NTSB Factual Report

HISTORY OF FLIGHT

On February 9, 2000, at 1920 eastern standard time, a Mooney M20J, N201RC, collided with a utility pole and subsequently the ground while on final approach to runway 26, at the Tampa Bay Executive Airport, in Odessa, Florida. The personal flight was operated by the private pilot under the provisions of Title 14 CFR Part 91, and visual flight rules. Night visual meteorological conditions prevailed and no flight plan was filed. The pilot and pilot/passenger sustained fatal injuries and the airplane received substantial damage. The flight originated from Melbourne International Airport in Melbourne, Florida, at 1800.

According to a Certified Flight Instructor (CFI), who was at the approach end of runway 26 preparing to takeoff with a student pilot on a night flight, heard N201RC attempt to contact the Unicom at the airport. The CFI informed N201RC that the Unicom was closed for the evening and advised him that runway 26 was the active. The pilot of N201RC informed the CFI that he wanted to use runway 35. The CFI responded that there was no runway 35 at this airport. The pilot of N201RC did not respond. The CFI stated that he observed N201RC fly over the airport from the north. The pilot of N201RC announced that he was entering a left downwind. The CFI radioed N201RC that runway 26 was a right hand pattern. The CFI said that the pilot of N201RC had asked several times where their aircraft was located and the CFI stated that they were on the taxiway to runway 26. The CFI stated that the pilot seemed a little confused as to his own location because he kept asking where the airport was as the CFI was watching him fly over it. Aircraft N201RC kept flying south and did not enter the pattern at that time.

The CFI instructed his student to takeoff on 26. As they climbed out, the CFI heard the pilot of N201RC, state that he was entering a right downwind for runway 26. The CFI observed N201RC on downwind and turn base, and heard the pilot announce entering base. The CFI turned to observe what his student was doing and when he looked back at N201RC, he saw a flash followed by a fire. The CFI stated that he knew what had happened. He took control of the airplane from his student, and proceeded to the site. The CFI radioed Tampa approach and informed the controller of the accident.

PERSONNEL INFORMATION

The certificated private pilot held a single engine land airplane rating. The pilot reported having 92 civilian flight hours on his last medical examination. The pilot's most recent second class medical was issued on July 3, 1991. No other information was available and the pilot's flight log was not located.

The pilot/passenger was certificated as a private pilot with single engine land and instrument airplane ratings. The pilot reported having 1000 civilian flight hours on his last medical examination. The pilot's most recent third class medical was issued on August 11, 1997, and according to Federal Regulations, expired on August 31, 1999. No other information was available and the pilot's flight log was not located.

AIRCRAFT INFORMATION

The 1983 Mooney, M20J, N201RC, was a four (4) seat, single engine airplane, and was registered to Deland Aircraft Leasing, Inc., in Deland, Florida. A review of the airplane logbooks found that on July 16, 1999, the airplane received an annual inspection with no major discrepancies noted. At the time of the accident the airplane had accumulated 55 hours since that inspection.

METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATION

Night visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the accident. There were no clouds or ceiling reported at the time. Visibility was 10 statute miles, Temperature was 64 degrees Fahrenheit, Dew Point 37 degrees Fahrenheit, Altimeter 30.11, Field Elevation 41 feet, and the winds were 320 degrees at 12 knots.

WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATION

Examination of the wreckage site found that the airplane had collided with a utility pole about 35 feet above the ground and about 1500 feet short of runway 26. Global Positioning System Coordinates: N 28 degrees 11.43, and W 082 degrees 36.95. The collision separated the left and a portion of the right wing from the fuselage. The airplane came to rest inverted, with the landing gear extended, separating the propeller from the engine and substantially damaged the vertical stabilizer. A post-crash fire erupted at the utility pole and downed power lines burned nearby trees, grass and shrubs. The airplane did not burn.

Examination of the cockpit/cabin area found that the airplane impacted inverted at about a 30 degree nose down attitude substantially compromising the cockpit survivable area. Examination of the flight instruments found the airspeed indicator at 0, and the altimeter at 880 feet, with an altimeter setting of 30.12. Both communication 1, and communication 2 radios were set to 122.8, the transponder was set to altitude, with a 1200 code dialed in. Electrical switches were found in the following positions: Master Switch, on, Avionics Switch, on, Navigation Lights, off, Strobe Lights, off, the Fuel Pump was off, and the Magnetos were selected to both.

Examination of the engine and propeller showed the propeller exhibited cordwise damage, consistent with rotation upon impact. The propeller assembly was impact separated at the engine crankshaft, the steel flange was fractured. One propeller blade exhibited bending on the leading and trailing edge damage. The opposite blade remained straight. Both blades showed heavy chordwise abrasion on the front and back surfaces. Chordwise scoring was noted on the outside diameter of the propeller spinner bulkhead assembly. The propeller system governor control was damaged.

The engine was accessed on all sides for inspection and documentation. All spark plugs were the same type, and were removed for inspection. The color of the combustion deposits was gray-to-dark brown. Electrode wear and gap settings measured approximately .030 inch. Note: Textron Lycoming Service Instruction 1042V specifies use of lower heat range spark plugs (#38) in IO-360-A (series) engines. Additionally, electrode gaps should be maintained between .016 -.022 inches. The engine assembly was rotated with a drive tool adapter inserted at the vacuum pump accessory drive, and rotation of the crankshaft, camshaft, valve train, and other accessory drives was established. Each cylinder produced compression when the engine was rotated. The dual magneto was checked and the gear timing was found normal. The magneto fired from all undamaged leads when rotated. The fuel system lines at the injector servo, and engine pump were disconnected during examination and contained blue aviation fuel. The engine oil suction screen and oil filter contained uncontaminated oil. The induction air box was found clear of obstructions; the alternate air door was secure. The induction air filter element was intact. The exhaust system was found clean, clear, and dry. Combustion deposits were consistent with the appearance of the spark plugs. The engine examination, revealed no evidence of any pre-impact mechanical failure or malfunction.

MEDICAL AND PATHOLOGICAL INFORMATION

A post-mortem examination of the pilot and pilot rated passenger was conducted by Joan E. Wood, M.D. Largo, Florida. On April 21, 2000, and March 29, 2000, respectively. A toxicology examination of the pilot and pilot rated passenger were conducted by the FAA Toxicology Research Laboratory. The examination revealed that both the pilot and pilot rated passenger were negative for carbon monoxide, cyanide, and ethanol.

TEST AND RESEARCH

The altimeter was found with a reading of 880 feet, with the altimeter set at 30.12. A review of the local weather and airport elevation found that the Altimeter was reading about 839 feet higher then it should. The altimeter was removed from the airplane and on March 14, 2000, the altimeter was taken to Florida Aircraft Instruments, Inc., in Leesburg, Florida, for further examination. The examination found that with the 10,000 foot pointer and the 100 foot pointer set at zero, the 1000 foot pointer read approximately 700 feet. Disassembly of the altimeter found that the top plate assembly appeared to be good. The 1000 foot pointer fit tightly on its hub. The altimeter mechanism appeared good. There were no broken pivots and the jewels appeared to be intact. The technician examining the altimeter stated that he could find no reason for the 1000 foot pointer to be off, and could not determine if the discrepancy of the altimeter existed prior to the accident, but did state that the discrepancy was likely a result of the accident. The technician reassembled the altimeter and functionally tested it to 20,000 feet, and it operated within designed specifications.

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

Parties to the investigation were the Federal Aviation Administration, and Textron Lycoming, the engine manufacturer.

The wreckage was released to the owner's insurance representative, Marshall Dean, at US Aviation Underwriters, Inc., 2635 Centre Parkway, Atlanta, Georgia 30345.

NTSB Probable Cause

The pilot's failure to maintain a safe altitude and his failure to attain the proper touchdown point during landing. A factor was the utility pole.