NTSB Factual Report

On April 4, 2001, about 1100 eastern daylight time, a Piper PA-44-180, N3060D, registered to and operated by Comair Aviation Academy, Inc., collided with a ditch while making a forced landing following loss of power in one engine, near Osteen, Florida, while on a Title 14 CFR Part 91 instructional flight. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time and no flight plan was filed. The airplane received substantial damage and the commercial-rated flight instructor, dual student, and one passenger were not injured. The flight originated from Sanford, Florida, the same day, about 1045.

The pilot in command, flight instructor stated the airplane's right engine had failed on a flight the day before the accident. The maintenance department worked on the magneto system and then returned the airplane to service. The engine runup prior to takeoff was within normal parameters. The dual student performed a normal takeoff on runway 27 right at the Orlando Sanford Airport, and they made a northeast departure. While maneuvering 5 miles southeast of Lake Ashby, the dual student applied climb engine power and initiated a climb. They were at 2,000 to 2,500 feet. The right engine back fired and he noticed an immediate loss of RPM. He took control of the airplane from the student. He identified the right engine as being the engine that had failed and tried to restart the engine. This was not successful, and the right propeller was feathered. The airplane would not maintain altitude with just the left engine. He decided he could not make it back to the departure airport and elected to land in a field. Landing touchdown and rollout were normal, until they encountered an unforeseen ditch. He pulled back all the way on the yoke to use any lift to get over the ditch. The airplane cleared the ditch but the wheels did not. They shutdown everything and evacuated the airplane safely. (See flight instructor statement.)

The dual student stated that the right engine loss of power occurred at about 2,000 feet. The flight instructor took control of the airplane and turned back toward Orlando Sanford Airport. The right engine had a short power recovery and then failed completely. While maintaining VySE, 88 knots, the airplane was descending about 200 feet per minute. At this time it became evident that they could not make it back to the airport and would have to make a landing in a field. He assisted the flight instructor with the "Landing with an inoperative engine" checklist and at this time they feathered the right propeller. The field they picked looked to be flat with grass. After landing they found the braking was not effective on the very wet grass. At the end of the field there was a 12 feet wide and 4 feet deep canal that sloped down. The airplane slid off the embankment and landed hard on the next field. The airplane suffered landing gear damage. They shutoff all electrical power and fuel and evacuated the airplane. (See dual student statement.)

The student observer seated in the backseat of the airplane stated that after clearing class D airspace the dual student added engine power and started a climb. All of a sudden the right engine popped and lost RPM. The flight instructor took control of the airplane. They were at 2,000 feet, about 5 miles south-southeast of Lake Ashby. The flight instructor and dual student performed the engine failure checklist and they were now at 1,500 feet and still losing altitude. They feathered the propeller on the right engine and committed to land in a field. During landing rollout, the grass in the field was wet and maximum braking was not helping. At the end of the field the instructor pulled back on the yoke and they cleared the embankment. The main landing gear caught on the ditch. (See student observer statement.)

Postcrash examination of the airplane was performed by an FAA inspector. All three landing gear were torn from the airplane. The right propeller was in the feathered position and the left propeller had one bent blade. The left engine cowling was removed and there were no signs of any damage. The propeller was turned and the engine rotated freely except for the started being engaged. The right engine cowling was removed and the engine showed no signs of fuel or oil leakage. The timing plug was removed from the magneto and the internal gears could be seen rotating when the propeller was turned. Attempts to start the right engine were not successful. There was fuel present at the carburetor but no spark was produced from the magneto. The internal inspection of the magneto revealed that neither set of breaker points were opening and the points for the right side were off set approximately 50%. All except one of the mounting screws that hold the breaker points assembly were sufficiently torqued. The one that was slightly loose was at the pivot point of the assembly and not at the adjusting slot. The right magneto was retained by FAA for further NTSB investigation. (See FAA Inspector statement.)

The engines were removed from the airplane and placed on a test stand. The left engine had a serviceable propeller installed to replaced the propeller bent during the accident. The engine started normally and allowed to idle. The crankshaft propeller flange was bent from accident damage and the engine vibrated excessively. The engine could not be operated above idle. The right engine magneto was replaced with a serviceable magneto. The right engine was started and operated to full power with no signs of failure or malfunction of the engine assembly and engine fuel system. (See Daytona Beach Jet Center statement.)

At the direction of the Manager, FAA, Orlando, Flight Standards District Office, the FAA inspector assigned to the accident investigation, and who had retained the right magneto for NTSB investigation, returned the magneto to the airplane operator. The airplane operator took the failed right magneto to Maxwell's Magneto Shop, Daytona Beach, Florida. The cam followers on both sets of breaker points was found melted and the points would not open. The breaker points were reset with a proper gap and the magneto produced spark. Additionally, it was determined that the capacitors should have been removed from the magneto in accordance with Teledyne Continental Motors, Critical Service Bulletin CSB662A, (See Maxwell's Magneto Shop report.)

After the right magneto was returned to the FAA, Orlando, FSDO, the NTSB instructed the FAA inspector to send the magneto to Teledyne Continental Motors, Mobile, Alabama, the magneto manufacturer. Examination of the right magneto by Teledyne Continental Motors personnel, under the supervision of an FAA inspector, showed that there were signatures indicating excessive temperature that suggest overheating of the rear bearing as the origin of the magneto malfunction. These signatures were blued bearing retainer, grease exuded from the bearing, lack of lubrication in the cam, and cam followers scrubbed against the cam. There was no evidence that the capacitors not complying with CSB662A was a factor in the failure of the magneto. (See Teledyne Continental Report.)

Airplane logbook records showed the magneto was overhauled by Maxwell's Magneto Shop on March 8, 2000. The magneto was installed on the right engine of N3060D on March 11, 2000, 1,027.6 flight hours before the accident. On April 3, 2001, .5 flight hours before the accident, the right engine had a loss of engine power. The instructor pilot for the flight reported they had a 70% loss of engine power during flight followed by a backfire noise. The engine quit completely after vacating the runway. They could not restart the engine and had an electrical fire smell during the restart attempt. The mechanic who repaired the engine stated he removed the right engine magneto, checked the internal timing, adjusted the points, and reinstalled the magneto on the engine. (See logbook records and mechanic statement.)

The Piper Aircraft Corporation, PA-44-180 Pilot Operating Handbook, states in Section 3, Emergency Procedures, Engine Inoperative Procedures, that if altitude permits, a restart may be attempted. If restart fails or if altitude does not permit restart, see Engine Securing Procedure. The Engine Securing Procedure states the propeller from the inoperative engine should be feathered. (See pages from Pilot Operating Handbook.)

NTSB Probable Cause

The pilot in command, flight instructor's delayed feathering of the right propeller after engine failure resulting in the airplane being unable to maintain altitude with the remaining engine and damage to the airplane during a forced landing in a field.