 degrees (specification is 6 to 14 degrees). The point gap measured 0.013 inch (specification is 0.012 to 0.024 inch). The carbon brush and the distributor gear electrode were unremarkable. The distributor gear was missing a nylon washer P/N 10-391309; however, an extra washer, P/N 10-606505 was noted to be installed. The distributor block was checked for carbon tracks; none were found. The capacitor checked .3 microfarads (specification is .34 to .41 microfarads). The coil primary resistance tested .3 ohms (specification is .2 to .6 ohms), and the coil secondary resistance tested 14,000 ohms (specification is 12,000 to 16,000 ohms).

Visual inspection of the ignition switch r

NTSB Probable Cause

The pilot’s improper placement of the fuel selector valve during takeoff, and his failure to maintain adequate airspeed following a total loss of engine power resulting in an inadvertent stall. Contributing to the accident was the failure of maintenance personnel to detect the lack of proper markings on the fuel selector stop and fuel selector valve shroud at the last 100-Hour inspection.