NTSB Factual Report

HISTORY OF FLIGHT

On April 17, 2003, at 0551 central daylight time, a Piper PA-31T1, N855JL, operated by Travel Express Aviation, L.L.C. (TEA), as a rental airplane, impacted an unlighted utility pole during a visual approach to runway 06 at Palwaukee Municipal Airport (PWK), Wheeling, Illinois. The airplane landed and veered off the right side of runway 06. The airplane received minor damage to the right main landing gear. No ground injuries were reported from the power lines and poles that fell onto a north-south road along the southwestern edge of the airport. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the incident. The 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 91 business flight was not operating on a flight plan. Both commercial pilots were uninjured. The flight originated from DuPage Airport (DPA), West Chicago, Illinois, at 0535, in order to pick up two passengers at PWK before departing to Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.

During an interview on April 17, 2003 with the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) Investigator-In-Charge (IIC) and two inspectors from the Federal Aviation Administrations (FAA's) DPA Flight Standards District Office (FSDO), the left seat pilot said that he has been a member of TEA for about 4-5 years. He joined the club after selling his Cessna 310, which he used for his business flights. He said that he was checked out in the club's Cessna 172, Cessna 182, Piper Warrior, Piper Archer, Piper Arrow, and Piper Saratoga. He was not checked out in the club's Mooney, Aztec, Cessna 414, and the incident airplane. He said that there are flight time requirements and required training at Flight Safety International, followed by a checkout by a club instructor, in order to fly the incident airplane. He could not cite what these requirements were. He said that the right seat pilot and one other pilot, whose last name he could not recall, were checked out in the incident airplane. He has flown a total of about 12-15 times and only 2 times in the incident airplane into PWK.

He woke up at 0430, arrived at DPA at 0500, and departed about 0530-0540 en route to PWK with the right seat pilot to pick up two passengers who were employed by the left seat pilot's company. They were then going to fly to Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. He could not recall the name or the identifier of the destination airport. He said that he called flight service to obtain a weather briefing and no flight plan was filed for the visual flight rules flight. He said that the flight was a 14 CFR Part 91 flight. He said that he used an Airplane Owners and Pilots Association airport facility directory in planning the flight.

The left seat pilot said that he made the determination to land on runway 6 based upon the wind conditions, which he said, were 040 degrees at 15 knots gusting to 22 knots. The approach was a 4-5 mile straight in visual approach to runway 6. When asked why he didn't see the power line, he said that he could not see the power lines when they activated the runway lights to high intensity from the airplane. He added that there were no balls or lights on top of the poles supporting the power lines. He said that they were focusing on the runway at the time of impact with the power line and when they did hit the power line it sounded like a "thud." When asked in what capacity the right seat pilot was acting in during the flight, he responded by saying that the right seat pilot was working the radios as he did on previous flights and that he was the non-flying pilot. He also said that the right seat pilot was serving as a "flight instructor, safety pilot, or whatever." He said that runway 6 did not have visual approach slope indicator lights.

When asked if he disagreed with the fact that this flight was a charter flight due to the number of his previous business flights in club airplanes without a checkout in the those airplanes, he responded by saying that he was not performing a charter flight but was only performing a flight for his business. He also said that he could not speak for the right seat pilot. He said what the airplane's wet hourly rental rate and the right seat pilot’s hourly and daily rates were. He has flown with the right seat pilot on overnight trips using club airplanes and cited one example, which was a trip to Boca Raton, Florida, where the right seat pilot stayed overnight with a friend in Fort Meyers, Florida. He has also flown similar flights for business to Detroit, Ohio, and Springfield, Illinois.

The left seat pilot stated the following in an NTSB Pilot/Operator Aircraft Report, dated April 24, 2003:

"I am a member of Travel Express flying club which has several airplanes available for member’s use after proper check-out and meeting all insurance requirements. One of the club aircraft is a Piper Cheyenne. I wished to be checked-out in the Cheyenne and was considering a potential purchase of this aircraft for the company that I work for. I had made arrangements for an instructional and demonstration flight of the Cheyenne a week or so in advance of the actual flight. I had taken one previous familiarization, instructional flight in the aircraft. This particular flight was to be from DuPage to Palwaukee to pick up two of my co-workers and then on to Pittsburgh. I checked the approach plate and airport diagram for both Palwaukee and Pittsburgh for familiarization. I checked with Flight Service for a weather briefing at about 5:20 am for the flight to Palwaukee then on to Pittsburgh. I met my flight instructor, [the right seat pilot] at DuPage about 5:30 am. [The right seat pilot] had checked equipment, charts and flight manual. [The right seat pilot] re-checked weather and [the right seat pilot] filed an IFR flight plan for the trip from Palwaukee to Pittsburgh. The [right seat pilot] and I did a walk around and a preflight of the aircraft and then got into the aircraft for the leg to Palwaukee. I then sat in the left seat... Since this was an instructional flight, I was to operate the controls and the [right seat pilot] was to handle radios. ...En route we listened to Palwaukee AWOS and rechecked winds. We agreed on using runway 6 due to winds. [The right seat pilot] radioed out intentions to land on runway 6 5 miles out as the tower was still closed. I set up for approach by reducing power and extending 1 notch flaps and extending the gear. [The right seat pilot] used the mike to activate the runway lights for [runway 06]. [Runway 06] is narrow and the lights quite bright against the dark ground. The approach appeared normal until the right main gear struck a power pole at the approach end of [runway 06]. We continued the approach and touched down beyond the displaced threshold on the centerline. After crossing the [runway 06/16] intersection the damaged gear caused the aircraft to veer right. [The right seat pilot] shut down the engines, radioed we were OK..."

The left seat pilot was listed as the second pilot on his NTSB Pilot/Operator Aircraft Report. The report contains a section titled Second Pilot Responsibilities At The Time Of The Accident. The choices afforded in this section are: 1. Co-Pilot, 2. Dual Student, 3. Safety Pilot, 4. Check Pilot, 5. None (Pilot-Rated Passenger). The left seat pilot checked: 2. Dual Student.

The right seat pilot stated the following in an NTSB Pilot/Operator Aircraft Report, dated April 24, 2003:

"At 5:00 a.m. on Thursday Morning [the left seat pilot] and myself checked weather utilizing both the Internet web sites Intellicast.com and adds.noaa.aviation weather.gov and by calling a FSS Briefer. The weather at DuPage and the local area was VFR. The FAR part 91 flight departed from Dupage at 5:30 a.m. with only two of us onboard on a northwesterly heading going around the class B airspace to an altitude of 1800 ft MSL. At 15 miles from Palwaukee I obtained the current AWOS information which stated the winds were 040 degrees at 15 [knots] gusting to 22 kts and the tower was closed to use 119.90 for the CTAF and to operate the pilot controlled lighting, after looking at the airport diagram we decided to use runway 06. I then tried to activate the [pilot controlled lighting] and we did not see the lights. At about 7 miles out I tried the [pilot controlled lighting] again and saw the taxiway lights and runway 16/34 lights after about 20-30 seconds the lights on 06/24 came on at full brightness and we lined up with the runway at this point I looked over at the radar altimeter and noticed that we were about 400 AGL at this point we deployed the approach flaps and gear to start our descent for runway 06. The next time I looked over at the radar altimeter we were at 200 AGL and about 2 miles from the runway. I then diverted my attention to making sure the gear was down and the plane was configured to land. The last time I looked over at the radar altimeter we were at 120 AGL and 120 kts I pulled up on the yoke and said no lower until we are at the fence and slow to 100 kts a few seconds later after I released the controls back to [the left seat pilot] I felt the bump. We then landed and I called for full reverse. As the roll out started the plane started pulling to the right, I pushed on the left rudder pedal and using the left brake to regain directional control. As the plane started to slow down it started to drift to the right as the rudder effectiveness was being lost. At this point we were headed into the grass I then pulled both condition levers to the off position. We stopped in the southeast grass area at the intersection of runways 06/24 and 16/34.

The right seat pilot listed himself as the second pilot on his NTSB Pilot/Operator Aircraft Report. The report contains a section titled Second Pilot Responsibilities At The Time Of The Accident. The choices afforded in this section are: 1. Co-Pilot, 2. Dual Student, 3. Safety Pilot, 4. Check Pilot, 5. None (Pilot-Rated Passenger). The right seat pilot wrote in "pilot in command."

On May 9, 2003, the left seat pilot stated the following in a written statement to the DPA FSDO regarding the incident:

"...In the course of my duties , it becomes necessary for me to travel frequently to destinations typically five to six hundred miles from my office and home in the Chicago Metropolitan area. There are less frequent requirements for me to travel further. Frequently, my travel requirements also include other principals or employees of the company. Particularly when our travel needs are over 500 miles or when time is of the essence, we typically charter jet aircraft for transport...

As a pilot, I am also a member of Travel Express Flying Club, which I understand is owned and operated by [the left seat pilot] and located at DuPage Airport. Travel Express has several airplane available for members' use after proper checkout and meeting all insurance requirements. In the past several years I have flown a number of the Club aircraft. In August 2001, we began to consider the possibility of the purchase of a company aircraft in lieu of using charter services. Travel Express had indicated that is Cessna 414 was available for purchase. Between November 2001 and March 2003, we chartered the 414 for five trips. On each of these trips, the purpose was for me to receive a demonstration of the aircraft for potential purchase and to travel to business meetings utilizing the aircraft to better evaluate the specific aircraft's functionality. On each of these occasions, the aircraft was chartered on a per hour basis and Travel Express provided the pilot. I was permitted to fly the aircraft under the instruction of the pilot/flight instructor during these trips.

By the end of 2002, and after having taken several trips, we realized that the 414 was probably not the aircraft that would meet our requirements. It became apparent that we would need at least a faster, turbine-powered aircraft. At that time I was aware that Travel Express had a Cheyenne that was also available for sale or lease. We had on trip in March, to Florida, where we chartered the Cheyenne on the same basis and for the same purposes as we had used the 414.

For the flight of April 17, 2003, when the incident occurred, I had made the same arrangements through Travel Express to charter the Cheyenne for a trip to Pittsburgh and back. Again, the purpose of this trip was to demonstrate the potential effectiveness of the Cheyenne, and to attend a business meeting in Pittsburgh with two of my co-employees. I am not checked out, nor proficient in the Cheyenne for any purpose nor do I have my high altitude endorsement (61.31).

PWK was closed for about 30 minutes following the incident.

PERSONNEL INFORMATION

The left seat pilot, age 52, was a member of and a flight instructor at TEA. He held a commercial pilot certificate with single-engine land, multiengine land, and instrument airplane ratings. He held a certified flight instructor certificate with airplane single-engine and instrument airplane ratings. He reported a total aircraft flight time of 1,572 hours, of which a total of 9 hours were in the incident make and model. The 9 hours in the incident make and model were accumulated in the last 90 days with 0 hours accumulated in the last 30 days.

The right seat pilot, age 38, was the president of TEA. He held a commercial pilot certificate with single-engine land, multiengine land, and instrument airplane ratings. He held a certified flight instructor certificate with airplane single-engine and airplane multiengine ratings. He reported a total aircraft flight time of 1,966 hours, of which a total of 193 hours were in the incident make and model. Of the 193 hours, 117 were reported as instructor flight time.

AIRCRAFT INFORMATION

The 1981 Piper PA-31T1, serial number 31T-8104045, airplane was registered to Capsonic Automotive Inc. Elgin, Illinois, on September 28, 2000.

The Piper PA-31T1 has a maximum demonstrated crosswind velocity of 16 knots.

METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATION

The PWK Automated Surface Observing System recorded at 0553: wind 040 degrees at 13 knots, gust 19 knots; visibility 10 statute miles; sky conditions few at 7,000 feet above ground level; temperature 3 degrees Celsius; dew point 0 degree Celsius.

U.S. Naval Observatory astronomical data for Wheeling, Illinois, on April 17, 2003, states that civil twilight began at 0539 and sunrise began at 0608.

AIRPORT INFORMATION

The Airport/Facility Directory states that PWK was a controlled airport with air traffic control tower (ATCT) hours of operation from 0600-2200, Monday to Friday. The airport had an elevation of 647 feet mean sea level and was served by runways 16-34, 12-30, and 06-24. The instrument approach procedures to the airport were: ILS 16, VOR 16, and GPS 16. All runways were equipped with pilot controlled high intensity runway lights through the airport's common traffic advisory frequency during hours when the ATCT was closed.

Runway 16-34 was a 5,001 foot by 150 foot grooved asphalt runway equipped with a precision approach path indicators (PAPIs). Runway 16 had a threshold crossing height of 40 feet and a "tree" at the approach end. Runway 34 had a threshold crossing height of 40 feet and a "road" at the approach end.

Runway 12-30 was a 4,397 foot by 50 foot asphalt runway equipped with high intensity runway lights. Runway 12 was noted to have displaced threshold of 334 feet and a "tree" at the approach end. Runway 30 was equipped with a PAPI and was noted to have a threshold crossing height of 43 feet, a displaced threshold of 432 feet, a "tree" at the approach end and a right traffic pattern.

Runway 06-24 was a 3,652 foot by 50 foot asphalt runway equipped with HIRL. Runway 06 was noted to have a displaced threshold of 287 feet and a "pole" at the approach end. Runway 24 was noted to have a displaced threshold of 1,251 due and a "tree" at the approach end.

WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATION

The airplane impacted a wood powerline pole which was about 25 feet in height and located about 400 feet from the edge of runway 06 or about 750 feet from the displaced threshold of runway 06. The power lines between the poles were equipped

NTSB Probable Cause

The pilot's failure to maintain obstacle clearance and the inadequate glidepath which resulted in a collision with a utility pole. Contributing factors were the lack of experience in the incident airplane by the left seat pilot, the visual illusion of a narrower runway, inadequate crew coordination of both pilots, and the improper use of aircraft by the flying club's management. The unlighted utility pole and the civil twilight light conditions were additional factors.