NTSB Factual Report

HISTORY OF FLIGHT

On April 4, 1998, about 1034 eastern standard time, a Cessna 525 (CitationJet), N111LR and a Cessna 172N, N737WD, collided in flight over a residential area in Marietta, Georgia. Both airplanes were operated by the respective pilots, under the provisions of Title 14 CFR Part 91. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the accident. The commercial certificated pilot of the 172, the airline transport pilot of the CitationJet, and the three passengers in the CitationJet, were all fatally injured. Both airplanes were destroyed. The CitationJet departed from the Dekalb-Peachtree Airport about 1030, with an instrument flight plan to Harrisburg, Pennsylvania. According to radar data, the 172 departed Mathis Airfield, near Cumming, Georgia, about 1025. A flight plan was not filed for the 172 flight, reported as a flight to inspect power lines for Georgia Power Co.

After takeoff, the CitationJet was initially assigned 3,000 feet mean sea level (msl) and a heading of 280 degrees by Atlanta Terminal Radar Control (TRACON). Subsequently, it was assigned a heading of 360 degrees and cleared to climb to 14,000 feet msl. According to radar data the CitationJet had vacated 3,000 feet msl and was at 3,400 feet msl, at 1034, when a primary target merged with the radar target of the CitationJet. In addition to the loss of radio contact with the CitationJet, the radar data block on the controller's display depicted "coast" indicating that radar contact was lost.

At 1033:01, a clearance to climb from 3,000 feet msl was issued to the CitationJet. Radar data indicated that N111LR was at 2,900 feet msl at that time. About 23 seconds later, at 1033:26, radar data depicted the airplane at 3,000 feet, indicating a climb had commenced. The CitationJet pilot's acknowledgement of the climb clearance was interrupted about 1034.

Recorded radar data provided by the Atlanta TRACON depicted a trail of primary targets (a primary target is radar energy reflected from the skin of the airplane without electronic enhancement) that began at 1025:07, approximately two miles southwest of the Mathis Airport, and extended to the southwest in a curving path that intersected the flight path of the CitationJet, over the collision site. The operator of Mathis Airfield reported that he believed the pilot of the 172 departed Mathis Airfield about 1015, on the day of the accident.

About 1034, the Cessna 172 initiated radio contact with Dobbins Air Force Base Air Traffic Control Tower (ATCT), and identified itself as seven Whiskey Delta. The controller responded "7WD, Dobbins Tower." The aircraft responded "Good morning , sir, 7WD Cessna one seventy." The controller stated "seven whiskey delta you were cut out." No further transmissions were received from the airplane, and the controller was unable to re-establish contact.

The CitationJet came to rest inverted in the rear of a residence at 1922 Fields Pond Glen, Marietta, Georgia. The 172 was observed to collide with trees and come to rest inverted in a residential yard at 5125 Timber Ridge Road, Marietta, Georgia.

PERSONNEL INFORMATION

CitationJet Pilot

The pilot of the CitationJet held airline transport pilot certificate number 253663704, with a CE-525S (Cessna 525 CitationJet) type rating. (The "S" suffix denotes that this type rating allows the holder to operate the CitationJet as a single piloted airplane.) Additionally, he held an airline transport pilot multiengine rating and a private airplane single engine land rating. The airline transport pilot certificate was issued to the pilot on January 9, 1998. His last medical certificate, a first class, was issued March 28, 1997, with the limitation that the airman must wear corrective lenses. As of the date of his last medical examination, the pilot had 1,510 total flight hours, according to Federal Aviation Administration records.

A pilot log was obtained that contained the CitationJet pilot's name on a preprinted label indicating he had completed a pilot-in-command and instrument proficiency check on February 28, 1998, at Wichita, KS. The last entry in the log was dated March 29, 1998. According to entries in the log the pilot had 1,824.6 total flight hours, with 81.4 and 4.5 flight hours within 90 and 30 days, respectively, prior to the accident. All of the flights listed in the log book within the 90 days prior to the accident were in the accident airplane. According to the log book, the pilot had 86.3 total hours in the CitationJet. The pilot recorded a total of 4.2 actual instrument flight hours, and 0.7 simulated instrument flight hours in the CitationJet. His total instrument flight hours were recorded in the log book as 180.1 actual instrument and 104.6 simulated instrument. There were entries in the log book that indicated the pilot regularly flew a Beech 90, turbopropeller airplane, prior to his operation of the CitationJet. The log book contained an entry dated August 29, 1997, that indicated an "ATP checkride" in the CE-525 simulator. The log book reflected two periods of CE 525 training at Flight Safety during August, 1997 and February, 1998.

A local flight instructor was interviewed who stated he provided the pilot's initial flight instruction in 1994, as well as through several ratings. He assisted the pilot to purchase his first airplane, a Beech 60 Duke, a high performance, pressurized, reciprocating engine twin. The pilot later moved to a Beech 90 King Air, high performance, pressurized, "T" tail, turbine powered twin. He then assisted the pilot select and purchase the CitationJet, and attended Flight Safety International training with him. The instructor described the pilot as highly qualified, competent, and detail oriented. It was his understanding that the pilot bought the airplane to be used for business travel. He also stated that the pilot enrolled in the CitationJet proficiency course that required attendance every three months. The instructor reported that the Flight Safety training course instructed the student to use the auto-pilot as soon as possible, after takeoff, to reduce the work load on the pilot (wheels up, flaps up, auto-pilot on). The instructor stated that the use of the auto-pilot to initiate a climb involved looking down, locating and turning the altitude select knob, checking the readout on the Electronic Attitude Director Indicator, then rotating the Pitch Wheel to initiate the climb.

Cessna 172 Pilot

The pilot of the Cessna 172 held commercial pilot certificate number 216623423 with airplane single engine, multiengine, and instrument airplane ratings. Additionally, he was a certificated flight instructor with airplane single and multiengine ratings. The pilot also held a mechanics certificate with airframe and powerplant ratings. His second class medical certificate was last issued on April 2, 1998, with no waivers or limitations.

A total of five pilot logbooks, numbered 2-6, were located for the pilot. Logbook number 1 was not found, however, an entry at the beginning of Logbook number 2 stated the student had lost his logbook, and his flight hours had been reconstructed from invoices. Entries in the logbooks indicated the pilot obtained his instrument rating, multiengine rating, and commercial pilot certificate in early 1982. Logbook entries indicated he received his flight instructor certificate and multiengine flight instructor rating about July 21, 1989. The logbook numbered 6 had a beginning date of May 22, 1997. An entry in logbook number 6, dated August 13, 1997, indicated the pilot had received a flight review. A corresponding entry indicated the flight review was accomplished in N737WD, the accident airplane. According to the entries in logbook number 6 the 172 pilot had 13,958.8 total flight hours, as of the last entry dated March 31, 1998. Within the last 90 and 30 days, the pilot's log indicated he had flown a total of 67.8 and 13.8 hours respectively. His pilot's logbooks inconsistently reflected multiengine, night, and instrument flight hours. The last entry that totaled multiengine flight hours indicated 348.9 hours, in logbook 5, which listed a beginning date of December 13, 1990. Additionally, the last recorded total instrument flight hours were 154.8, and the last recorded total night hours were 181.9.

Information provided by FAA records indicated the pilot's certificate was suspended on three occasions. On September 10, 1987, his certificate was suspended for 30 days for violation of Title 14 CFR Part 91.119 regarding minimum safe altitudes. The certificate was suspended on March 26, 1990, for 45 days for violation of Title 14 CFR Part 91.131 regarding an ATC clearance for operations in Class B airspace. His certificate was suspended for 60 days on July 12, 1993, for violation of various sections of Title 14 CFR Part 23 and 91 that dealt with miscellaneous markings and placards on the airplane, airman certificate requirements, careless operation, and airworthiness of the airplane. Additional information is contained in the Operations Group Chairman's Factual Report.

AIRCRAFT INFORMATION

CitationJet

N111LR was a Cessna 525, manufactured in 1997, with serial number 525-0222. The airplane was registered to Alpha Wolf Enterprises LLC, 116 Lewis Lane, Trailsend Ranch, Twin Bridges, Montana 59749. The airplane was configured with two pilot seats, one jump seat, four passenger seats, and one toilet seat. It was powered by two Williams International FJ44-1A turbojet engines with 1,900 pounds of static thrust. Maximum weight of the airplane was 10,500 pounds. The airplane was certificated for day, night, instrument flight rules, visual flight rules, known icing conditions, and single pilot operations.

The autopilot control panel, containing the autopilot and yaw damper engage switches, the pitch wheel, and the turn knob was located on the rear of the cockpit center pedestal.

The airplane, according to Cessna Aircraft Company was wired for, but not equipped with a cockpit voice recorder. A Traffic and Collision Avoidance System was not installed in the airplane. According to the instructor for the CitationJet pilot, the airplane was not equipped with a Flight Management System.

The Aircraft Flight Log and the airplane maintenance records were examined. The last entry in the Flight Log was dated March 29, 1998, which recorded 181.7 total airplane and engine hours, 125 landings, and 125 engine cycles. An entry with the same date indicated the VOR 1 and VOR 2 bearing error was zero.

The maintenance records indicated that the airplane was maintained under a manufacturer's inspection program. According to a Maintenance Transaction Report dated November 18, 1997, the static pressure system, both transponders, and the altimeters were inspected and found to comply with applicable federal aviation regulations.

The records for the left and right engine, serial number 1457 and 1456, respectively, indicated the engines were maintained under a manufacturer's inspection program. Engine Service and Maintenance Record entries indicated a Check 1 inspection was performed on both engines on February 28, 1998. The record also indicated that the engines were on a spectrometric oil analysis program.

Cessna 172

Cessna 172N, N737WD, serial number 17269724, was manufactured in 1977. Maximum weight for the airplane was 2,150 pounds. It was powered by a Lycoming O-320-H2AD, engine, serial number L-6597-76. The airplane was registered to Rudolph H Duncan d/b/a Duncan Aviation, 1022 Oak Chase Drive, Apt G Tucker, GA 30084.

Partially burned records were found in the wreckage of the airplane that included a "profile" of the airplane and major installed accessories, and a list of Airworthiness Directives that applied to a Cessna 172N. Additional pages were entitled Airworthiness Directive (AD) Compliance Record, for N737WD. The compliance records indicated compliance with the individual AD, or listed its non-applicability to N737WD.

One aircraft log was found with the airplane wreckage, one aircraft log was provided by family members of the pilot/owner, and the engine log was not located. The last entry in the aircraft logs was dated March 28, 1998, and stated that an annual inspection had been completed. The entry indicated that Airworthiness Directive (AD) 80-20-03, requiring an inspection of seats and seat tracks, had been complied with, by inspection. The logbook contained entries that indicated that the airplane had accrued 13,744.3 total hours as of March 28, 1998, An entry was found in the aircraft log indicating that the transponder had been inspected and found to comply with 14 CFR Part 91.413 on October 15, 1996. Another entry with the same date indicated the altimeter and pitot static system also had been inspected.

The aircraft records indicated that the engine installed in the airplane had been installed on November 24, 1994, as an overhauled engine. Based on the aircraft records, as of March 28,1998, the engine time since overhaul was 847.8 hours.

The flap extension system had an electric motor that moves a jack screw on the right wing flap, which moves a bellcrank. The bellcrank then moves the right wing flap through a rod, and the left wing flap through cables.

METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATION

The aviation routine weather report (METAR) for Atlanta's Hartsfield International Airport, located 22 miles south of the accident site, at 1053 eastern standard time on April 4, 1998, was wind 290 degrees at 16 knots; visibility was 10 statute miles; clouds were broken at 3,300 feet; with 5/8 coverage, temperature was 12 degrees centigrade (54 degrees Fahrenheit) and dew point was 06 degrees centigrade (43 degrees Fahrenheit); altimeter setting was 29.77 inches of Hg.

Dekalb-Peachtree Airport METAR, located 9 miles southeast of the accident site, at 1053 eastern standard time on April 4, 1998, was wind 320 degrees at 12 knots with gusts to 20 knots; visibility 10 statute miles; broken clouds with 5/8 coverage at 2,800 feet, overcast clouds with 8/8 coverage at 3,600 feet; temperature 12 degrees Centigrade (53 degrees Fahrenheit), dew point 07 degrees centigrade (44 degrees Fahrenheit); altimeter setting 29.76 inches of Hg.

Dobbins Air Force Base METAR, located 8 miles southwest of the accident site, at 1055 eastern standard time on April 4, 1998, was wind 310 degrees at 14 knots; visibility 7 statute miles; scattered clouds at 2,600 feet, with 3/8 coverage, and overcast clouds at 3,100 feet; with 8/8 coverage, temperature 11 degrees centigrade (54 degrees Fahrenheit), dew point 06 degrees centigrade (43 degrees Fahrenheit).

WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATION

CitationJet

The wreckage of the CitationJet was scattered over an area of approximately 1.5 square miles. The horizontal stabilizer, elevators, and the top 1/4, approximately, of the vertical stabilizer was separated from the airplane. The separated portion of the empennage was found about one mile southeast of the main wreckage. Additionally, the outboard 1/2 of the left horizontal stabilizer and elevator were sheared away and mangled. The main wreckage came to rest, inverted, in a residential yard at geographical coordinates 33degrees 59' 55" N and 84 degrees 24' 11" W. The terrain around the accident site was rolling hills at an elevation between 968 to 1168 feet.

The airplane wreckage was moved to a hangar for further examination. Black color tire marks were found on the vertical stabilizer leading edge beginning about 60 inches above its base and extending up to about 72 inches from the base. The left horizontal stabilizer outboard 2/3 was crushed aft about 40 degrees, with respect to the leading edge. Engine oil was found on a separated portion of the upper surface. A small 5 inch long section, separated from the outboard end of the left horizontal stabilizer leading edge, was crushed aft, forming a tight 3 inch diameter "U" shape. This section was among the first debris located on the wreckage path. Additionally, blue paint that was similar to the blue paint of the Cessna 172 was found transferred to the leading edge of the portion of the horizontal stabilizer that remained attached to the vertical stabilizer. The Structures and Systems Group Chairman's Factual Report indic

NTSB Probable Cause

The failure of both pilots to see and avoid conflicting traffic, and the failure of the 172 pilot to operate the transponder as required by current regulations. Factors were the controller's failure to observe the traffic conflict, the lack of radar conflict alert capability, and the training emphasis on maximum autopilot usage with the autopilot controller placed at the rear of the cockpit center mounted pedestal.