Crash location | 29.809722°N, 83.545555°W
Reported location is a long distance from the NTSB's reported nearest city. This often means that the location has a typo, or is incorrect. |
Nearest city | Perry, FL
30.117435°N, 83.581815°W 21.4 miles away |
Tail number | N26GW |
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Accident date | 21 Sep 2012 |
Aircraft type | Beagle B206 Series 2 |
Additional details: | None |
HISTORY OF FLIGHT
On September 21, 2012 about 1245 eastern daylight time, a twin engine, Beagle B206 Series 2, N26GW, was substantially damaged during an emergency landing after a loss of power in the right engine in Perry, Florida. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed and no flight plan was filed for the Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 personal flight. The certificated commercial pilot and his five passengers were not injured. The flight destined for Tallahassee Regional Airport (TLH), Tallahassee, Florida, originated from Placid Lakes Airport (09FA), Lake Placid, Florida about 1140.
According to the pilot, at approximately 0830 he performed a preflight inspection on the airplane for the flight to TLH. During the preflight he checked the fuel quantity onboard the airplane by looking at the fuel computer installed in the airplane. It displayed 65 gallons. He then added 20 gallons of fuel to the left wing fuel tank and 25 gallons to the right wing fuel tank. He then entered the added amount of fuel to the existing fuel that was displayed on the fuel computer for a total of 110 gallons which was consistent with the fuel gauges which display fuel in pounds and which indicated that 275 pounds of fuel was in the left tank and 350 pounds of fuel was in the right tank.
After departure from 09FA, the pilot turned towards TLH and climbed the airplane to approximately 3,000 feet above sea level. About 1240 while over the Gulf of Mexico, the right engine began to surge and "after going through the checklist" the pilot elected to do a "precautionary landing" as he was offshore. After turning east towards shore, the pilot asked Jacksonville Air Route Traffic Control Center for the closest airfield. However, the pilot after seeing nothing but trees decided to land on a road with the landing gear in the up position. During the landing the left wingtip struck a tree.
PERSONNEL INFORMATION
According to Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and pilot records, the pilot held a commercial pilot certificate with ratings for airplane single-engine land, airplane multi-engine land, and instrument airplane. His most recent FAA third-class medical certificate was issued on February 16, 2011. He reported that he had accrued approximately 2,560 hours of total flight experience, 1,020 hours of which was in the accident airplane make and model.
AIRCRAFT INFORMATION
The accident aircraft was a low wing, twin engine airplane of conventional metal construction. It was equipped with retractable landing gear, and multiple position wing flaps. It was powered by two 340 horsepower, Continental GTSIO-520-C engines, each equipped with a Hartzell, 3-blade, fully feathering, constant speed propeller.
According to the United Kingdom Civil Aviation Authority, the airplane design had been certificated in their Performance Group C, indicating that the airplane had positive en-route performance with one engine inoperative.
According to FAA and airplane maintenance records, the airplane was manufactured in 1969. The airplane's most recent annual inspection was completed on March 23, 2012. At the time of accident, the airplane had accrued approximately 3,190 total hours of operation.
METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATION
The recorded weather at Perry-Foley Airport (40J), Perry, Florida, located approximately 16 nautical miles north of the accident site, at 1253, included: winds variable at 3 knots, 10 miles visibility, clear, temperature 27 degrees C, dew point 21 degrees C, and an altimeter setting of 30.03 inches of mercury.
WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATION
Examination of the wreckage revealed that both propellers were in the feathered position, the wing flaps were up, and the landing gear was up. The wing structure, engine firewalls, engine nacelles, elevator, and landing gear doors, were substantially damaged.
Further examination revealed that the left wing fuel tank contained approximately 22 gallons of fuel. However the right wing fuel tank was almost devoid of fuel. No fuel could be drained from its aft drain, and only about 4 ounces of fuel was able to be drained out of its forward drain.
Examination of the cabin revealed that the wing flaps switch was in the up position, the landing gear switch was in the up position, the magneto switches were off, the boost pump switches were off, the engine vents switches were in the open position, the left engine and right engine mixture controls were in the full rich position, the left engine fuel selector was in the left tank position, and the right engine fuel selector was in the right tank position.
TESTS AND RESEARCH
Review of the Operating Handbook for the airplane revealed that the fuel system consisted of left and right fuel tanks each supplying its associated engine through a "booster pump" (boost pump), "cross-feed cock" (cross-feed valve), and a filter. Each tank had a capacity of 117 gallons, 114 of which was usable. When required, either tank could feed the opposite engine by operation of the cross-feed cocks, but both tanks could not feed one engine simultaneously.
The operating handbook provided guidance regarding unequal fuel feeding stating that: "Should unequal feeding occur as shown by the readings on the fuel contents gauges, the fuel cock on the low side should be selected to feed from the high side until balanced is restored."
The operating handbook also contained an emergency procedures section which provided guidance regarding engine failure, fuel pump failure, and landing with one engine inoperative.
Comparison of the required positions of the cockpit controls in the emergency procedures section to the as found position of the cockpit controls in the airplane revealed that the mixture control for he inoperative engine was not in the required position, the engine cooling flap for the inoperative engine was not in the required position, the fuel selector was not in the required position, and the wing flaps were not in the required position.
Review of performance information contained in the Operating Handbook indicated that if the airplane had been configured per the guidance in the emergency procedures section, the airplane would have been able to remain at altitude.
The pilot’s improper in-flight fuel management, which resulted in fuel starvation and the right engine’s complete loss of power. Contributing to the accident was the pilot’s improper configuration of the airplane following the loss of engine power.