NTSB Factual Report

HISTORY OF FLIGHT

On November 16, 2000, at 1548 eastern standard time, a U.S. Air Force F-16CG, operated by the 347th Wing, Air Combat Command, collided in mid air with a Cessna 172, N73829, near Bradenton, Florida. The F-16, based at Moody Air Force Base (AFB), Valdosta, Georgia, was on a low-altitude training mission. The Cessna 172, registered to Crystal Aero Group, was operating as a 14 CFR Part 91 personal flight. The airline transport (ATP)-rated Cessna pilot was killed. The F-16 pilot, who held a commercial pilot's certificate, ejected from the airplane and sustained minor injuries. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the accident. The accident F-16 was part of a flight of two F-16s. A composite military instrument flight rules (IFR)/visual flight rules (VFR) flight plan was filed. The two F-16s departed Moody AFB at 1513. The Cessna 172 departed Sarasota Bradenton International Airport (SRQ) Sarasota, Florida, about 1541. No flight plan was filed.

The accident F-16 pilot, who was using call sign Ninja 2, stated that he was maintaining visual formation with his flight lead, call sign Ninja 1, when he saw a blur "like a sheet of white" appear in front of him. He stated that the airplane shuddered violently, and part of the canopy on the left side was broken away. The accident pilot stated that wind, smoke, and a strong electrical smell filled the cockpit. He stated that he called his flight lead several times, but could not hear a reply. Because the airplane was still controllable, he decided to try to reach MacDill AFB, and he began a right turn in that direction. He stated that his primary flight instruments were shattered and that he could not see them. He stated that the engine began to spool down and that he realized that he would not be able to make the airport. He stated that he turned the airplane left toward a wooded area away from a residential area and attempted an engine restart, which was not successful. When the airplane cleared the residential area, it started an uncommanded left roll. When the airplane went past a 90-degree bank angle, the pilot stated that he decided to eject. During his parachute descent, he observed the airplane "pancake" into the ground inverted and explode.

The flight lead stated that the two F-16s were assigned a block altitude of between 25,000 feet and 26,000 feet en route to the entry point of visual military training route (MRT) VR-1098. As the flight approached the SRQ area, Miami Air Route Traffic Control Center (ARTCC) cleared the F-16s to descend to 13,000 feet. At 1543:39, the Miami ARTCC controller instructed the flight lead to contact Tampa Terminal Radar Approach Control (TRACON) controllers. The flight lead was not successful (because he was given an incorrect frequency), and he reestablished contact with Miami ARTCC and canceled IFR. Miami ARTCC advised him of traffic at 10,000 feet, which was acquired on radar. The controller accepted the cancellation and asked the pilot if he wished to continue receiving radar traffic advisory services. The flight lead declined. According to the air traffic control (ATC) transcripts, the controller then stated, "radar service terminated, squawk VFR [transponder code 1200], frequency change approved, but before you go you have traffic ten o'clock about 15 miles northwest bound, a Beech 1900 at ten thousand [feet]." The flight then began a VFR descent to enter VR-1098. (For additional information see Air Traffic Control Group Chairman's Factual Report attachment to this report.)

The flight lead informed Ninja2 that they were going to perform a "G" check (G awareness maneuver). They accelerated to 400 knots, made a right 90-degree turn, followed by a left 90-degree turn back on course, and continued their descent below 10,000 feet. The flight lead then instructed the accident pilot to assume the "fighting wing" formation (with the wingman at the 7 o'clock position behind the flight lead). They continued to descend through 5,000 feet about 6 miles north of the entry point to VR-1098. The flight lead attempted to obtain a visual reference to the entry point. The flight lead also looked at his low-altitude en route chart to reference the class B airspace at Tampa and the class C airspace at Sarasota.

About 1547, the F-16 flight was heading south and descending through 4,300 feet on a converging course with N73829. Radar data indicated that the flight had overshot its intended entry point to VR-1098 and was several miles southwest of the MTR. The flight had also inadvertently passed through Tampa class B airspace without the required ATC clearance and was about to enter the Sarasota class C airspace without establishing communications with ATC, which is required by Federal regulations.

After continuing to descend, the flight lead looked back to the left and observed the accident F-16 slightly below him at the 7 o' clock position and about 4,000 feet to 5,000 feet behind him. The flight lead also observed a white, high-wing white airplane (the Cessna) in a 30 to 45-degree right turn. The Cessna and the accident F-16 collided in a left-to-left impact at the flight lead's 10 o' clock position, he stated. After the collision, the flight lead observed vaporizing fuel on the F-16's right side. The flight lead did not see the Cessna. The flight lead called the accident pilot and stated, "it appears you have had a mid air and are streaming fuel." There was no response. The flight lead began a left turn to keep the accident F-16 in sight. The flight lead saw the accident pilot bail out and the airplane collide with the ground. At 15:48:55, the flight lead stated, "mayday mayday." At 15:49:11, the flight leader stated, "mayday mayday mayday F sixteen down." At 15:50:00, the flight lead stated, "yes this is Ninja one we have an F sixteen down there is a light aircraft may have also gone down sir I am not sure." The collision occurred about 2,000 feet msl, about 6 miles southwest of the entry point for VR-1098.

A review of ATC transcripts of communications between N73829 and Tampa TRACON and communication between Miami ARTCC and Tampa TRACON indicated that N73829 contacted Tampa TRACON at 15:45:19 stating he was off Sarasota-Bradenton at 1,600 feet. At 15:45:23, Tampa TRACON told N73829 to maintain 1,600 feet. N73829 acknowledged the transmission at 15:45:30. At 15:46:59, Tampa TRACON informed N73829 to turn left to heading 320 and to follow the shoreline northbound. At 15:47:10, Tampa TRACON instructed N73829 to climb and maintain 3,500 feet, which was acknowledged by N73829 at 15:47:15.

The Miami ARTCC controller contacted Tampa TRACON at 15:47:55 and asked Tampa TRACON for the flight lead's altitude because he had lost radar contact with the lead F-16 (only the flight lead had his transponder activated because formation flights are handled as a single aircraft by ATC). Tampa TRACON replied at 20:48:00, stating "ahh hang on I see him down at two thousand." At 15:48:09, Tampa TRACON informed N73829 that he had traffic off his left side at 2,000 feet. N73829 did not respond. (For additional information see the ATC transcript attachment to this report.)

A review of altitude data and ground track data (and airspace boundaries) determined that Tampa TRACON's intruder conflict detection software noted a conflict between the flight lead and the Cessna, and generated an aural conflict alert in the TRACON facility at 1547:39 that continued until 1548:03. The controller receiving instruction at the time of the accident told Safety Board investigators that he heard an alarm (conflict alert), but that he could not recall where it was. The controller providing instruction at the time of the accident stated that he didn't remember whether he saw an alert on his radar display or if he heard an aural conflict alert. He added that conflict alerts occur frequently, and that many were false. The conflict detection system did not account for the accident F-16, or a possible conflict, because it's transponder was in the standby mode. (For additional information see the NTSB Recorded Radar Study and the Air Traffic Control Group Chairman's Factual Report attached to this report.)

Witnesses stated that they heard the sound of approaching jets. They observed the first jet flying south, followed by the second jet located to the left and slightly lower than the first. They also observed a small civilian airplane flying from west to east, perpendicular to the military jets. The second jet collided with the civilian airplane and initially continued southbound, according to witness statements. The second jet was observed to make a right turn, followed by a left turn. A parachute was observed, and the airplane was observed to enter a flat spin to the left before it disappeared from view below the trees. An explosion was heard, followed by heavy dark smoke rising above the terrain. (For additional information see NTSB Group Chairman's Field Report, Ninja 1 and Ninja 2 pilot statements, and witness statements.)

PERSONNEL INFORMATION

Air Force training, flight evaluations and flight records indicated that the accident F-16 pilot, age 31, completed undergraduate pilot training on September 27, 1996. He was qualified in the F-16 on March 3, 1997, and graduated from the F-16 basic course on July 22, 1997. His most recent instrument/qualification examination was completed on October 22, 1999. His most recent mission examination was completed on June 21, 2000. He was qualified as a 2-airplane flight lead on March 19, 1999, and as a 4-airplane flight lead on January 11, 2000. He held a current military flight physical completed on May 30, 2000, with the restriction, "required to wear vision correction devices while performing flying or special operational duty." The pilot indicated on AF Form 1042 that he wore contact lenses while performing flying or special operational duty.

A review of FAA records indicated that the accident pilot held a commercial pilot certificate issued on September 9, 1999, with ratings for airplane single-engine land, airplane multi-engine land, and instrument airplane. In addition, he held a flight instructor certificate with ratings for airplane single-engine land, airplane multi-engine land, and instrument airplane. The pilot's FAA second-class medical certificate was issued on December 21, 1998, with no restrictions. He had accumulated a total of 1,279 flying hours.

Air Force training, flight evaluations and flight records indicated that the flight lead completed undergraduate pilot training on May 16, 1980. He was qualified in the F-16 on December 20, 1988, and graduated from the F-16 basic course in March 1989. Following a non-flying tour he completed the F-16 re-qualification course on June 8, 1998. His most recent instrument/qualification examination was completed on September 29, 2000. His most recent mission examination was completed on December 29, 1999. He was qualified as a 4-airplane flight lead on February 10, 2000. He held a current military flight physical completed on August 30, 2000, with the restriction "required to wear vision correction devices while performing flying or special operational duty." The pilot indicated on Air Force form 1042 that he did not wear contact lenses while performing flying or special operational duty.

A review of FAA records indicated that the flight lead held an ATP certificate issued on May 18, 2000, with ratings for airplane single-engine land, airplane multi-engine land, and instrument airplane. The flight lead held a first-class medical certificate issued on October 30, 2000, with the restriction "must wear corrective lenses."

The Cessna 172 pilot, age 57, held an ATP certificate issued on December 15, 1999, with ratings for airplane single-engine land, multi-engine land, and instrument airplane. In addition, he held a flight instructor certificate with ratings for airplane single-engine and multi-engine land, instrument airplane, and a ground instructor certificate for basic and advanced instruments. His first-class medical certificate was issued on September 14, 2000, with the restriction "must wear corrective lenses and possess glasses for near and distant vision." The pilot's logbook was destroyed in the crash. The pilot indicated on his last medical certificate application that he had accumulated 2,020 flight hours.

AIRCRAFT INFORMATION

The accident F-16 was equipped with a General Electric turbofan F110-GE-100 engine. The engine was overhauled by Tinker AFB Oklahoma, Air Logistics Center, on December 17, 1998. The engine operating time was 2,537.5 hours, with 5,610 engine total accumulated cycles (TACs). The engine had accumulated 640 operating hours since overhaul. The airframe had accumulated 3,243.7 total flight hours. All time compliance technical orders pertaining to the airframe and engine assembly had been accomplished.

A Safety Board review of N73829's airplane logbooks indicated that the last recorded altimeter, static, and transponder system checks were completed on November 11, 1999. The last annual inspection was conducted on April 7, 2000. The last 100-hour inspection was conducted on November 13, 2000.

METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATION

The nearest weather reporting facility at the time of the accident was Sarasota-Bradenton Airport. The 1553 surface weather observation indicated the following: clear, visibility 10 miles, temperature 80 degrees Fahrenheit, dew point 64 degrees Fahrenheit, wind 210 degrees at 11 knots, altimeter 29.97 Hg.

WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATION

The F-16's wreckage was located in a wooded area near Sarasota. The wreckage was about 4 miles southwest of the Cessna 172 crash site on a bearing of 187 degrees magnetic.

Examination of the F-16 crash site revealed that the airplane collided with the ground in a left flat spin on a heading of 170 degrees. The right wing was found inverted and had evidence of an impact 81 inches inboard of the wing tip in the vicinity of the SUU-20 (bomb and rocket training dispenser). A aluminum fuel line from the Cessna 172 was found wedged between the lower wing surface and the SUU-20 attachment point. The Air Combat Maneuvering Instrumentation (ACMI) pod, with the associated missile rail launcher (MRL), was separated from the right wing tip at station 9. A faint transfer of red paint was present on the upper aft surface of the MRL. The ACMI pod exhibited scarring discoloration on the upper aft surface. A segment of one of the Cessna 172's flight control cables was found wedged in the F-16's right wing leading edge. The wing's leading edge was deformed upward and aft. Scratches were observed on the upper wing surface between the SUU-20 mount point area and the wing tip. The scratches extended from the wing's leading edge to the trailing edge.

The canopy was located about 640 feet northwest of the main wreckage. The canopy was shattered on the left side extending from the 11 o'clock position rearward to the 7 o'clock position. Gouging from the Cessna was present on the canopy rail's leading edge. The gouging extended aft and over the transparency portion of the canopy, ending at the 11 o'clock position. A faint paint transfer was present on the right forward canopy rail.

The SUU-20 was found imbedded tail first in the ground adjacent to the entrance of Rosedale Golf and Country Club Community. Part of the Cessna's main landing gear trunnion was found imbedded in the upper leading structure of the SUU-20.

Visual examination of the airframe revealed no evidence of a precrash mechanical failure or malfunction. Flight control continuity was confirmed through data retrieved from the crash survivable memory unit (CSMU). The engine assembly was not examined because the pilot reported that he did not experience any engine-related problems before the collision.

The Cessna wreckage was located in numerous pieces in the southwest quadrant of the Rosedale Golf and Country Club community on the east side of Bradenton. Numerous small pieces of F-16 structure and canopy material were located within the Cessna debris field. Because of airframe disintegration, verification of flight control continuity was not possible. No preimpact discrepancies were observed during the on-site

NTSB Probable Cause

the failure of the F-16 flight lead pilot and F-16 accident pilot to maintain an adequate visual lookout while maneuvering. Factors contributing to the accident were: the F-16 flight lead pilot’s decision to discontinue radar traffic advisory service, the F-16 flight lead pilot’s failure to identify a position error in his aircraft’s navigational system, the F-16 pilots subsequent inadvertent entry into class C airspace without establishing and maintaining required communications with air traffic control (ATC); and ATC’s lack of awareness that there was more than one F-16 aircraft in the formation flight, which reduced the ATC controllers ability to detect and resolve the conflict that resulted in the collision.