| Crash location | 37.503889°N, 87.000278°W |
| Nearest city | Hartford, KY
37.451159°N, 86.909160°W 6.2 miles away |
| Tail number | N94PH |
|---|---|
| Accident date | 10 May 2013 |
| Aircraft type | Bell 206B |
| Additional details: | None |
On May 10, 2013, about 1842 central daylight time, a Bell 206B, N94PH, registered to and operated by Provine Helicopter Service, Inc., collided with a powerline then the ground during an aerial application flight near Hartford, Kentucky. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time and no flight plan was filed for the 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 137 flight. The helicopter sustained substantial damage and the commercial pilot, the sole occupant, was not injured. The flight originated about 5 minutes earlier from a location immediately adjacent to the accident site.
The pilot stated that he took the final load of chemical to complete the current tract, or field. He circled over it 3 times looking for lines, obstructions, houses and people and to develop a plan to spray the field. He completed 2 spray passes and during the 3rd spray pass, he heard a “pop” sound and saw “…the lines” as they contacted the windscreen. The helicopter was controllable for a, “brief moment” but it then yawed slowly to the right and slightly down at which point all control was lost. The helicopter continued to rotate clockwise and veered to the right, then impacted the ground on the left side. He reported there was no preimpact mechanical failure or malfunction with the helicopter or its systems.
The company Policy and Procedures Manual in effect at the time of the accident specifies major duties and responsibilities of the pilot, which included information that a pre-work conference be conducted before application to each tract being sprayed. The pre-work conference specifies that the tract representative, “turn key”, ground crew, and pilot agree on and understand the weather conditions, locations of the tract and boundaries, products being applied and their rates, landing zones, adjacent landowners, and potential problem area or miscommunication. However, nowhere in the duties and responsibilities is it spelled out specifically that potential flight hazards be identified during the pre-work conference.
Postaccident, the operator changed the Policy and Procedures Manual to specify that all involved personnel involved identify flight hazards during the pre-work conference.
The pilot’s failure to avoid a powerline that crossed a field that he was spraying. Contributing to the collision was the company’s failure to specifically mention that flight hazards be identified during a pre-work conference.