NTSB Factual Report

HISTORY OF FLIGHT

On January 12, 2013, about 1529 eastern standard time, a Benton Seawind 3000, N829GS, was destroyed following a collision with trees and terrain after takeoff from Sarasota/Bradenton International Airport (SRQ), Sarasota, Florida. The commercial pilot and one pilot-rated passenger were fatally injured. The airplane was registered to a corporation and was operated by the pilot under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 as a personal flight. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed and no flight plan was filed. The local flight was originating at the time of the accident.

According to air traffic control personnel, the pilot departed the airport under visual flight rules and did not make a distress call before the accident.

A witness was in his automobile on 15th Street, on the east side of SRQ, and watched the airplane take off on runway 22. He reported that the takeoff roll seemed longer than normal, and the airplane climbed slowly. As the airplane approached trees located past the runway, it "pancaked" into the trees and did not spin prior to impact. He then saw a plume of smoke and realized the airplane had crashed. He stated that the airplane "looked like it was under powered from the beginning."

Another witness was in his kitchen, and heard a "backfire" or "pop" sound. He came outside and saw the airplane nearly hit a telephone pole; he knew at that point that the airplane was going to crash. The airplane was very slow; he estimated its speed at 60 knots. The airplane clipped trees, then hit another large tree with its belly. When it hit the last tree, a large fireball erupted, surrounding the entire tree. He stated that he heard the engine running during the entire crash sequence, but it sounded like it was at a reduced power setting.

Two air carrier pilots observed the airplane take off. The captain reported that, after landing at SRQ, they were on taxiway Bravo en route to the terminal. He noticed that a general aviation aircraft had taken off on runway 22. It was about 300 feet above the ground when the airplane yawed to the right. The pilot straightened the aircraft out and he noticed that the aircraft had stopped climbing and seemed to be descending. He continued to watch the airplane descend until it disappeared behind a tree line beyond the airport boundary. He called ground control about what he had witnessed, and then saw a flash of fire and a large plume of smoke from behind the trees. He observed no smoke, fire, or damage to the airplane before it crashed, and he did not see any objects fall from the airplane. He estimated the time from the initial yaw to the crash to be between 30 and 60 seconds.

The first officer reported that he observed the airplane "struggling to maintain controlled flight" overhead SRQ. He observed the airplane in a shallow descent about 300 feet above the ground. He saw a wing dip several times and the airplane appeared to be "just above stall speed." After the airplane cleared the airport boundary, it "descended sharply into the trees" and crashed.

A local aviation business owner, who was a flight instructor, observed the airplane on the ramp prior to the accident. He reported that the pilot was having trouble getting the engine started. He tried four or five times to start the engine, without success. Later he observed the airplane taxiing, and the pilot kept opening the canopy during taxi.

A local pilot was at the airport prior to the accident and observed the accident airplane taxiing with the upper engine cowling removed. He stated that he was familiar with the airplane was positive that the cowling was not there. He did not see the airplane take off.

PERSONNEL INFORMATION

The pilot, age 70, held a commercial pilot certificate with airplane single engine land, airplane single engine sea, airplane multi-engine land, and instrument airplane ratings. He was also a flight instructor (airplane single engine) and held an experimental aircraft builder certificate. He reported a total flight experience of 15,000 hours, including 250 hours during the last six months, on his third class medical certificate application, dated October 3, 2012. His pilot logbooks were not located following the accident.

The pilot-rated passenger held a private pilot certificate with airplane single engine land, glider aero tow, and instrument airplane ratings. He reported a total flight experience of 1,200 hours, including 20 hours during the last six months, on his second class medical certificate application, dated September 1, 2011. His pilot logbooks were not located following the accident.

AIRCRAFT INFORMATION

According to local maintenance personnel, the airplane had been at SRQ since September, 2012. The accident pilot was involved in an emergency landing in the accident airplane; he landed in the Indian River Lagoon, near Sebastian Inlet, Florida, following a loss of engine power. According to the aircraft records, a fuel injector line was subsequently replaced because of a broken fitting. Also, the propeller and propeller governor were overhauled during maintenance unrelated to the engine problem.

On the morning of January 12, the pilot reportedly performed some high speed taxi tests on the runways at SRQ to determine that the engine and propeller were working satisfactorily. The pilot reportedly stated that 120 knots was achieved on the ground and the engine and propeller were working correctly. The passenger, who was a potential buyer of the airplane, arrived about 1400 that afternoon. Reportedly, this was the first flight for the airplane since the maintenance work was completed.

According to the aircraft maintenance logbooks, the last condition inspection was performed on September 11, 2012. The aircraft and engine accrued times were not recorded in the logbook entries.

METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATION

The 1553 surface weather observation for SRQ included scattered clouds at 6,500 feet, wind from 230 degrees at 8 knots, visibility 10 statute miles or greater, temperature 77 degrees F, dew point 67 degrees F, and altimeter 30.08 inches of mercury.

WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATION

The airplane struck three tall pine trees on the campus of New College of Florida before impacting terrain and coming rest on a lawn. The wreckage was largely consumed in a post-crash fire. The main wreckage was located about 0.3 nautical miles beyond the departure end of runway 22. The length of the wreckage debris field was about 300 feet and was oriented on a heading of 240 degrees. The fuselage was found inverted.

The left wing was fragmented and its components were found along the debris field leading to the main wreckage. The wing parts were burned except for some composite pieces that were outside the ground fire zone. The left wing fuel tank was compromised. The left aileron remained partially attached to the outboard section of the left wing and was burned. The left wing flap was broken from the wing. The pre-impact position of the left flap could not be determined. One left aileron control cable was disconnected at the turnbuckle and the other end showed indications of tension overload. This section of cable was found loose in the left wing debris field. The other half of the aileron cable was broken from overload and continuity was established to the cockpit controls. The other cable was disconnected at the aileron attachment point and continuity was established to the cockpit controls.

The right wing remained with the main wreckage and remained partially attached to the fuselage. The right aileron was separated from the wing and found adjacent to the main wreckage. The right flap was partially burned away but remained in its respective position on the wing. The right fuel tank was compromised. The aileron cables were still connected to the hinge points on the aileron. Right aileron cable continuity was established to the cockpit controls.

The pilot and copilot control wheels were linked together via a chain and sprocket assembly. The chain remained in place on the sprockets.

The empennage was burned and remained attached to the fuselage. All elevator and rudder control surfaces remained attached. Control cable continuity was established from the cockpit controls to the rudder and elevators.

A metal fuel header tank with two selector handles still attached was found in the fuselage. The tank was empty and fire damaged and its two valve handles turned freely through 360 degrees of motion and were no longer operational. No fuel strainer or filter was found within the wreckage. The left fuel tank filler cap was located with the left wing outboard section. The cap latch was in the closed position.

All avionics were consumed by post-crash fire. No cockpit instruments were found that provided any readings that could be recorded.

The nose landing gear was retracted inside the gear well. The main landing gear were observed in a partially extended position. The gear well recesses were burned away.

The engine remained attached to its mount on the airframe. Extensive fire and heat damage was evident throughout the engine. All engine accessories were fire-damaged. A hole was melted in the oil sump, exposing the accessory drive gears.

A magneto was installed in the left magneto position. It exhibited fire and impact damage and could not be tested. The right magneto position was blocked off with a metal plate. A fire-damaged assembly, consisting of four coils, some electronic components, and ignition wires, was located with the wreckage near the engine accessory section.

The engine was suspended from a lift to facilitate an inspection. The engine was rotated by manually turning the propeller, which remained attached to the crankshaft. Internal engine continuity was established from the crankshaft to the rear gears and the valve train. Compression and suction were observed on all six cylinders.

The fuel injector servo remained attached to the engine. The throttle and mixture controls remained attached to the servo and were observed near the full throttle and full rich mixture positions, respectively. The servo fuel inlet screen was absent of debris. The brass plug in the servo regulator cover was secure. The regulator section was disassembled and the diaphragms were observed to be destroyed by fire.

The fuel flow divider was disassembled and the diaphragm was found burned. The fuel injector nozzles were removed. The numbers 1, 2, 3, and 5 nozzles were unobstructed. The numbers 4 and 6 nozzles appeared to be obstructed. The engine driven fuel pump was destroyed by fire. Two components that appeared to be electric boost pumps were recovered from the fuselage area. The units were heavily fire-damage and could not be tested.

Oil was observed inside the engine. The oil filter was opened and the paper element was charred. There were no metallic particles observed inside the filter.

The bottom spark plugs were removed for visual inspection. The plug electrodes on all six cylinders were dark gray in color and exhibited normal wear when compared to a Champion inspection chart.

MEDICAL AND PATHOLOGICAL INFORMATION

A postmortem examination of the commercial pilot was performed at the offices of District Twelve Medical Examiner, Sarasota, Florida, on January 13, 2013. The autopsy report noted the cause of death as "Thermal Cutaneous Burns" and the manner of death was "accident." The autopsy report noted a positive carboxyhemoglobin level of 7 percent saturation.

Forensic toxicology testing was performed on specimens of the pilot by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Bioaeronautical Sciences Research Laboratory (CAMI), Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. The CAMI toxicology report indicated no carbon monoxide in the blood (10 percent cutoff), no ethanol in the urine, and salicylate (a metabolite of aspirin) in the urine. Testing for cyanide was not performed.

TESTS AND RESEARCH

Propeller Assembly

On March 13, 2013, the propeller assembly was examined at the facilities of Quality Aircraft Salvage, Groveland, Florida. The propeller was a Hartzell propeller Model HC-E3YR-1RF, Serial No. FM1082A with a propeller hub number A34830A. The propellers were labeled "A", "B", and "C" to correlate with previously handwritten labels located on the blades.

The piston remained attached and secured in position with a cotter pin. The piston was disassembled and the change rod remained intact and was unremarkable in appearance. The spring indicated thermal damage to the tension but otherwise remained intact. The aft portion of the rear hub exhibited impact damage co-located with the preload plates. The blade pitch change knobs exhibited impact damage and were sheared in overload. The preload plate for the blade labeled "C" was measured and indicated approximately 13 degrees of pitch at impact, which correlated to a low pitch setting. The other two (2) blades' preload plates exhibited similar indications and all were considered unremarkable.

Blade "A" visually indicated in a "feather" position while mounted on the hub, and the tip exhibited extensive thermal damage. The blade indicated a slight twist in the leading edge towards the low pitch position. The bearing and race were removed and were unremarkable.

Blade "B" visually indicated an "extreme reverse" position while mounted on the hub. Extensive thermal damage was noted approximately five inches from the hub which resulted in extensive deformation of the blade. The bearing and race were removed and were unremarkable.

Blade "C" visually indicated a "flat pitch" position while mounted on the hub. The preload plate exhibited an impact crack along the radius on one side of the circumference. Extensive thermal damage was noted and the outboard section of the blade, beginning approximately six inches from the hub, was burned away.

Fuel Injection Nozzles

Six fuel injection nozzles from the accident engine were submitted to the NTSB Materials Laboratory to determine if the nozzles were blocked and to identify the material inside the nozzles. The nozzles were arbitrarily numbered 1 through 6 by the laboratory examiner.

The nozzles were x-rayed to determine if any blockage was present before the nozzles were removed from the bags they were received in. No blockages were observed in the radiographs of any of the nozzles. Visual examination of the nozzles found no significant blockages of any of the submitted nozzles. All of the nozzles were moderately sooted on both the exterior and the interior surfaces.

Each nozzle interior was swabbed with a clean cotton swab. Each cotton swab was examined using a Fourier Transform Infrared (FTIR) micro-spectrometer with a germanium attenuated total reflectance (ATR) accessory. The spectrometer was used to collect and process infrared wavelength absorbance spectra of each sample. Nozzles #1 through #4 and Nozzle #6 showed no significant spectral patterns with the exception of a negative peak at ~2400 cm-1 which is often indicative of the presence of elemental carbon which absorbs infrared energy. Nozzle #5 did have one peak pattern, a carbon-hydrogen bonding peak located between ~3000-2800 cm-1 indicating the presence of an aliphatic hydrocarbon. Aliphatic hydrocarbons are found in aircraft materials such as fuel, lubricating and hydraulic oils.

The swab samples were then analyzed by scanning electron microscopy (SEM) and quantitative standardless energy dispersive x-ray spectroscopy (EDS). The EDS analysis showed the presence of carbon, aluminum, silicon, oxygen, magnesium, and iron. These constituents are consistent with soot and materials found within the aircraft engine compartment and

NTSB Probable Cause

The pilot's inability to establish a normal climb rate after takeoff for reasons that could not be determined because postaccident examination did not reveal any anomalies that would have precluded normal operation.