NTSB Factual Report

HISTORY OF FLIGHT

On March 26, 2011, about 1629 eastern daylight time, an Aerostar S.A. Yak-52, N808TD, registered to and operated by a private individual doing business as Walker Brothers Aircraft, collided with terrain during an aerobatic flight at Flagler County Airport (XFL), Palm Coast, Florida. The personal flight was operated under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91, and no flight plan filed. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed. The commercial pilot was fatally injured and the airplane sustained substantial damage due to impact forces and a postcrash fire. The flight departed from XFL about 7 minutes earlier.

The purpose of the flight was performance of aerobatic and non-aerobatic maneuvers by 4 airplanes of Red Thunder Air Show Team for a fly-in at the XFL Airport called “Wings Over Flagler.” Prior to the accident flight the team had flown 2 routines earlier that day; both earlier routines were flown as briefed and were uneventful. The first routine was performed at about 1115, and the second routine was performed about 1400. After the second routine all team members ate at the VIP tent where plenty of water was available.

During the third routine that day, the pilot of the accident airplane and one other pilot of the team were scheduled to perform aerobatic maneuvers while the pilots of the other two airplanes were scheduled to perform non-aerobatic maneuvers during the planned 10 to 15 minute routine. The aerobatic maneuvers scheduled to be performed by the accident pilot in part were a loop, wingover and barrel roll, heart maneuver, then a loop. The accident occurred during the heart maneuver.

The accident pilot was considered the lead pilot for the accident flight. According to a transcription of communications, at 1614:15, the pilot of the accident airplane contacted ground control and advised the controller that the flight of four was ready to taxi to the active runway and planned to fly in the aerobatic box for 15 minutes. The ground controller cleared the flight of four aircraft to taxi to runway 24, and at 1620:45, the accident pilot contacted the local controller and advised that the flight or four aircraft were ready to depart. The controller advised the flight of four aircraft to hold for an arrival then at 1621:48, cleared the flight of four aircraft into position and hold. At 1622:13, the local controller cleared the flight of four aircraft to depart and about 18 seconds later the accident pilot was heard to comment on the frequency, “ah red thunder go company go now.” At 1625:14, the local controller advised the accident pilot that the aerobatic box was cleared for them, which the pilot acknowledged. There were no further recorded transmissions from the accident pilot or any of the pilots of the team airplanes. Additionally, the pilot did not report any failure or malfunction on the frequency the team was utilizing which was also being monitored by the control tower.

The pilot who was performing aerobatics with the accident pilot and who was flying in the right wing position reported he, the accident pilot (lead pilot), and the pilot’s of two other airplanes were performing an aerial routine that was pre-briefed. He and the accident pilot were the only two pilots performing aerobatic maneuvers, and he reported that at the completion of one maneuver (heart) while crossing at the bottom of the maneuver, the accident pilot was to pull up to perform a loop, while he was to pull up and do a Half Cuban Eight maneuver. While at the top of the Half Cuban Eight maneuver, he had visual with the accident pilot and at that time all appeared normal. As he completed the half roll he saw the accident flight in a position that was not expected. He broadcast the first name of the accident pilot on the air-to-air frequency they were using but there was no response. He then broadcast on the frequency to “knock it off” and expected all to stop maneuvers and to re-group; again there was no response from the accident pilot. He then heard on the frequency “no, no, no” which was later attributed to another team pilot, and he returned for landing. While on base to final he noted smoke from the crash site, and he landed uneventfully.

The pilot of another airplane who was flying at the same time as part of the aerial routine reported that after completion of the heart maneuver, the accident pilot and the right wing position pilot flew vertical with the accident pilot to perform a loop and the right wing position pilot to perform a Half Cuban Eight. The pilot further reported that he next saw the accident pilot’s airplane was upright in an approximately 45 degree down line angle flying down runway 24. The accident airplane continued on the same line of flight until impact. He initially reported he did not detect any deviation during the last 300 feet of the descent.

Witnesses on the ground reported seeing the airplane continue descending until ground contact. One witness did not perceive any change in pitch attitude from the top of the maneuver until losing sight just before impact. One individual videotaped the remaining seconds of the flight from the airport ramp, and later provided the video to NTSB.

According to local controller, after takeoff he observed the accident airplane and the other airplane scheduled to perform aerobatic maneuvers pass the air traffic control tower coming out of a heart shaped maneuver. Shortly afterwards he reported hearing “no no no” on the frequency used by the team. The controller reported looking out the southwest window and saw a flash fire approximately ½ mile southwest of the tower and 500 feet to the right side of runway 06. The controller immediately notified a fireflight helicopter which was located outside class D airspace that they needed assistance and to proceed inbound. Following the accident one team airplane was landed on runway 24, while the remaining team airplanes were landed on runway 06.

The airplane crashed during daylight conditions; there were no ground injuries.

PERSONNEL INFORMATION

The pilot, age 58, held commercial and private pilot certificates. At the commercial level he had ratings for airplane single engine land, and instrument airplane, and at the private level, he had a rating for airplane multi-engine. He was last issued a second class medical certificate with no medical restrictions on October 15, 2010. He listed a total time of 3,500 hours on the application for his last medical certificate. His last flight review in accordance with 14 CFR Part 61.56 was performed in a Piper PA-34-200T airplane on December 3, 2010.

NTSB review of the pilot’s certified medical file from the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Aerospace Medical Certification Division revealed his first medical was dated July 16, 1981, and his last medical was dated October 15, 2010. He did not report any history of heart or vascular trouble or neurological disorders, epilepsy, seizures, stroke, or paralysis on any of the 23 medical application forms. Additionally, on the application form for his last medical certificate he indicated “No” to the question asking if the airman currently uses any medication.

Performers of the Red Thunder Air Show team who were with the accident pilot several days before the accident stated he was in good spirits, but 3 days before the accident, the accident pilot advised he was a little tired after he and one other team pilot had performed some aerobatic maneuvers. Although a second flight was discussed between the accident pilot and the other team pilot, because the accident pilot claimed he was tired no further flights were flown that day. Two days before the accident after 2 practice performances by the team, the pilot made a remark that he would have to start working out more so the G forces would not get to him. That remark caught the attention of an individual of the Red Star Pilot’s Association who had a discussion with the accident pilot about G and how to counter the effect on his body. Another team member jokingly commented to the accident pilot and the individual who discussed the G effects that the accident pilot would be in the weight room the next morning to start on an exercise program. A third flight was flown by the accident pilot and there were no further complaints by him pertaining to G or being tired up to and including the accident flight.

The pilot’s wife and son were interviewed in person by a FAA inspector 3 days after the accident. They commented when interviewed that the pilot’s comment about being tired was a reason to avoid further practice, and not related to his health. The pilot’s wife reported that her husband was feeling fine but the weekend before he took a Rolaids for acid indigestion which he attributed to Mexican food consumed the night before. She also reported that his sleep habits were normal and there was no outstanding pressure on him.

The team members stated that the night before the accident date they ate at a local restaurant at 2030, had ice-cream and several of the team members reported going to bed about 2130. On the morning of the accident one team member reported eating breakfast with the accident pilot between 0715 and 0830; they then departed for the airport.

According to documents provided by personnel from the International Council of Air Shows (ICAS), an application for Statement of Aerobatic Competency (SAC) for the pilot was submitted to the FAA Flight Standards District Office, Nashville, TN, on January 9, 2010. The application and draft SAC card submitted to the FAA specified the authorized aircraft were all variants of the Yak 52, with an altitude limitation of 250 feet. The maneuvering limitation specified solo aerobatics, formation aerobatics, and night shows.

According to personnel from the FAA Flight Standards District Office, Nashville, TN, they did not retain a copy of the issued SAC card; however, their records indicate issuance of a SAC card on March 12, 2010.

The manager of the Flagler County Airport reported that all aerobatic performers participating in the 2011 Wings Over Flagler fly-in were required to present their SAC card prior to signing the waiver; however, copies were not made of the performer’s SAC card.

Pilot logbooks and miscellaneous documents were provided by the pilot’s family for review by NTSB. The provided pilot logbooks document his first logged flight which occurred on July 2, 1981, and his last logged flight in June 2002. His total time at the conclusion of his last logged flight was calculated to be approximately 1,830 hours. Further review of his first pilot logbook revealed his first entry specifying aerobatic flight training was dated September 1993. Additional entries specifying aerobatic training or flying continued to the end of his first pilot logbook. Further review of his second pilot logbook revealed that between August 1999, and September 2000, he listed flying 14.0 hours in a Skybolt performing various local aerobatics. The second logbook also reflected 15.0 hours local aerobatic training in a Yak 50 between September 1999, through September 2001.

Review of the provided documents lists the dates of his last flight review and instrument competency check which occurred on December 3, 2010. Further review of the miscellaneous documents revealed that as of February 2, 2005, his total time was reported to be 2,894 hours, of which 300 hours were in the accident make and model airplane. The documents also indicate that between January 1, 2007, and March 1, 2008, he flew approximately 232 hours in the accident airplane as well as 2 others airplanes.

AIRCRAFT INFORMATION

The tandem two-seat, low wing, tailwheel airplane with retractable main landing gear was manufactured in 1983, designated serial number 833808. It was powered by a 360 horsepower Vendenyen 9 cylinder M-14P radial engine and equipped with a two bladed constant speed propeller. The front and aft seats were equipped with control sticks that are inconnected by push/pull tubes. The elevator primary flight control surface is operated by either control stick, then via a push/pull tube to a bellcrank near the aft seat, followed by cables which connect to the bellcrank near the aft seat and also to a bellcrank near the control surface. A trim tab attached to the left elevator is controlled via cable from the cockpit, while the flaps are pneumatically controlled by a single flap actuator then via control rods to the flap control surfaces. With the flaps retracted, the rod or piston extended from the left and right sides of the flap actuator measure approximately 1.25 inches and 6.5 inches, respectively, while with the flaps extended, the piston or rod extended from the left and right sides of the flap actuator measure approximately 6.5 inches and 1.25 inches, respectively. The rudder control surface is operated via cables from the cockpit to a bellcrank near the control surface, while the aileron flight control surfaces are controlled by push/pull tubes that connect to the rear control stick then via middle and outer bellcranks followed by another push/pull rod to the control surface. The airplane is rated for plus 7.0 and minus 5.0 G’s.

Review of the maintenance records revealed the last annual inspection was signed off as being completed on October 1, 2010, at a recorded hour meter reading of 578.2 hours, airframe total time of 1,188.2 hours, and engine time since overhaul of 578.6 hours. Heat damage to the airplane precluded determining the current hour meter reading.

METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATION

A special surface observation taken at Flagler County Airport at 1629, or at the time of the accident, indicates the wind was from 130 degrees at 9 knots, the visibility was 10 miles, and the skies were clear. The temperature and dew point were 28 and 10 degrees Celsius, respectively, and the altimeter setting was 29.88 inches of Mercury.

COMMUNICATIONS

At the time of the accident the pilots of the flight formation airplanes were communicating on 123.15 MHz. That frequency was being monitored by control tower personnel but that frequency was not being recorded by the control tower or any of the other airplanes in the formation.

AIRPORT INFORMATION

For the Fly-In an aerobatic box measuring 1,000 feet wide and 5,000 feet long was depicted near runway 06/24. The northern edge of the aerobatic box was just north of the north edge of runway 06/24, and the closest crowd line location to the closest portion of the aerobatic box measured 1,500 feet.

Personnel who planned to fly at the Fly-In signed a certificate of waiver, which included the accident pilot. The certificate of waiver allowed deviation from FAR’s 14 CFR Part 91.117(a) and (b), 91.119 (b) and (c), 91.127, 91.129, 91.155(a), 91.303(c) and (e), and 91.515. Additionally, 35 special provisions were stipulated. The stipulations indicate in part that pilots who perform aerobatics must possess a valid FAA Form 8710-7, titled Statement of Acrobatic Competency, and all limitations on the form will be adhered to including altitude restriction for the entire performance.

WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATION

The accident site was located on airport property which when plotted was located about the middle of the aerobatic box, which straight line distance to the nearest point of the crowd line box measured about 2,563 feet. All debris was located within the aerobatic box. The wreckage came to rest at 29 degrees 27.813 minutes North latitude and 081 degrees 12.331 minutes West longitude.

Further examination of the accident site revealed the initial impact was made by the right wing as evidence by the right wingtip which was found partially buried in the initial impact crater. The wingtip in the crater was oriented on a magnetic heading of 160 degrees magnetic. An arcing ground scar to the right was noted, followed by a crater located approximately 28 feet from the right wingtip impact point. Airplane debris consisting in part of the propeller blades was found along the energy path between the ground scar made by the right wing and the impact crater attributed to the engine. The wreckage consisting of the fuselage, wings, empennage, vertical and horizontal

NTSB Probable Cause

The pilot’s failure to recover from the nose-low descent during an aerobatic maneuver.