NTSB Factual Report

HISTORY OF FLIGHT

On March 3, 2003, about 1929 eastern standard time, a Piper PA-28R-201T, N6369C, registered to Cherry Hill Aviation, Inc., was lost from radar and radio contact with Jacksonville Air Route Traffic Control Center and crashed in the Gulf of Mexico near Cedar Key, Florida. Instrument meteorological conditions prevailed in the area at the time and no flight plan was filed for the 14 CFR Part 91 personal flight from Key West International Airport, Key West, Florida, to Tallahassee Regional Airport (KTLH), Tallahassee, Florida. The airplane was destroyed and the private-rated pilot and one passenger were fatally injured. The flight originated about 1733, from Key West International Airport.

After takeoff, air traffic control communications (ATC) were transferred to several air traffic control facilities including Miami Air Route Traffic Control Center (Miami ARTCC), Southwest Florida International Airport Air Traffic Control Tower (KRSW ATCT), and Jacksonville Air Route Traffic Control Center (Jacksonville ARTCC). Before establishing ATC communications with the KRSW ATCT, the pilot contacted the Miami Automated Flight Service Station En Route Flight Advisory Service (Miami AFSS EFAS), and was provided in part AIRMET, SIGMET, rain and thunderstorm information. The pilot established contact with the KRSW ATCT at approximately 1807, and while in contact with that facility, the pilot inquired about the weather conditions ahead to which he was advised of the limitations of the radar and that the only weather observed was located northeast of his position. The flight continued and ATC communications were transferred to the Miami ARTCC. While in contact with the R24 sector controller of that facility, the pilot advised the controller that he observed "buildups" that were located 70-80 miles ahead and questioned the best route by asking whether he needed to "...go ahead and make a turn inland now or ah if it looks like we will be alright." The controller replied, "ah there’s a big front it its ah covering the whole pan handle...." The pilot responded, "ok roger that um how’s it looking out ah on the in the gulf is it worse in the gulf or is it better over land." The controller replied, "it is a big long front that is extending out into the gulf and up towards new york." The pilot acknowledged the comment from the controller who then advised the pilot that the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Flight Service Station might have more information. The pilot requested to go off frequency for a period of time which was acknowledged by the controller. At approximately 1821, the pilot established contact again with the Miami AFSS EFAS and obtained pilot reports. The pilot re-established contact with the Miami ARTCC R24 sector controller, and ATC communications were then transferred to the R7 sector controller, then to the R8 sector controller of the Miami ARTCC.

While in contact with the Sector 8 controller, the pilot was advised by the controller, "...i am depicting some uh weather in the vicinity of tampa but I believe that's mainly at high altitude." The pilot reported, "ah roger that ah we are looking at some ah buildups up ahead it looks um if we kinda headed (garbled area of transmission) direct um tampa at this time um we might ah kinda go through it is that not accurate" The controller advised the pilot that the transmission from him was garbled and requested the pilot repeat his question. The pilot advised the controller that he was turning to a heading of 345 degrees which looked to him to fly between "...a couple of ah larger buildups is that ah are you painting that same picture." The controller replied, "yeah that looks like about just to the west of ah saint Petersburg about 3 miles or so", which the pilot acknowledged. The controller then advised the pilot that the higher intensity weather was located at higher altitudes, and if he needed anything different to let him know. The pilot then advised the controller that he would stay on a heading of 345 degrees, which was acknowledged by the controller. The pilot then contacted the controller and advised that, "...we are just ah coming up on some of these ah overcast buildups (portion unreadable) and want to ah check and see how its looking out there in front of us if ah it looks like its going to be fairly broken or ah if we need to get on down." The controller questioned if the pilot wanted to contact Flight Watch to which he replied, "ah yeah unless um unless you can tell us what you're painting there ah we'll be glad to ah check flight watch." The controller advised the pilot he was, "...welcome to check flight watch in addition to ah im showing ah a couple of cells ah but like I said that all appears to be high altitude it looks like from your present position a heading of about 310 or about 010 will keep you clear to the big stuff." The pilot replied that he wanted to be sure that he was not getting into too many overcast areas, was going to stay on a heading of 345 degrees, there was buildups to his left, and then he would be able to make a turn for Tallahassee. The controller did not acknowledge that transmission and ATC communications were then transferred to Jacksonville Air Route Traffic Control Center (Jacksonville ARTCC).

The pilot established contact with the Jacksonville ARTCC at 1855:10, and advised the controller that the flight was at "twelve five." The controller acknowledged that transmission and provided the pilot with an altimeter setting. The pilot then questioned the controller as to what type of weather his radar was depicting to which the controller responded that between his present position and Tallahassee, "...not that much some stuff off your ten o'clock and about 40 miles but looks like its not in your flight path right now." The pilot questioned the controller if he was depicting any cloud cover between his position and Tallahassee to which the controller responded, "i don't paint that uh all i paint is heavy [precipitation] on my radar...." At 1856:53, the non-instrumented rated pilot advised the controller, "...we are in a little bit of clouds here and uh trying to uh maintain vfr." At 1857:09, the controller questioned the pilot if he wanted to obtain an instrument flight rules clearance to which he responded, "well we'll uh give it just a second here"; the controller did not respond. At 1903:38, the pilot contacted the controller and questioned if a 336 heading would keep the flight out of, "...most of the weather." The controller questioned the pilot if wanted to stay "...vfr" and fly heading 336 to which the pilot replied, "...we're picking our way through it pretty good didn't want to make sure we're running ourselves into some little hole up ahead of us." The controller advised the pilot that weather radar does not depict "cloud cover", that VFR or IFR was available to him, and that if he continued VFR he would point out traffic to him. The pilot advised the controller that, "...we got a little uh reliability problem with ah with one of our instruments this afternoon so we're going to do our best to stay out of the ifr"; the controller did not acknowledge that transmission. At 1904:56, the pilot advised the controller that he would like to go to flight watch which the controller approved.

At 1905:06, the pilot contacted Miami AFSS EFAS and questioned what the weather radar depicted between his present position (approximately 30 miles northwest of Tampa International Airport), and Tallahassee. The briefing specialist advised the pilot that based on his position report the airplane appeared to be in an area of heavy rain showers and asked the pilot if he was encountering any precipitation. The pilot responded negative bit he did report some buildups to his left with scattered heavy cloud cover. The briefing specialist advised the pilot to expect continuous rain showers off an on for his route of flight with "activity" moving from the southwest to the northeast, with the latest data indicating broken area of moderate to heavy rain showers "...just in front of you...", with no reported tops. While the briefing specialist looked to determine the tops, the pilot advised the briefing specialist that the flight was coming out of, "...a little more extensive cloud cover...", and reported that the cloud cover, "we've been coming through was pretty close to uh twelve thousand five hundred...." During that same transmission the pilot asked the controller if a 334 heading would "keep working for us." The briefing specialist advised the pilot that moderate to heavy rain showers existed across his route of flight, that there were some isolated imbedded thunderstorms, but there was no convective sigmet for his route of flight.

At 1912:14, the Miami AFSS EFAS briefing specialist advised the pilot that he was seeing a "...fairly good size uh level three thunderstorm approximately uh thirty miles west of cedar key with a uh area of uh light to moderate rain showers extending northward up to coastline...", and also, "...i probably uh try to swing east of that cell uh along the coastline and east of the key cedar key area and on up towards tallahassee from there over." The pilot responded by stating that he would go a little more westbound to which the briefing specialist advised, "...you stay about that far out off the coast you probably going to run right into it looks like you probably want to swing a little east of that cell and uh linger along the coastline near cedar key...." The briefing specialist also advised the pilot to contact Jacksonville Flight Watch and that the cell he was looking at was located approximately 30 miles west-southwest of cedar key and it could diminish but it also could continue in its present state and, "you probably [want] to steer a little bit east of that over." The briefing specialist asked the pilot if he anticipated the possibility of flying into instrument conditions to which he advised of "one instrument that ah we're not relying on real heavily so we're going to go ahead and take a more northerly turn at this time and uh more or less uh you think heading direct cross city...." At 1916:10, the briefing specialist asked the pilot for a more current position report to which the pilot replied that the flight was 65 miles south-southwest of the Cross City VOR. The briefing specialist advised the pilot, "...direction is recommended to toward cedar key and uh at this point you can still swing into the cedar key area and move north along the coastline uh heading towards cross city is recommended at this point over." The pilot advised the briefing specialist that he was heading 010 degrees, and the briefing specialist provided the pilot the cross city altimeter setting and advised him to contact Jacksonville Flight Watch for further updates. The pilot only reported hearing the flight watch information and advised the briefing specialist at 1918:42, that he was changing back to Jacksonville ARTCC frequency.

The pilot re-established two-way communications with the Jacksonville ARTCC at about 1920, and advised the controller that the flight was descending from 12,500 to 10,500 msl. The controller acknowledged hearing the part that the airplane was descending and at 1924:32, the pilot asked the controller what the weather currently looked like at the Cedar Key. The controller advised the pilot, "...just west of cedar key im painting uh just a couple of heavy returns out there but uh over cedar key im not painting anything right now." At 1927:50, the controller advised the pilot, "...i got uh one heavy return painting about twelve o'clock and two and a half miles." The pilot responded at 1928:19, by stating, "jacksonville center six niner charlie uh we could use some help." The controller responded that a 120 heading would take him into the clearest area; the pilot did not respond to this transmission. At 1929:12, the controller stated, "...uh don’t uh turn too tight there you might want to level your wings and stay straight for a bit." The pilot did not acknowledge that transmission and there were no further recorded radio transmissions from the pilot of the accident airplane.

Review of NTSB plotted radar data revealed that from 1900:04, to 1915:54, the airplane flew at 12,600 feet mean sea level (msl) on a northwesterly heading while flying over the Gulf of Mexico. At 1915:54, the airplane turned right and proceeded on a north-northeasterly course and continued flying at 12,600 feet msl, until 1919:30. From 1919:30, to 1927:18, the airplane remained on the north-northeasterly course but descended from 12,600 feet msl to 8,800 feet msl. A review of the radar targets overlaid onto a weather radar chart indicates that no weather radar echoes were noted along the flight path for the altitude flown between 1917:06, and approximately 1922:06, at which time the airplane was at the south edge of depicted weather echoes. Between approximately 1922:06, and 1928:42, the airplane remained nearly continuously in depicted weather echoes. The plotted radar targets indicate that at 1927:54, the airplane began a left descending turn with an average rate of descent of 4,000 feet-per minute between the 1927:54, and 1928:06 radar targets. The airplane continued in a left turn but descended only 200 feet at the next radar target at 1928:18. The airplane continued in a left descending turn flying in a southerly then southeasterly direction. The calculated average rate of descent between the 1928:30 radar target (8,300 feet msl), and the last radar target at 1929:18 (1,700 feet msl), was in excess of 5,000 feet-per-minute. The last radar target was located at 29 degrees 06.216 minutes North latitude and 083 degrees 08.950 minutes West longitude.

The airplane crashed in the Gulf of Mexico during the hours of darkness; there were no known witnesses to the accident. The wreckage was located on March 4, 2003, at 1431 hours, in about 12 feet of water at 29 degrees, 06.060 minutes North latitude and 083 degrees 06.890 minutes West longitude.

PERSONNEL INFORMATION

The pilot was the holder of a private pilot certificate with airplane single-engine land rating which was issued on August 8, 2000. A review of Federal Aviation Administration records revealed he did not have any accidents or incidents or enforcement actions when checked using his pilot certificate number. He was last issued a third class medical certificate with no limitations on September 27, 1999.

A review of his pilot logbook that contained entries from November 4, 1998, to an entry dated October 6, of an unknown year (presumed to be 2001), revealed he logged a total time of approximately 682 hours. Of the 682 logged hours, 616 were in the accident airplane. He logged a total time of 646 hours as pilot-in-command (PIC), of which 604 hours were in the accident airplane. He also logged a total of approximately 17 and 20 hours of actual instrument and simulated instrument flight time, respectively. He logged approximately 15 hours actual instrument flight time on 34 flights as PIC; the entries for these flights did not contain a signature by a certified flight instructor or safety pilot. He also logged approximately 12 hours simulated instrument flight time on 20 flights as PIC; the entries for these flights also did not contain a signature by a certified flight instructor or safety pilot. Further review of his pilot logbook revealed that prior to the date of obtaining his private pilot certificate (August 8, 2000), he logged 3.25 hours of actual instrument flight time as PIC during 10 separate flights. None of the entries contained a signature by a certified flight instructor; one entry dated April 25th, has "20 min in IFR" in the remarks section for that flight. His last logged instrument instruction flight occurred on August 1, 2001, in which 1.3 hours simulated instrument time of a 1.6 hour flight occurred with a certified flight instructor.

No determination was made as to the date of his last biennial flight review.

AIRCRAFT INFORMATION

The airplane was manufactured by The Piper Aircraft Company, Inc., in 1978, as model PA-28R-201T, and designated serial number 28R-7803222. It was certificated in the normal category and was equipped with a 200-horsepower Teledyne Continent

NTSB Probable Cause

The pilot's inadequate in-flight planning/decision by his continued VFR flight into instrument meteorological condition after receiving an in-flight weather advisory. Also causal was his failure to maintain aircraft control, which resulted in flight that exceeded the design limits of the aircraft and resulted in an in-flight breakup. Contributing factors were the pilot's overconfidence in his personal ability, and the failure of the National Weather Service to issue an Airmet to identify IFR conditions for the area of the accident.