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N35BA accident description

Florida map... Florida list
Crash location 30.825278°N, 85.800278°W
Nearest city Bonifay, FL
30.791856°N, 85.679653°W
7.5 miles away
Tail number N35BA
Accident date 05 Feb 2005
Aircraft type Bell 206B
Additional details: None

NTSB Factual Report

HISTORY OF THE FLIGHT

On February 5, 2005, about 0550 central standard time, a Bell 206B JetRanger helicopter, N35BA, registered to, and operated by Lance Aviation, as a Title 14 CFR Part 91 positioning flight, crashed in the town of Bonifay, in Holmes County, Florida. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed, and no flight plan was filed. The commercial-rated pilot received fatal injuries, and the helicopter incurred substantial damage. The flight was originating at the time of the accident.

A witness, the pilot's wife, stated that the helicopter had been parked overnight at her parent's residence, and on the morning of the accident it was being repositioned to its home base at Lance Aviation, in Lakeland, Florida. She said that she awakened with her husband and prepared breakfast while he preflighted the helicopter. After breakfast she then watched as her husband prepared to depart. Prior to departure she said her husband used the garden hose and washed the windscreen with water. He then embarked the helicopter, started the engine, and "warmed up the helicopter." She said he then lifted the helicopter into a hover, and hover taxied from the back of the house, where it had been parked, and initiated a normal takeoff in the open field to the side of the house, as he had done in the past.

She said she watched the takeoff, and at an altitude of about 75 to 100 feet, the helicopter assumed a slight nose low descending attitude. She said this was something her husband did not normally do when he departs, and it made her think that he was going to land the helicopter. She said the helicopter continued to descend with no other abnormal movements, and it then suddenly fell to the ground. She said it landed upright on its landing gear and then rolled right. When asked, she added that the helicopter had been operating normally, and she did not hear any unusual noises, or observe any erratic movement associated with the helicopter, and that all she saw initially prior to the impact was a gradual nose low right side low, but faster than normal descent. She said it was not the usual gentle movements she had observed her husband perform countless times before when landing or taking off in the helicopter.

A second witness, the pilot's father in law, stated that he was asleep, and he awakened when he heard the helicopter engine. He then quickly got dressed so he could observe the helicopter depart. He said that the helicopter was departing as the sun was coming up. He said that there was sufficient light such as to permit him to see the pilot's face. He said he was standing at the edge of the driveway when the helicopter was about 100 feet in the air, and he heard a loud "pop" noise, saw a momentary blaze of fire, and then the helicopter nosed over, and descended impacting the ground upside down.

PERSONNEL INFORMATION

Information obtained from the FAA showed that the pilot held a FAA commercial pilot certificate with rotorcraft and instrument ratings, issued on December 28, 2000. He also held an FAA second-class medical certificate issued on March 25, 2004, with the stated limitations that he wear corrective lenses for near and distant vision.

According to the pilot's logbook, labeled "Logbook Number 4", whose entries began on May 6, 2004, and the pilot reported having accumulated about 4,827 total flight hours in helicopters. The records also showed that on January 13, 2005, he completed a flight review in a Bell 206 helicopter.

AIRCRAFT INFORMATION

N35BA is a Bell 206B JetRanger helicopter, serial number 487, manufactured in 1969. Originally the helicopter had been an "A" model, but had undergone modifications to convert it to a "B" model. At the time of the accident, the helicopter had accumulated about 15,696.1 total flight hours on the airframe.

The helicopter was also equipped with a 420 horsepower, Allison Model 250-C20B turbo-shaft engine, whose serial number was CAE 830164.

Maintenance records showed that the helicopter was last received an annual inspection on August 4, 2004, its last 300-hour inspection on December 1, 2004, and its last 100-hour inspection on January 2, 2005. At the time of the accident, the helicopter had reportedly accumulated 81.6 flight hours since its last inspection, and about 1,734.6 flight hours since major overhaul. The helicopter's records also indicated that its static system, altimeter, and transponder had last been last tested on December 1, 2004.

METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATION

Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time. The Panama City-Bay County International Airport, Panama City, Florida, surface weather observation was wind calm, visibility 6 statute miles, sky condition clear, temperature 5 degrees Celsius, dew point temperature 3 degrees Celsius, altimeter setting 30.28 inHg.

About the time of the accident, astronomical data showed that for the location of the accident, civil twilight was predicted to commence at 0606, and sunrise at 0631.

WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATION

N35BA crashed in an open field in front of, and on the east side of a residence located at 2415 Bonifay Gritney Road, Bonifay, Florida, a rural area of Holmes County, about 9 miles south of the city of Bonifay, Florida. The helicopter was located in geographic position 30 degrees, 49.516 minutes North latitude, 085 degrees, 48.009 minutes West longitude, and came to rest in an area of the field which had about a 5 to 7 degree left to right down sloping gradient. The main rotor, transmission, and tailboom had separated from the fuselage, and the fuselage underside had fractured near the aft cross tube. There was ground scarring consistent with the helicopter having impacted hard on its right skid first, and also scarring indicative of there being little or no forward movement at the time of impact.

The cockpit was configured with the controls installed on the right side, and all controls to include the cyclic, collective, pedals and throttle linkage moved freely when manipulated. Control components were examined and all fractures were consistent with overload. The vertical control tubes had fractured at the upper ends, and were connected at the lower ends. The cockpit had maintained its integrity, and there was minimal damage to the instruments. The fuel cutoff switch was in the "on" position, and all exterior light switches were in the off position. The anti-collision and position lights were in the "off" position. The start/heater, generator and battery and blower defog switches were in the "on" position. The altimeter displayed about 850 feet , and had a barometric pressure setting of 30.03 inHg. The airspeed indicator read about 10 knots.

On the right side of the wreckage, about a 3-foot long and 11-inch deep gouge was noted, consistent with the "white" blade, which had the most damage, having first struck the ground. The white blade's outboard tip had separated and was found about 75 feet in front of the main wreckage. In addition, the "red" blade had also fractured at the outboard edge of the doublers, however, both rotor blades except for the separated sections, were connected to the mast and transmission. The transmission had separated from the fuselage at its base, and was lying under the tailboom. The damage was consistent with the main rotor being driven when it struck the ground. The pitch change links had also fractured consistent with overload.

The helicopter's roof and beam assembly were displaced, and the beam assembly had torn through the roof. Control tubes had fractured, and , and the pylon support links had been displaced. The collective sleeve, swashplate, and support were still present on the mast above the transmission and they exhibited heavy impact damage. The mast did not display any notable damage, and both cyclic servos and the collective hydraulic actuators had remained attached to the cylinder support assembly. The control tubes attaching to the actuators were fractured consistent with overload.

The main transmission, main driveshaft, and main rotor system had separated from the fuselage roof and were found lying under the tailboom of the aircraft. The main driveshaft had been pulled from the outer coupling of the main driveshaft at the transmission end. The damage observed was consistent with the main rotor being driven when it struck the ground. In addition, the transmission input quill was consistent with the coupling being attached, and being driven at the time of separation. Also consistent with the impact, the transmission mount points were torn from the pylon support links, and the threads on the transmission mount bolts had smeared and the bolt studs were bent. The damage to the mounts and the pylon support links was consistent with the transmission mount studs nuts having been stripped from the mount studs. In addition, consistent with the transmission's separation, the control tubes, idler lever and collar set, had all incurred damage. During examination, the transmission turned freely and drive continuity through the transmission was confirmed. There was no notable damage to the mast.

The tail boom sustained impact damage consistent with the impact, and had partially fractured and was twisted in a clockwise direction, as viewed from the rear. Both horizontal stabilizers had sustained impact damage consistent with the main rotor strike and rolling of the aircraft. The tail rotor driveshaft had fractured and it displayed rotational scoring at locations along the length of the tailboom. The tail rotor control head and control assembly was undamaged, and the controls remained connected and moved freely. Movement of the control tube inside the tail boom produced corresponding movement of the tail rotor blades, and the blades rotated freely.

Both horizontal stabilizers had incurred compression damage and the skin displayed wrinkles. The left horizontal stabilizer had a slash mark to the undersurface of the stabilizer, which exposed the its interior to include the rib. The top stabilizer was undamaged except for the beacon lens, which had detached, and the lower vertical stabilizer had been slashed at about the mid point, and was bent upward, but remained attached.

On scene examination revealed a small amount of grass in the area had burned, and a portion of the engine exhaust cowling was found on the exhaust stacks, and it too displayed heat damage as well as carbon accumulation, consistent with the engine operating post-impact for some period of time.

The Allison 250 engine was attached to the fuselage, and there was no evidence of any external damage to the engine. The onscene examination revealed evidence consistent with the engine operating at the time of impact. The N1 and N2 drives displayed rotational continuity, all air and fuel lines and associated fittings were tight and no fractures were noted. The compressor first stage blades and vanes displayed evidence of foreign object damage (FOD) ingestion, and both engine magnetic indicating plugs were found not to have any material present. The NTSB secured the engine for a more detailed examination.

The aft cross tube connecting the skids had been pushed up into the bottom portion of the fuselage consistent with a hard landing, and the fuel bladder located above had ruptured. No fuel was present in the engine fuel filter or the fuel nozzle inlet fuel line. The fuel nozzle screen was clean and not collapsed. The airframe fuel filter was found void of fuel, and the filter was clean and free of obstructions.

During the emergency response the fire and rescue personnel had dispersed a water and chemical foam on the aircraft wreckage. Subsequent fuel samples taken from the remaining fuel in the aircraft tank were white and cloudy in appearance and did not exhibit a strong fuel odor. The fuel samples were examined in a laboratory, and no anomalies were found. The NTSB secured the fuel control unit for further examination

On March 8, 2005, a detailed engine examination was conducted at Aeromaritime Incorporated, Mesa, Arizona, under the supervision of an FAA inspector, and the examination revealed no evidence of preimpact anomalies. All shafting, gears and bearings were intact, the first stage turbine nozzle had metal splatter. No anomalies were noted to the power turbine, and the forth stage nozzle, third stage blade track area had significant rub in the knee area. The compressor first stage blades and vanes had significant fod damage, and the fuel nozzle screen was clean and had not collapsed.

On May 24, 2005, the power turbine governor and main fuel control units was examined and given functional tests by Honeywell Engine Systems and Services, South Bend, Indiana, under the supervision of an FAA inspector, and the examination of the power turbine governor revealed both units to be within operational limits, and no anomalies were noted that would have precluded normal operation.

MEDICAL AND PATHOLOGICAL INFORMATION

On February 7, 2005, a Medical Examiner, District 14, Panama City, Florida, performed a postmortem examination of the pilot. The cause of death was attributed to blunt force trauma to the back of the head. No findings which could be considered causal to the accident were reported.

The FAA Toxicological Laboratory, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, performed postmortem toxicology testing on specimens obtained from the pilot. Tests were conducted for carbon monoxide, cyanide, volatiles and drugs, and none were found to be present.

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

On February 7, 2005, the NTSB released the wreckage of N35BA to Mr. Eric Vorce, General Manager, Lance Aviation. The NTSB retained the Allison 250-C20B engine assembly for later examination and it was released to Mr. Eric Vorce on June 22, 2005.

NTSB Probable Cause

The pilot's failure to maintain a climb after takeoff and his continued descent which resulted in an in-flight collision with the ground. A factor in the accident was the dark night.

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