NTSB Factual Report

On April 14, 2018, about 1540 eastern daylight time, an SZD-48 Jantar Standard 2 glider, N456RM, was substantially damaged when it entered a descent and collided with the ground during the initial climb from La Belle Municipal Airport (X14), La Belle, Florida. The private pilot was fatally injured. The airplane was registered to and operated by the private pilot under the provisions of Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 as a personal flight. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed, and no flight plan was filed for the local flight.

According to witnesses that assisted the pilot in assembling the glider prior to the flight, they stated the assembly was normal. After affixing the wings to the fuselage, the pilot prepared for launch. The glider was attached to the tow rope of the tow airplane and positioned on the runway.

According to the tow pilot, he had towed the pilot's glider for the past five years and spoke highly of the pilot's abilities. He said that he and the glider pilot were in radio communication prior to takeoff. The tow pilot said the pilot requested a "left break" after takeoff, which was precautionary, in the event the tow rope broke on climb out. The tow pilot was not concerned with this request since the winds were aligned with the active runway. The pilot also requested to be towed up to "3,000 ft above the field before release" and the tow pilot acknowledged. During the climb out, about 200 ft above ground level (agl), the tow pilot noticed that the tow rope had a lot of slack, which did not seem normal. He also said that the glider was "moving around a lot more than he was accustomed too." The tow pilot started a shallow turn to the right to keep the airplane upwind and to "take up the slack in the tow rope." After this maneuver the glider did not reduce the slack out of the line, which effected the glider's airspeed. At 400 ft agl the glider encountered a thermal and began to climb rapidly while lifting the tail of the tow airplane. The tow pilot was about to release the glider when it released from the tow rope. The tow pilot continued in straight level flight to avoid the glider, and when he was far enough away to look back he noticed that the glider was about 200 ft below the tow airplane in a spin. The glider continued in a spin until it collided with the ground.

According to Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) records, the glider pilot held an air transport pilot certificate with ratings for airplane single and multi-engine land, glider, and instrument airplane. He reported a total flight experience of 25,000 hours including 71 hours during the last 6 months, on his FAA third-class medical certificate application, dated May 18, 2017. A review of the pilot's logbook record revealed that it was his third glider logbook. The logbook revealed that the pilot had carried over 399.1 hours of total flight time in gliders. Further review showed that the pilot had accumulated a total of 42.4 hours in the accident glider.

According to FAA records, the glider was manufactured in 1981 as a one-seat standard class high-performance glider. It was made of glass-fiber reinforced epoxy resin.

At 1535, the recorded weather at Immokalee Regional Airport (IMM), Immokalee, Florida, about 18 nautical miles north of the accident site, included wind from 160° at 11 knots, 10 statute miles visibility and clear skies. The temperature was 34° C, the dew point was 14° C, and the altimeter setting was 29.98 inches of mercury.

Examination of the accident site revealed that the glider came to rest in a cow pasture about 1/2 mile southeast of the airport. The glider was orientated on a 030° magnetic heading, with the debris field extending from the initial impact crater out to 75 ft. All flight control surfaces were accounted for at the accident site.

Examination of the fuselage revealed the cockpit hull was fragmented aft of the wing attachment assembly, and all flight controls and pushrods were exposed. The aileron pushrods were traced back to the quick locks aft of the wing spars. Both quick locks were intact and did not show signs of damage. The airbrake control was traced to the airbrake assembly in the fuselage, and when manipulated, it rotated the airbrake tubes within the fuselage. The elevator pushrod was traced back to the empennage and when moved revealed continuity. The empennage was broken away from the fuselage and impact damaged. The pushrods for the elevator and rudder were impact damaged.

Examination of the left wing revealed the leading edge of the wing exhibited crush damage. The wing remained intact throughout the span of the wing. The aileron control tube was manipulated, and continuity was established to the aileron. The attachment fitting on the aileron control tube that was connected to the quick lock in the fuselage was impact damaged. The left wing was partially attached to the fuselage, displaced forward and impact damaged at the wing root. The wing was equipped with an airbrake system. Examination of the airbrake revealed that it was in the extended position. When the airbrake control tube was rotated, the airbrake retracted.

Examination of the right wing revealed the outboard section of the wing was fragmented and the aileron was broken away from the attachment points. The aileron control tube was manipulated, and continuity was established to the aileron attachment fitting. The attachment fitting that connected to the quick lock in the fuselage was impact damaged. The right wing was partially attached to the fuselage and impact damaged at the wing root. Examination of the airbrake revealed that it was in the stowed position. The airbrake control tube was rotated and the airbrake deployed. The control tube was broken at the gear fitting at the wing root. The control tube was removed and retained for further examination at the NTSB Materials laboratory.