NTSB Factual Report

HISTORY OF FLIGHT

On September 9, 2000, about 1026 central daylight time (all times central daylight time), a Beech 58P, N58PB, registered to Winter Park Aviation, Inc., experienced a loss of control and collided with terrain while circling to land during a VOR/DME or GPS-A approach to the Brookhaven-Lincoln County Airport, Brookhaven, Mississippi. Instrument meteorological conditions prevailed at the time and an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan was filed for the 14 CFR Part 91 personal flight. The airplane was destroyed and the airline transport-rated pilot and one passenger were fatally injured. The flight originated about 0737, from the Orlando Executive Airport, Orlando, Florida.

The pilot received IFR clearance for the flight to the Brookhaven-Lincoln County Airport, and was cleared for takeoff at approximately 0737. Air traffic control (ATC) communications were transferred to several ATC facilities then at 0926, transferred to the Houston ARTCC. Copies of the chronological summary of communications with the facilities are an attachment to this report.

According to a transcription of communications with the Houston ARTCC, at 0926:35, the pilot advised the controller that the flight was level at flight level 180. The controller acknowledged the report and at 0930:39, the pilot advised the controller, "...I was just getting the uh awos with uh Hattiesburg and the mccomb weather I'd like to proceed direct to the mccomb vor for the vor dme approach into brookhaven please." The flight was cleared direct to the McComb VORTAC. The flight continued and was cleared to descend and maintain 12,000 feet mean sea level (msl), followed by a descent clearance to 11,000 feet msl. At 0957:57, the flight was cleared direct to the McComb VORTAC, which was acknowledged by the pilot. The flight was cleared to descend to 10,000 feet msl, then at 1002:21, cleared to descend at pilots discretion to 3,000 feet. The pilot acknowledged the transmission from the controller and at 1007:08, asked the controller, "center it's eight papa bravo would you happen to have the latest mccomb sequence over." The controller responded, "November five eight papa bravo the mccomb one four four niner observation wind one two zero at six visibility six haze ceiling six hundred broken and one thousand broken three thousand overcast altimeter three zero zero one." The pilot acknowledged the controller's transmission and at 1014:04, the pilot advised the controller that the flight was at 3,000 feet msl. The controller advised the pilot the McComb altimeter setting was 30.01 inHg, which was correctly repeated by the pilot. At 1014:21, the controller stated, "...maintain three thousand until established on a portion of the approach cleared for approach into uh brookhaven municipal airport." The pilot responded at 1014:29, "three till established cleared for the approach...." The controller then advised the pilot to report cancellation of the IFR clearance or down time on the communication frequency or if unable through the Greenwood Radio and change to the advisory frequency was approved. The pilot acknowledged the controller's transmission; there were no further recorded transmissions from the pilot with the Houston ARTCC.

Review of radar data revealed that the last radar target occurred at 1021:11, when the flight was approximately 8 nautical miles and 155 degrees from the destination airport. A copy of the provided radar data is an attachment to this report.

A witness who was located approximately 4 nautical miles south-southeast of the airport reported hearing a loud popping and "smothering noise" but he did not see the airplane. He also reported a "heavy overcast" existed. A copy of his witness statement is an attachment to this report.

The pilot's father and stepbrother who are both pilot-rated were at the airport at the time of the accident. The pilot's stepbrother verbally reported in part the day after the accident that he heard the airplane fly over from the east to the north. He walked onto the ramp and observed the airplane flying northeast bound parallel to the runway with the left wing probably over the rotating beacon. He also reported that he thought the downwind leg was closer in than a traffic pattern for a Baron. The rotating beacon tower was later measured and found to be located 644 feet south of the south edge of the runway. He heard what he thought was full power applied for what he thought would be a missed approach and a change in sound he associated with the propellers being placed in low pitch. The flaps appeared positioned to the approach setting and the landing gear was extended. He observed the airplane turning base when the flight was approximately 10-20 degrees past the approach end of the runway then observed the airplane bank approximately 70-75 degrees to the left. He reported thinking to himself for the pilot to execute a missed approach and later reported that he believed the excessive bank angle was due to being close-in on the downwind leg and also due to a tailwind of 7 knots while turning on the base leg. He verbally and later reported that the left wing stalled and the airplane then pitched nose down and impacted the ground; it did not spin. The engine sound remained the same after hearing full power applied until the impact. He later reported that when the left wing stalled, "...full right aileron was applied in an attempt to fly-out of the stall." He never lost sight of the airplane from the first sighting to the moment of impact and he did not hear any engine related problems or see smoke trailing the airplane during flight. A copy of the statement from the stepbrother and a transcription of the interview are attachments to this report.

Additional witnesses located near the airport reported seeing the airplane in a "real sharp turn" and the airplane, "...began to dive toward the ground out of control. Then the aircraft hit the ground noise [sic] first and burst into flames." Copies of the witness statements are an attachment to this report.

PERSONNEL INFORMATION

The pilot was the holder of an airline transport pilot certificate with the ratings airplane multiengine land. He also was the holder of a commercial pilot certificate with the ratings airplane single engine land. He was issued a first class medical certificate with no limitations on December 11, 1998. Review of excerpts from his pilot logbook provided to the FAA revealed he logged a total time of approximately 5,080 hours.

He attended SimCom located in Orlando, Florida. According to their records, his last training took place over a two-day period beginning on November 27, 1999, and ending the next day with a Pilot Proficiency Certificate issued. There were 2 recorded sessions on the first day and 1 recorded session on the last day. A landing from a circling approach and circling approaches were satisfactory performed on the last day of training. Copies of his training records are an attachment to this report.

AIRCRAFT INFORMATION

The permanent airplane maintenance records were initially provided to the FAA aviation safety inspector assigned to the investigation. The inspector reviewed the provided maintenance records and returned them to the pilot's stepbrother before NTSB examination. Copies of the maintenance records were requested by the NTSB investigator-in-charge (IIC) during an interview with the pilot's stepbrother the day after the accident, in the form of a voice mail message to the pilot's stepbrother on January 22, 2001, and again during a phone conversation with the pilot's stepbrother 8 days later. He reported at that time that an attorney handling the pilot's estate had possession of the maintenance records and he (pilot's stepbrother) would have a complete copy of the maintenance records mailed to my attention. Copies of the maintenance records were not provided.

The fuel tanks of the airplane were topped off one day before the accident date. The airplane was not reportedly flown from the time of refueling to the departure of the accident flight.

METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATION

According to a private-rated pilot (pilot's stepbrother) who has an instrument rating and was at the airport at the time of the accident, he estimated that the ceiling was 500-600 feet and the visibility was 3 statute miles. There is no weather reporting facility at the accident airport.

A METAR observation taken at the McComb-Pike County-John E Lewis Field (MCB) airport at 1050 indicates that the wind was from 150 degrees at 7 knots, the visibility was recorded to be 7 statute miles. Broken clouds existed at 1,000 and 1,800 feet; overcast clouds existed at 25,000 feet. The temperature and dew point were approximately 81 and 75 degrees Fahrenheit respectively, and the altimeter was 30.00 inHg. The MCB airport is located approximately 183 degrees and 26 nautical miles from the accident airport.

An automated weather observation (AWOS) taken at the Hattiesburg-Laurel Regional (PIB) Airport at 1056 indicates that the wind was from 100 degrees at 6 knots; the visibility was recorded to be 10 statute miles. Overcast clouds existed at 800 feet; the temperature and dew point were approximately 79 and 73 degrees Fahrenheit respectively. The altimeter was 30.03 inHg. The PIB airport is located approximately 094 degrees and 56 nautical miles from the accident airport.

An AWOS taken at the Hardy-Anders Field Natchez-Adams County Airport (HEZ) at 1015, indicates that the wind was from 140 degrees at 9 knots, the visibility was recorded to be 10 statute miles. Overcast clouds existed at 1,400 feet, the temperature and dew point were approximately 79 and 73 degrees Fahrenheit respectively, and the altimeter setting was 29.96 inHg. The HEZ airport is located approximately 267 degrees and 46 nautical miles from the accident airport.

COMMUNICATIONS

The pilot was last in contact with the Houston Air Route Traffic Control Center and transcriptions of communications with that facility are an attachment to this report.

AERODROME INFORMATION

The Brookhaven-Lincoln County Airport has one runway designated 4/22 which 3,800 feet long and 75 feet wide. Both runways have displaced thresholds; the landing distance for runway 22 is 2800 feet. The airport is served in part with a VOR/DME or GPS-A approach. The depicted minimums for the accident category airplane executing a circling approach are 1,200 feet mean sea level with 1 mile visibility. The depicted missed approach point is the MAJON intersection, which is 19.5 nautical miles from the McComb VORTAC. A copy of the NOAA U.S. Terminal Procedures instrument approach chart is an attachment to this report.

WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATION

The airplane crashed on the Brookhaven-Lincoln County Airport. The crash site was located approximately 050 degrees and 1,460 feet from the centerline of the displaced threshold of runway 22.

Examination of the accident site revealed the airplane was upright on a magnetic heading of 148 degrees; postcrash fire destroyed the cockpit, cabin, and portion of the empennage (see photographs 1 through 6). A ground scar from the left wing located approximately 20 feet forward of the main wreckage was oriented on a magnetic heading of 175 degrees. The left wing was found inverted between the fuselage and right engine nacelle (see photograph 7), and the left wingtip containing a fuel tank was found approximately 95 feet due north from the main wreckage location. Chordwise leading edge crushing was noted on the separated wingtip. The left engine was found inverted in the co-pilot's seat position; the engine mounts were broken. One of the propeller blades from the left propeller was found about 22.5 feet forward of the resting location of the left engine. Fire damage was noted to the right wing inboard of the engine nacelle and also in several areas on the upper and lower wing skins; no evidence of in-flight fire was noted. The right propeller was separated from the engine; the propeller was located in a crater approximately 15 feet forward of the right engine. The right wing fuel tanks were found to contain approximately 2.5 gallons of fuel; no contaminants were noted. The right wing was connected to the fuselage at the forward attach points; the aft spar was connected at the fuselage but the spar was fractured near the engine nacelle location. The landing gear was fully extended as evidenced by the gearbox and the flap selector switch was in the down position (see photograph 8). The left flap actuator was separated from the airplane and exhibited a witness mark from the postcrash fire correlated to full flap extension (see photographs 9 and 10). The right flap actuator was heat damaged. Examination of the rudder and elevator flight control cables revealed no evidence of preimpact failure or malfunction. Examination of the aileron flight control cables revealed the right aileron control cable was connected at the control surface bellcrank and at the chain in the cockpit, but was fractured near the aft transition pulley where the cable changes 90 degrees of direction. Both ends of the fractured cable were retained for further examination (see Tests and Research section of this report). The left aileron control cable was fractured near the chain in the cockpit; no evidence of preimpact failure or malfunction was noted. The balance cable for the aileron was attached at the right aileron and continuous to the cable clevis of the left aileron; a turnbuckle of the balance cable was bent and fractured, only the safety wire held the fractured turnbuckle together. An impact signature on the lower surface of the rudder balance weight and the left side of the aft spar of the vertical stabilizer indicated approximately 15-degree trailing edge right rudder deflection (see photograph 11). All autopilot servos were free to rotate. Both engines were recovered for further examination.

Examination of the left engine revealed fire damage. Crankshaft, and camshaft continuity was confirmed. Thumb suction and compression was noted in cylinder Nos. 1, 3, 5, and 2. Heat damage to the valve springs of cylinder Nos. 4 and 6 were noted; the springs were noted to be loose. The engine driven fuel pump was free to rotate and no discrepancies were noted with the fuel pump drive shaft. Both magnetos were heat damaged which precluded operation. Examination of the oil filter revealed no contaminants. The throttle plate was found in the "closed" position. The turbocharger was free to rotate. The fuel control screen was clean, and the fuel control unit was free to operate. Heat damage to the fuel manifold diaphragm was noted. The turbocharger waste-gate controller was broken, and the right magneto and vacuum pump were broken from the accessory case. All fuel injector nozzles were plugged with the exception of the No. 3 cylinder.

Examination of the right engine revealed crankshaft, camshaft, and valve train continuity. Thumb compression and suction was noted on all cylinders. Fire damage was noted to the left side of the engine. The crankshaft flange was fractured. The turbocharger was free to rotate. Both magnetos were rotated by hand and were found to spark at all terminals. All fuel injector nozzles were clear. No discrepancies were noted with the fuel manifold diaphragm. The filter in the fuel controller was clean. The attach bolts of the engine driven fuel pump were broken and the fuel pump drive coupling was noted to be bent and fractured. The fuel control and air valve throttle plate was in the "open" position. The starter, vacuum pump, and pressure controller were separated. The waste-gate control was broken.

Initial examination of the left propeller revealed propeller blades Nos. 1 and 2 remained in the hub (see photograph 12); the No. 3 propeller blade was separated from the hub. Propeller blades Nos. 1 and 2 were bent aft approximately 40 degrees, propeller blade No. 3 was bent aft approximately 30 degrees (see photograph 13). Initial examination of the right propeller revealed that a section of crankshaft flange remained secured to the propeller flange. The propeller blades Nos. 1 and 3 remained in

NTSB Probable Cause

The poor in-flight planning/decision by the pilot for flying a close-in downwind leg, improper aircraft handling by the pilot for his executing a 70-75 degree angle of bank turning base to final while circling to land, and inadvertent stall/mush of the airplane by the pilot-in-command.