NTSB Factual Report

***This report was modified on July 25, 2014. Please see the docket for this accident to view the original report.***

HISTORY OF FLIGHT

On November 10, 2011, about 1214 Hawaiian standard time, a Eurocopter EC130 B4 helicopter, N11QV, collided with mountainous terrain near Pukoo, Hawaii, on the island of Molokai. The commercial pilot and four passengers were fatally injured. The helicopter was registered to Nevada Helicopters Leasing, Henderson, Nevada, and operated by Helicopter Consultants of Maui, Inc., dba Blue Hawaiian Helicopters. The flight was operated as a visual flight rules (VFR) sightseeing flight under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 135. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of departure, and company flight-following procedures were in effect. The flight originated from the Kahului Airport, Kahului, Hawaii, on the island of Maui, about 1144.

The flight departed with four passengers aboard for a scheduled 1 hour and 10 minute roundtrip sightseeing flight. The planned route of flight was to fly north-northwest from the Kahului Airport to the northern tip of Maui before proceeding northwesterly across the waterway between Maui and Molokai. The flight was to proceed to the northeastern shore of Molokai to view the Halawa Valley Waterfall, before continuing westbound along the sea cliffs on the northern shore to view Papalaua Falls. If the weather permitted, the flight was to continue into the Wailau Valley and climb up and over the valley wall to the southern side of Molokai. If weather conditions would not allow the pilot to use the Wailau Valley route, an alternate route was to reverse course and fly back eastbound along the northern shoreline, and then proceed around the eastern tip of the island to the south side.

Pilots of other air tour helicopters in the vicinity of Molokai during the timeframe of the accident reported that overall weather conditions would not have allowed the accident pilot to fly through Wailau Valley. Additionally, they reported seeing the accident helicopter and/or talking with the accident pilot at various times and locations throughout the flight. These locations were near the Papalaua Waterfalls, the Halawa Valley Waterfall, and along the southern side of Molokai.

The last pilot to observe the accident helicopter reported seeing it flying westbound above the mountainous terrain on the southern side of Molokai, just below the cloud ceiling, which he reported was about 2,000 feet mean sea level (msl). He stated that the accident helicopter appeared to be in straight and level flight and did not appear to be in any form of distress. For information about the weather conditions reported by this pilot, see the Meteorological Conditions section of this report.

Ground witnesses reported that their attention was drawn to the helicopter when they heard some form of "woop wooping" sound. One witness observed the helicopter descending from the island's central ridgeline; he reported that he observed pieces falling from the helicopter as it descended. Another witness, who was closest and had the clearest view of the accident helicopter, reported that the helicopter went "straight down" and impacted the ground sideways. Other witnesses reported that they observed a large "fire ball" when the helicopter impacted the ground.

The ground witnesses reported rain showers in the area during the timeframe of the accident. Several witnesses reported that the accident occurred between rain "squalls," and one reported that it occurred during a heavy rain "squall." Most witnesses interviewed described the weather conditions at the time of the accident as "poor."

PILOT INFORMATION

The pilot, age 30, held a commercial pilot certificate with a rotorcraft helicopter rating and a helicopter instrument rating. He also held a certified flight instructor certificate with a rotorcraft helicopter rating. In addition, he held a private pilot certificate with airplane single-engine land and multi-engine land ratings. His most recent second-class medical certificate was issued on March 14, 2011, with the limitation that he must possess corrective lenses for near and intermediate vision.

Company personnel reported that the pilot's previous helicopter flight experience was gained as a pilot flying Bell 407 and 206B series helicopters for Bristow International Helicopters in the Gulf of Mexico. During his employment with Bristow International, he accrued about 3,300 flight hours; his last flight with Bristow International occurred on June 22, 2011.

The pilot was hired by Blue Hawaiian Helicopters on July 1, 2011; at that time, the pilot had no flight time in an EC130 B4 helicopter and a total helicopter flight time of about 4,500 hours.

On July 10, 2011, the pilot completed initial company training, which included EC130 B4 pilot ground and flight training, and he was subsequently assigned to fly EC130 B4 helicopters at the company's base on Maui. While employed with Blue Hawaiian Helicopters, the pilot accrued about 306 flight hours in EC130 B4 helicopters. On November 9 (the day before the accident), he completed a 14 CFR Part 135.293/299 airman competency check ride, which was administered by the FAA's principal operations inspector (POI) for Blue Hawaiian Helicopters. The check ride included instrument navigation and communications procedures, inadvertent IMC procedures, and unusual attitude recovery. According to the POI, the accident pilot was capable and current in all of his required pilot tasks and training.

The pilot was off duty on November 7 and 8. On November 9, his duty day started at 0700 and ended at 1700, and the only flight time accrued that day was 1.2 hours on the Part 135 check ride.

On the day of the accident, the pilot arrived at the company office about 0730, which was indicated by other company pilots as his typical arrival time. After checking the weather, he completed a preflight inspection on the assigned helicopter and then waited for his first passengers of the day to arrive. The pilot subsequently completed two sightseeing flights without incident.

The accident flight was the pilot's third flight of the day.

Additional pilot/operational information can be found in the Operations/Witness Factual Report located in the public docket for this accident case file.

HELICOPTER INFORMATION

The Eurocopter EC130 B4 is an 8-place single-engine helicopter powered by a Turbomeca Arriel 2B1 turboshaft engine, rated to 730 shaft horsepower and equipped with a Full Authority Digital Engine Control (FADEC) unit. The helicopter has a three-bladed main rotor and a shrouded tail rotor, which is called a Fenestron. The Fenestron is a composite shell structure with the tail rotor mounted in the inner duct.

The accident helicopter, S/N 4909, was manufactured in France in 2010. According to the FAA registry, the aircraft received an FAA certificate of airworthiness on March 2, 2010. It was registered as N11QV on April 16, 2010.

The helicopter was equipped with a Garmin G500H electronic flight display system. The G500H is an electronic flight information system that utilizes the primary flight display (PFD), multi-function display (MFD), air data computer (ADC) and attitude heading reference system (AHRS). The G500H system installed on N11QV included the optional Garmin Terrain - Helicopter Synthetic Vision Technology (HSVT) system. HSVT is primarily comprised of a computer generated, forward looking, attitude aligned view of the topography immediately in front of the aircraft from the pilot's perspective. The HSVT is shown on the pilot's PFD and offers a 3-dimensional view of terrain and obstacles with visual and audio alerts for terrain or obstacles supplied to the pilot. The system provides the pilot with real-time 3-dimensional moving-map graphics, terrain features, chart data, navigation aids, and flight plan routings; the system has the capability to identify threats, such as towers and terrain features. The PFD also depicted, in part, attitude, airspeed, vertical speed, climb rate, and course/heading information.

The helicopter was maintained in accordance with an FAA Approved Aircraft Inspection Program (AAIP). The most recent 100-hour inspection was completed on November 8, 2011, at 2431.4 hours total time since new (TTSN). During this 100-hour inspection, Eurocopter Emergency Alert Service Bulletin # 53A019 (Check of the tail boom / Fenestron junction frame for cracks) was complied with, and no defects were noted.

At the time the helicopter departed for the accident flight, it had accrued 2,439.6 hours TTSN. Based on an estimated time of 0.5 hours accrued during the accident flight, the aircraft TTSN at the time of the accident was about 2,440.1.

The helicopter did not have, and was not required to have, a cockpit voice recorder or flight data recorder.

The helicopter was equipped with a multi-camera digital video and audio recording system that was installed by the operator under an FAA field approval. The system incorporated three externally mounted color cameras and one internally mounted "lipstick" camera that recorded to onboard digital optic disc recorders. Camera selection was controlled by the pilot via a 4-way switch located on the cyclic. The recordings were provided to passengers for entertainment purposes after flightseeing tours. In addition, the recordings were reviewed by the operator for the purpose of operational quality control. The camera recording system were not hardened or designed to be crash resistant. The video data captured by this system was consumed by post-crash fire and therefore not available to the investigation team.

The helicopter was configured with seven passenger seats and one pilot seat (eight total) arranged in two rows of four; the pilot always occupied the left outboard front seat. According to the Blue Hawaiian Helicopters pre-departure load manifest, the two front seat passengers occupied the right inboard and outboard seats, and the two aft seat passengers occupied the two outboard (window) seats. The load manifest indicated that the helicopter's fuel load at takeoff was 435 pounds (64 gallons), and the helicopter was loaded within weight and balance limits.

METEOROLOGICAL CONDITIONS

The last pilot to see the accident helicopter reported that throughout the morning, the weather conditions were continually deteriorating with a strong northeasterly wind and fast moving rain squalls. The pilot stated that when he had flown in the accident area earlier that day, he had experienced many updrafts, downdrafts, and microbursts, to the point that it scared him. He further reported that the visibility was "great" below the clouds and out of the heavy rain. The pilot reported that he departed Maui about 1130-1135 and was conducting a sightseeing flight around Molokai at the time of the accident. He estimated that during the flight, the cloud bases around the island were about 2,000 to 2,100 feet msl. His route of flight was southbound along the eastern side of the island and then westbound along the southern shore, where he experienced a "little bit of a bumpy ride." As noted previously, while flying along the south side of the island, he briefly observed the accident helicopter flying westbound along the south side of the island's central mountain ridges just below the clouds.

Kapalua Airport (PHJH) in Lahaina, Hawaii, was located about 11 miles to the southeast of the accident site at an elevation of 256 feet, and was equipped with an Automated Weather Observing System (AWOS). The following observations were recorded on November 10, 2011:

At 1150, PHJH reported wind from 070 degrees at 12 knots gusting to 20 knots, visibility of 7 miles, light rain showers, scattered clouds at 2,500 feet, ceiling broken at 4,000 feet, temperature 23 degrees Celsius(C), dew point temperature 19 degrees C, altimeter setting 30.00 inches of mercury. Remarks: visibility lower to the north.

At 1250, PHJH reported wind from 050 degrees at 17 knots gusting to 23 knots, visibility of 12 miles, showers in the vicinity, few clouds at 1,200 feet, scattered clouds at 2,500 feet, ceiling broken at 4,000 feet, temperature 23 degrees C, dew point temperature 19 degrees C, altimeter setting 30.04 inches of mercury. Remarks: showers in the vicinity to the north, southeast and west.

Molokai Airport (PHMK) in Kaunakakai, Hawaii, was located about 15 miles to the west-northwest of the accident site at an elevation of 454 feet, and was equipped with an Automated Surface Observing Station (ASOS). The following observations were recorded on November 10, 2011:

At 1154, PHMK reported wind from 040 degrees at 17 knots gusting to 27 knots, visibility of 8 miles, scattered clouds at 2,600 feet, scattered clouds at 3,100 feet, ceiling broken at 4,500 feet, temperature 24 degrees C, dew point temperature 19 degrees C, altimeter setting 30.08 inches of mercury.

At 1232, PHMK reported wind from 030 degrees at 12 knots gusting to 24 knots, visibility of 4 miles with haze, scattered clouds at 2,400 feet, ceiling broken at 2,900 feet, broken clouds at 5,000 feet, temperature 23 degrees C, dew point temperature 20 degrees C, altimeter setting 30.07 inches of mercury.

An Area Forecast that included the Molokai area was issued at 0535 and was valid until 1800. It advised of a surface wind from the east-northeast with a magnitude of 25-30 knots over mountain ridges and through valleys. In addition, for the north through east sections of mountainous areas, as well as the waters adjacent to Molokai, the following conditions were forecasted: scattered clouds at 2,500 feet, ceiling broken at 4,500 feet, cloud tops to 9,000 feet; temporary conditions: ceiling broken at 2,000 feet and visibility 3 to 5 miles with rain showers and mist; isolated conditions: ceiling broken at 1,500 feet with cloud tops to 12,000 feet, visibility at or below 3 miles, heavy rain showers and mist.

An updated Area Forecast that included the Molokai area was issued at 1140 and was valid until 0000 on November 11, 2011. It advised of a surface wind from the east-northeast with a magnitude of 25-30 knots over mountain ridges and through valleys. In addition, for the north through east sections of mountainous areas, as well as the waters adjacent to Molokai, the following conditions were forecasted: scattered clouds at 2,500 feet, ceiling broken at 4,500 feet, cloud tops to 9,000 feet; temporary conditions of ceiling broken at 2,000 feet and visibility 3 to 5 miles with rain showers and mist; isolated conditions of ceiling broken at 1,500 feet with cloud tops to 12,000 feet, visibility at or below 3 miles, heavy rain showers and mist.

An AIRMET TANGO for temporary moderate turbulence below 10,000 feet was issued at 0530 for areas over and immediately south through west of mountains on all Hawaiian Islands. An updated AIRMET TANGO for temporary moderate turbulence below 10,000 feet was issued at 1145 for areas over and immediately south through west of mountains on all Hawaiian Islands.

At 0736, a weather briefing was provided to the pilot by Lockheed Martin Flight Service. The weather briefing included the 0530 AIRMET TANGO and the 0535 Area Forecast.

Additional weather information can be found in the Meteorology Factual Report located in the public docket.

COMMUNICATIONS

The pilot was not in radio contact with air traffic control, and no distress calls were heard by other pilots during the timeframe of the accident.

WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATION

The helicopter impacted mountainous terrain about 5 miles west of Pukoo, Hawaii. It came to rest on the apex of a north-south oriented ridgeline bordered by heavy vegetation that primarily consisted of thorny trees. The ridgeline was one of several in the area that led from the higher elevations of Molokai's central peaks south toward lower elevations near the shore. The elevation at the main wreckage was about 530 feet msl, and the terrain angle varied between 25-30 degrees.

The overall wreckage debris field measured approximately 1,330 feet in length. The lower main wreckage debris field (from upper Fenestron to burn area) encompassed an area approximately 400 feet in lengt

NTSB Probable Cause

The pilot's failure to maintain clearance from mountainous terrain while operating in marginal weather conditions, which resulted in the impact of the horizontal stabilizer and lower forward portion of the fenestron with ground and/or vegetation and led to the separation of the fenestron and the pilot's subsequent inability to maintain control. Contributing to the accident was the pilot's decision to operate into an area surrounded by rising terrain, low and possibly descending cloud bases, rain showers, and high wind.