NTSB Factual Report

HISTORY OF FLIGHT

On December 22, 2003, at 2000 mountain standard time, a Beech 58P, N181AM, registered to Ridgeaire Inc., operated by the U.S. Forest Service as a 14 CFR Part 91 positioning flight, collided with an open field shortly after takeoff from Missoula International Airport, Missoula, Montana. Night instrument meteorological conditions prevailed at the time and an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan was filed. The aircraft was destroyed by impact damage and a post-crash fire. The airline transport pilot (ATP), pilot-in-command (PIC) received minor injuries, while the ATP certificated second pilot was not injured. The flight was departing from Missoula to Redmond, Oregon.

The second pilot reported that the flight had originated in Redmond, Oregon, about 1530 Pacific standard time. The purpose of the flight from Redmond to Missoula was to transport two other pilots to Missoula. During this flight the second pilot was in the right seat for familiarization in the Beech 58 as he was getting ready to attend training to transition to the Beech 58. For the return trip to Redmond, the second pilot was going to the fly the airplane from the left seat with the understanding that the ATP in the right seat was the pilot-in-command.

During a telephone interview and subsequent written statement, the second pilot stated that prior to take off he filed the IFR flight plan and received a standard weather briefing. While the ATP was accomplishing a walk-around, the second pilot was familiarizing himself with the cockpit. The ATP talked the second pilot through the start procedures and after start checks. Anti-ice was turned on at the time. The aircraft was taxied to the runway and the current automatic terminal information service (ATIS) was received along with the takeoff clearance. While waiting for another aircraft to land, the pilots reviewed the departure procedure. The climb out airspeed was planned for 130 knots. When the aircraft taxied onto the runway for takeoff, the second pilot noted that he could see a long way down the runway. The ATP talked the second pilot through the takeoff roll. When rotation speed was reached, followed by lift-off, the second pilot noted a positive rate of climb on the vertical speed indicator, but held off on retracting the landing gear. The aircraft accelerated to 130 knots, and the second pilot pitched the aircraft to hold the airspeed. The runway edge lights started to fade when the aircraft was about 300 feet above ground level, and the landing gear was retracted. The second pilot maintained runway heading, climbing to 400 to 500 feet above ground level before a right turn was started to intercept the 155 degree radial from the Missoula (MSO) VOR (VHF omni-directional radio range) per the departure procedure. The second pilot stated that he rolled into a 30 degree bank, then corrected back to 25 degrees. The second pilot scanned the airspeed indicator, which was holding 130 knots, then he scanned back to the attitude indicator. At this time the second pilot stated that he heard a "thump and felt a jolt," and thought that they might have hit a bird. The aircraft "aggressively rolled to the right to around a 45 degree bank." The second pilot corrected with left aileron input, which took an "excessive amount of left aileron to stop the right bank." The aircraft eventually started to come back towards wings level as the ATP took control of the aircraft. The second pilot stated that the "aircraft rolled back to the left very sluggishly and slow." Just as the wings leveled, the aircraft impacted the ground.

During the telephone interview, the second pilot stated that after the thump was felt and the aircraft rolled to the right, he could not recall if he looked at the vertical speed indicator or altimeter to verify if they were indicating a climb or descent.

During a telephone interview and subsequent written statement, the ATP reported similar events leading up to the collision. Prior to takeoff, the ATP confirmed that he did turn on the three pitot and fuel vent switches, along with the windshield heat and prop de-ice. After takeoff and at an altitude of about 400 - 500 feet above ground level the second pilot initiated the right turn. The bank angle was initially at 30 degrees, then corrected back to 20 degrees. The pitch was relaxed to about 4 to 5 degrees to hold the 130 knot airspeed. The second pilot reached down to reset the heading bug to the intercept heading for the 155 degree radial. At this time the ATP heard a "somewhat muffled - like a whoomp" noise that seemed to be on the right side. The noise was not so loud as to startle him, but it did draw his attention. The ATP stated that engine noise did not change, but the second pilot seemed to be adding a little left aileron control to maintain the established turn. The ATP noticed that the second pilot was increasing aileron pressure, however the pitch, bank and airspeed remained consistent at 4 degrees, 20 degrees and 130 knots for the next few moments. The ATP was focused on those instruments and confirming the intercept heading for the outbound radial. As the intercept heading came in, the second pilot added left aileron to try and roll out. The ATP stated that the aircraft did not seem to respond and the heading appeared to continue to track. At this time the ATP noticed terrain come into view and grabbed the control yoke and applied substantial left aileron to level the wings to the terrain. The ATP reported that the aircraft seemed to have some adverse yaw in this roll out. As the ATP applied left rudder pedal for a coordinated turn, the aircraft struck something on or near the ground.

Neither pilot could explain the loss of altitude as both believed they were in a continuous climb during the event.

The aircraft skipped along the flat open field, subsequently colliding with an above ground sprinkler system. The empennage separated from the structure and the right engine caught on fire. The aircraft eventually came to rest upright on its belly, and was consumed by fire shortly after the pilots exited the aircraft out the aft end.

PERSONNEL INFORMATION

At the time of the accident, the ATP pilot-in-command (PIC) held commercial, airline transport and flight instructor certificates, with ratings for single-engine land and sea, multi-engine land, helicopter, glider and instrument operations. The PIC reported a total flight time in all aircraft of 4,850 hours, with 1,000 hours in the make and model aircraft involved in the accident.

At the time of the accident, the second pilot held commercial, airline transport and flight instructor certificates, with ratings for single-engine land and sea, multi-engine land and sea and instrument operations. The second pilot reported a total flight time in all aircraft of 2,136 hours, with no flight time in the make and model aircraft involved in the accident.

METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATION

At 1914, the second pilot contacted Great Falls Automated Flight Service Station to request an abbreviated weather briefing and file an IFR flight plan from Missoula to Redmond. The second pilot reported to the specialist that the departure time was proposed at 1945. The en route altitude was 16,000 feet with the route of flight from Missoula, and then the Mullan Two Transition to Konna direct to Pendleton, OR, direct to Deschutes, OR, and then direct to Redmond, OR.

The specialist reported that the computer would not take a Mullan Pass Two Transition and asked the pilot if Missoula direct to Konna would work. The pilot indicated that, that would work. After the flight plan was filed, the specialist asked the pilot what weather he needed. The pilot reported that he needed the weather at his destination. The specialist reported that airmets were in effect from Missoula to Pendleton for occasional IFR conditions from the Washington, Idaho border to the destination for occasional mountain obscuration and occasional IFR conditions in the Redmond area.

The specialist then gave the pilot the current and forecast weather conditions in Redmond, which were indicating fog, low ceilings and low visibility. The conversation concluded with the specialist giving the pilot the winds aloft for the route of flight and a request for pilot reports. The specialist also gave the pilot the frequency for flight watch.

At 1953, the Missoula Airport weather observation was reporting a temperature of 26 degrees F and dew point of 24 degrees F. The wind was calm. Visibility was 3/4 mile. The clouds were 100 feet and fog.

COMMUNICATIONS

At 1944, N181AM made contact with Missoula Ground Control to report ready for taxi and the IFR clearance. The pilot was instructed to taxi to runway 11 and hold short of the ILS (instrument landing system) critical area. The controller then asked the pilot if he had a departure procedure preference. The pilot reported that he did not. The controller then cleared the flight to Redmond via the Missoula One departure, Missoula Transition, then as filed. Climb and maintain 14,000 feet and expect 16,000 feet within 10 minutes of departure. The departure frequency was 124.9 and the transponder code squawk was 4073. The controller indicated that the current field conditions were an indefinite ceiling at 100 feet with a visibility of 1/2 mile and freezing fog. The altimeter was 30.31.

The pilot responded to the controller with a read back of the clearance of cleared to Missoula via the Missoula One Departure, Missoula. The pilot indicated that he missed the climb and maintain altitude and reported that he thought that it was 10,000 feet, then expect 16,000 feet. The pilot correctly read back the departure frequency and the transponder code.

The controller corrected the pilot in stating that the flight was cleared to Redmond via the Missoula One, Missoula as filed and maintain 14,000 feet. The rest of the read back was correct.

At 1946, the controller broadcast the current field conditions as indefinite ceiling at 100 feet, with a visibility of 1/2 mile and freezing fog.

At 1951, a flight identified as Big Sky, flight 2589 reported in with the tower controller reporting that they were inbound on the ILS approach for runway 11.

At 1954, N181AM reported that they were holding short of the ILS critical area for runway 11 and were ready for takeoff. The controller informed the pilot to hold short for the inbound aircraft on final approach.

At 1956, the controller announced the airport conditions were now a measured overcast ceiling at 100 feet, with a visibility of one mile and mist.

At 2000, the landing traffic reported clear of the runway and N181AM was cleared for takeoff. There were no further communications received from N181AM after this time.

The Missoula tower controller attempted several times to contact N181AM after the aircraft took off with no response. The controller also contacted Spokane Approach control inquiring if N181AM made contact. Spokane Approach control reported no. The Missoula controller indicated that he had a primary target on radar for a moment about one mile off the departure end of runway 11. No altitude was identified.

AERODROME INFORMATION

The departure route description for the MZULA One Departure, Missoula Transition for takeoff on runway 11, indicates a climbing right turn to intercept MSO (Missoula VOR) R-155, (155 degree radial from MSO VOR) thence after leaving 7,800 feet, make a climbing left turn direct to MSO VOR/DME (Distance Measuring Equipment).

WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATION

On site wreckage documentation by a Federal Aviation Administration Inspector from the Helena, Montana, Flight Standards District Office, reported that the first impact signature noted to the relatively flat open terrain (cow pasture) was on the northeast side of a dry canal that was 12 feet wide and five feet deep. The initial impact was located approximately one mile south of the departure end of runway 11, and located on the approximate 165 degree radial from the Missoula VOR. After the first impact, the aircraft appeared to have become airborne for a short distance before hitting the ground again, then skipped over the canal and struck and destroyed a drive assembly attached to an above ground irrigation pipe about 88 yards into the wreckage distribution path. The aircraft continued skipping along the ground on a 250 degree magnetic bearing, shedding debris of sheet metal, fiberglass, carpet, and paper. Evidence of fire was noted about 170 yards into the path. Approximately 246 yards into the path, the empennage section separated from the structure. The aircraft slid along the ground the remaining distance from this point to the final resting point of the main wreckage at 352 yards. The aircraft came to rest facing to the south and positioned flat on its belly. A post-crash fire consumed the entire fuselage structure and cockpit.

Both wings remained attached to their respective wing roots. Both engines remained encased in their respective nacelles. The right wing structure was completely destroyed aft of the leading edge and reduced to ash. The outboard two feet of the right wingtip had separated and was located about 95 yards into the wreckage distribution path with some fuel remaining in the tank.

The left wing displayed heat distress, but maintained its form. Both the flap and aileron remained attached to their respective hinges.

The empennage separated from the structure just forward of the horizontal stabilizer. Both left and right side horizontal stabilizers remained attached to the root, as well as the vertical stabilizer. The elevators remained attached to the stabilizer at their respective hinges. The rudder remained attached to the vertical stabilizer.

The left side propeller assembly remained attached to the crankshaft. All three propeller blades remained attached to the hub. All three blades displayed severe aft bending about mid-span.

The right side propeller assembly remained attached to the crankshaft. All three propeller blades remained attached to the hub. All three blades were missing the blade tips. All three blades displayed bending signatures.

Inspection of the leading edge surfaces did not indicate evidence of an in-flight impact with an object.

ADDITIONAL DATA/INFORMATION

The wreckage was recovered from the accident site and transported to a secured hanger at the Missoula Airport. The wreckage was released to the USDA National Aviation Safety and Training Manager on January 14, 2004.

NTSB Probable Cause

The second pilot's failure to maintain terrain clearance while maneuvering after takeoff. Proper climb rate not verified by the flight crew, fog, freezing fog, dark night conditions and inadequate supervision by the pilot-in-command were factors.