NTSB Factual Report

HISTORY OF FLIGHT

On July 16, 2014, about 1745 eastern daylight time, a Piper PA-32R-301T, N297AS, was substantially damaged when it impacted the water near North Captiva Island, Florida. The airplane departed from Page Airport (FMY), Ft. Myers, Florida about 1735 with an intended destination of Salty Approach Airport (FL90), Ft. Myers, Florida. Day, visual meteorological conditions prevailed and no flight was filed. The private pilot was fatally injured. The personal flight was conducted under the provisions of Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 91.

Numerous witnesses reported that the airplane appeared to be departing from FL90. Some of those accounts stated that the airplane "was having a hard time trying to climb" or "that it appeared that the pilot was trying to build up speed to gain elevation" prior to the left wing making contact with the water. One eyewitness, who was familiar with the pilot, reported that the pilot had flown in earlier in the afternoon with a load of tile and the accident flight was the second trip for the day. Another eyewitness reported that the airplane appeared to be "taking off attempting to recover [from] an aborted landing and did not have the airspeed to recover." Several of the witnesses reported that they audibly observed the engine operating at the time of the accident. Some of the witnesses reported the airplane was about 7 feet above the ground when it passed over the beach.

PERSONNEL INFORMATION

According to Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) records, the pilot held a private pilot certificate for airplane single-engine land with a rating for instrument airplane. His most recent third class medical certificate was issued on October 22, 2013. The pilot's flight logbook was located in the forward baggage compartment of the airplane. The logbook was saturated with water and considerable damage was done to the edge of the logbook; however, some pages were separated and on the last full page of handwritten entries indicated that the pilot had accumulated 2,018.7 total hours of flight experience. The subsequent page had four entries of 0.5 hours each, for a total flight experience of 2,020.7 hours; however, those entries were not dated.

AIRCRAFT INFORMATION

According to FAA records, the airplane was issued an airworthiness certificate on December 10, 1999, and was registered to Howard Aviation on June 11, 2007, and the pilot was listed as the "president." It was powered by a Lycoming TIO-540-AH1A engine and driven by a Hartzell propeller model HC-I3YR-1RF. A review of copies of maintenance logbook records showed an annual inspection was completed on January 13, 2014, at a recorded Hobbs meter reading of 1,225 hours and indicated an engine total time in service of 1,225 hours. The Hobbs hour meter was observed at the accident site and indicated 1267.5 hours.

METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATION

The 1745 recorded weather observation at FMY, located approximately 20 miles to the east of the accident location, included wind from 330 degrees at19 knots with gusts of 30 knots, visibility 1 3/4 miles with thunderstorms in the vicinity and light rain, scattered clouds at 2,400 feet above ground level (agl), broken clouds at 3,400 feet agl, overcast at 5,500 feet agl, temperature 26 degrees C, dew point 23 degrees C and barometric altimeter 29.99 inches of mercury. The remarks section included a peak wind at 1741, lightning in all quadrants surrounding the airport, rain began at 1745 and a thunderstorm was present between 1727 and 1744.

No witnesses or first responders reported lighting, rain, or adverse winds in the vicinity of FL90 at the time of the accident.

AIRPORT INFORMATION

The airport was privately owned and at the time of the accident did not have a control tower. There was one runway designated runway E/W. The turf runway was 1,800 feet long and 100 feet wide. The airport was about 6 feet above mean sea level and had a sandy beach area located at both ends of the runway.

WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATION

The airplane was located in 8 to 10 feet of water, approximately 200 yards west-southwest of the extended centerline of the runway designated "W." The main wreckage was located at coordinates 26:36'215N 082:13.640W. The airplane was resting its left side on the sea floor. The left wing separated during the impact sequence and was originally found at coordinates 26:35'250N 082:13.670W. The engine remained attached to the airplane and was collocated with the main wreckage. The airplane came to rest on a magnetic heading of approximately 340 degrees.

The airplane was recovered utilizing three lifting air bags. During recovery the tie straps damaged the right wing in the vicinity of the aileron. The stabilator and left wing could not be located utilizing sonar or visual sighting.

Post recovery examination of the wreckage and witness statements indicated that the airplane impacted the water in a left wing low attitude. The fuselage was placed on a hangar floor for the examination. The right wing was removed to facilitate transportation and the left wing was not located at the accident location. The nose gear as viewed was in the nose wheel well; however, the hydraulic extension ram was extended and bent aft during the accident sequence. The right main landing gear was impact-separated at the attach point; however, the hydraulic ram was extended 8 inches, correlating to the right main landing gear being extended and locked at the time of impact. The flap jackscrew was measured at 3 exposed threads, which correlated to a flaps 40 position or fully extended position.

Porcelain tiles and two wooden pallets were located, unsecured in the cabin section of the airplane. The tiles and pallets were removed and weighed, on a scale; the contents weighed a total of 666 pounds. A placard located on the aft wall of the cargo compartment indicated that 609 pounds was the maximum allowed cargo weight.

Fuselage

The fuselage remained intact; the left cargo/passenger door remained attached, had an approximate 8 inch gouge just aft of the forward hinge point, and the cabin had a gouge on the roof approximately 6 inches above the pilot, or left side, window. The windows remained in position; except for the pilot side windscreen and pilot side window, which were not located. The forward cabin door remained attached and during recovery the locking mechanism operated normally; however, during post recovery examination the door was slightly ajar and would not lock into position. The airplane was equipped with two front seats; the four aft passenger seats were removed sometime prior to the accident flight. The pilot seat exhibited torsional twist to the left, similar to the torsional twist of a mass in place at the time of impact. Both seats remained on their respective seat tracks and locked in place. Seat restraints were located and all were unremarkable, operated normally with no abnormalities noted and exhibited no web stretching. The two front seatbelts were unlatched when found. No cargo securing mechanism was noted in the accident aircraft other than the passenger seatbelts and a single cargo strap that were found folded and stowed inside the aircraft.

Cockpit

The instrument panel remained attached and the "L Mag" and "R Mag" switch on the ceiling were in the "ON" position. All instrumentation remained attached and the turn and bank indicator indicated a left bank turn. The control "T"-bar and the sprockets and chains remained attached; however, binding was noted at the base of the "T"-bar. Removal of the channel cover indicated that the floor had a slight buckling and manipulation of the buckling allowed the control cables to operate. Control cable continuity was traced to all the cable breaks from the associated attach points and the breaks had the appearance of broomstrawing at the fracture points. The right side aileron balance cable was cut to facilitate transport to the salvage yard. The fuel selector valve indicator and fuel selector valve both indicated that the right fuel tank was selected. The throttle, mixture, and propeller levers were in the full forward positions. The throttle was operated and was confirmed operating through the full arc of operation at the throttle linkage. The fuel pump and air-conditioner switches were found in the "OFF" positions. The landing gear lever was in the "DOWN" position and the gear switch was bent to the right. The flap handle was in the "40 degree" or full flap position.

Empennage

The vertical fin and rudder remained attached; however, the stabilator was impact-separated from the fuselage and was not recovered. The impact damage was consistent with overload fractures. The rudder was attached to the vertical fin at its hinge points and control cable continuity was confirmed to the rudder pedals. The stops were in place and exhibited no peening. The rudder balance weight was located in the rudder assembly. The rudder position at impact could not be determined.

The stabilator was separated from its mounting. The fracture points were consistent with being separated in an aft and right direction. The stabilator trim drum was absent and not located.

Left Wing

The left wing was impact separated and was not located. However, the attach structure exhibited overload fractures in the aft and positive direction. The primary balance cable was fractured and exhibited tensile overload signatures. Control continuity was established to the fracture point.

Right Wing

The right wing remained attached to the fuselage. The wing was unremarkable, except for the damage that resulted from the recovery of the airplane. The right main landing gear was impact separated at the attach fitting; however, considering the hydraulic ram position of 8 inch, the landing gear was determined to be in the down and locked position. The flap remained attached to the wing and on the flap track; however, the exact position could not be determined except by utilizing the exposed threads under the floor in the cabin section. The aileron remained attached and was operated by the control cables, which were cut to facilitate transport, and revealed no anomalies. The aileron balance weight was in position and attached to the outboard section of the aileron. The fuel tank contained 15 gallons of blue fluid similar in color and smell as aviation 100LL fuel. The fuel cap was tight and secure and no water was present in the fuel when drained to facilitate recovery. A small hole was punctured by investigators into the forward section of the tank to facilitate draining of the fuel into containers. The wing tip remained attached.

Engine

The engine remained attached to the airframe via the mounts, cables, and wires. The propeller remained attached to the propeller hub, which remained attached to engine. The fuel inlet screen was removed and was free of debris. The fuel injectors were removed from the engine and a partial obstruction was observed in all injectors, however, utilization of low air pressure air removed the obstructions. All lines from the divider and vent return were intact. The turbocharger remained attached to the engine; the impeller rotated smoothly by hand and exhibited soft or minor damage to two of the impeller blades. An undetermined quantity of oil was observed in the turbocharger drain back tank. The turbocharger waste gate operated smoothly with no abnormalities noted. All ignition leads were intact and secured to the spark plugs. The top and bottom spark plugs were removed and appeared normal in wear and slightly dark in color. The bottom sparkplugs were wet with oil, which was consistent with the at-rest position of the engine. The engine was rotated utilizing the propeller through the propeller hub and continuity was confirmed to the right rear magneto pad and the magneto impulse coupling was audibly observed to be actuating. Thumb suction and compression was confirmed on all six cylinders. The magnetos were removed and were spun utilizing a cordless drill; however, no spark was observed. The left and right magnetos remained attached to the engine. The engine driven fuel pump was removed and the shaft remained intact. The vacuum pump was removed and rotation was accomplished by hand with suction noted at the intake fitting. The oil dipstick was present and oil was observed on the oil dipstick; however, an accurate quantity could not be determined. The density control and pop off valves remained attached to the engine. The oil filter was removed, cut open, and was free of metallic particulates. The air/oil separator was removed and examined, revealing oil was present in the screen and a minimal amount of debris was noted.

No obstructions were observed in the exhaust crossover section.

Propeller

The Hartzell 3-bladed propeller exhibited S-bending and tip curling on all blades. All three propeller blades were bent in the aft direction between 17 and 19 inches from the propeller hub. The propeller governor remained attached to the engine and operated with no abnormalities noted.

MEDICAL AND PATHOLOGICAL INFORMATION

An autopsy was performed on the pilot on July 19, 2014 by District 21, State of Florida, Office of the District Medical Examiner. The cause of death was listed as "Drowning."

Forensic toxicology was performed on specimens from the pilot by the FAA Bioaeronuatical Sciences Research Laboratory, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. The toxicology report revealed the following:

96 (mg/dl, mg/hg) Ethanol detected in Liver

46 (mg/dl, mg/hg) Ethanol detected in Muscle

N-Propanol detected in Liver

N-Propanol detected in Muscle

Additionally, putrefaction (which consists of the post-mortem creation of ethanol) was noted as yes. The report further stated that no drugs were detected in the liver.

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

CFR Part 91.9(a) states, "Except as provided in paragraph (d) of this section, no person may operate a civil aircraft without complying with the operating limitations specified in the approved Airplane or Rotorcraft Flight Manual, markings, and placards, or as otherwise prescribed by the certificating authority of the country of registry."

Pilots Handbook of Aeronautical Knowledge (FAA-H-8083-25A)

Section 4 "Aerodynamics of Flight" states "The CG [center of gravity] range is very important when it comes to stall recovery characteristics. If an aircraft is allowed to be operated outside of the CG, the pilot may have difficulty recovering from a stall. The most critical CG violation would occur when operating with a CG which exceeds the rear limit. In this situation, a pilot may not be able to generate sufficient force with the elevator to counteract the excess weight aft of the CG. Without the ability to decrease the AOA [angle of attack], the aircraft continues in a stalled condition until it contacts the ground."

The "Glossary" defines CG as "the point at which an airplane would balance if it were possible to suspend it at that point. It is the mass center of the airplane, or the theoretical point at which the entire weight of the airplane is assume to be concentrated. It may be expressed in inches from the reference datum, or in percentage of mean aerodynamic chord (MAC). The location depends on the distribution of weight in the airplane."

Advisory Circular (AC) 61-67C "Stall and Spin Awareness Training"

Chapter 1 "Ground Training: Stall and Spin Awareness" states in part "The CG location has a direct effect on the effective lift and AOA of the wing, the amount and direction of force on the tail, and the degree of stabilizer deflection needed to supply the proper tail force for equilibrium. The CG position, therefore, has a significant effect on stability and stall/spin recovery. As the CG is moved aft, the amount of elevator deflection needed to stall the airplane at a given load factor will be reduced…this could make the entry into inadvertent stalls easier…IN an airplane with an extremely aft CG, very light back elevator control forces may lead to inadvertent stall entries…"

Saratoga II TC PA-32R-301T Pilot Operating Handbook (POH)

Section 6 "Weight and Balance" states in part "Misloading carries consequences for any aircraft. An Overloaded airplane will not take off, climb or crui

NTSB Probable Cause

The pilot’s failure to secure the cargo in the cargo compartment, which resulted in a weight shift that led to the center of gravity exceeding its aft limit during a go-around attempt and a subsequent aerodynamic stall. Also causal to the accident were the pilot’s inadequate preflight inspection and his loading the airplane beyond the cargo compartment weight limit.