NTSB Factual Report

On July 14, 2014, around 1435 eastern daylight time, a Let L23 Super Blanik, N342BA, was substantially damaged when it struck a Let L23 Super Blanik, N400AZ, which was on the runway of Roosevelt Memorial Airport (5A9), Warm Springs, Georgia. The flight instructors and student pilots of both gliders were not injured. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the accident. Both gliders were owned and operated by the Civil Air Patrol. Neither of the gliders filed flight plans for the local instructional flights, which were conducted under the provisions of Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91.

According to the flight instructor of N400AZ, he and the student pilot landed the glider and came to rest on the centerline about 1,000 feet past the threshold of the landing runway. As the flight instructor was talking to the air boss after coming to rest on the runway and waiting for ground personnel to help stage the glider for a launch, the glider was struck from behind by the second glider. The glider came to rest on the runway and both occupants of the glider exited without incident. N400AZ sustained substantial damage to the right wing, fuselage, and empennage. In addition, the flight instructor reported no preimpact mechanical malfunctions or failures with the glider that would have precluded normal operation.

According to the flight instructor of N342BA, he and the student pilot landed just beyond the displaced threshold markers at the approach end of the runway. Both the flight instructor and the student applied "maximum braking" but were unable to stop the glider prior to impacting N400AZ. In addition, the flight instructor had each of his hands on the flight controls and brake lever respectively, and was unable to use the radio to alert N400AZ of the impending collision. Following the impact, N342BA came to rest on the paved portion of the runway and both occupants egressed without incident. N342BA incurred substantial damage to the left wing and fuselage. In addition, the flight instructor reported no preimpact mechanical malfunctions or failures with the glider that would have precluded normal operation.

According to both flight instructors, they had performed numerous landings that day in their respective gliders, as part of the training requirements for the students. One of the flight instructors reported that prior to the accident the wind direction had changed from a quartering headwind to a quartering tailwind while they were in the traffic pattern to land.

According to the airboss at the time of the accident, the wind shifted to a tailwind for the airplanes landing on runway 36. In addition, he stated that after the first glider landed and was preparing for an aerotow launch, he went over to discuss the wind shift with the glider instructor. He watched as the second glider turned from the base leg to the final leg in the traffic pattern and then land prior to the numbers on the runway. As the landing glider continued to approach the glider positioned on the runway, he "realized that at less than 300 feet" the landing glider was not going to slow down in time to stop prior to the glider positioned on the runway. The landing glider moved to the right of the centerline in order to avoid a collision with the glider positioned on the centerline of the runway, however, the left wing of the landing glider struck the glider positioned on the runway.

According to the chief of safety of the Civil Air Patrol, both gliders were equipped with radios and the pilots were using them prior to the accident. He also reported that the glider procedures indicated that flight operations were to use runway 36. The gliders were to stage in the grass on the west side of the runway, south of the southernmost taxiway. That allowed the tow airplanes to pull onto the runway at that taxiway and pick up the next glider. The gliders were to land short of the southernmost taxiway if possible and push off into the grass to await the next tow. If a glider landed longer than the south taxiway, it would be pushed off into the grass and towed by a golf cart or pushed by hand back to the staging area. "At no time [would] there be an aircraft on the runway when an aircraft [was] landing."

5A9 was equipped with one runway, which was designated as 18/36. The runway was 5,004 feet long, 75 feet wide, constructed of asphalt, and noted as "in good condition." In addition, the airport was not tower-controlled.

The weather recorded at 1415 at LaGrange-Callaway Airport (LGC), Lagrange, Georgia, which was approximately 19 miles to the west of the accident location, indicated wind from 260 at 7 knots. In addition, a review of the recorded weather indicated a quartering headwind, wind of 280 at 4 knots, approximately an hour and a half prior to the accident.

The Code of Federal Regulations, Section 91.113, right-of-way rules stated, "Aircraft, while on final approach to land or while landing, have the right-of-way over other aircraft in flight or operating on the surface, except that they shall not take advantage of this rule to force another aircraft off the runway surface which has already landed and is attempting to make way for an aircraft on final approach."

According to the Glider Flying Handbook (FAA-H-8083-13A), in Chapter 7, Launch and Recovery Procedures and Flight Maneuvers, it stated that after landing the pilot should "move or taxi the glider clear of all runways. If the glider is to be parked for a short interval between flights, choose a spot that does not inconvenience other gliderport/airport users."

NTSB Probable Cause

The failure of the flight instructor to move his glider from an active runway in accordance with procedures due to his distraction by having a conversation with the air boss, which resulted in the landing glider colliding with the glider on the runway.