NTSB Factual Report

HISTORY OF FLIGHT

On May 25, 2011, about 1613 eastern daylight time, a Hawker Beechcraft Corporation 58, N77AR, collided with mountainous terrain near Murphy, North Carolina. The airline transport pilot and three passengers were fatally injured and the airplane sustained substantial damage. The airplane was registered to Aero Resources Corporation, and operated by Friendship Flying Service, Inc., under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 135 as an on-demand, non-scheduled, domestic passenger flight to Wendell H Ford Airport (K20), Hazard, Kentucky. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed in the area at the time of the accident and an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan was filed. The flight originated from Fulton County Airport (FTY), Atlanta, Georgia, about 1543.

The flight plan indicated 3 on board; however, the airplane operator reported that an additional individual asked the pilot before departure to be flown to K20.

According to a chronological summary of communications, at 1544, the pilot established contact with the Atlanta Terminal Radar Approach Control (Atlanta TRACON) and advised the controller that the flight had departed FTY and was at 1,700 feet. The flight was radar identified and the pilot was cleared to climb to 9,000 feet, which he acknowledged. Air traffic control communications were transferred to Atlanta Air Route Traffic Control Center (Atlanta ARTCC) and the pilot remained in contact with that facility from 1552 to 1611; normal communications were reported. At 1611, the pilot was advised to contact Knoxville Approach Control which he acknowledged.

According to a transcription of communications with Knoxville Approach Control, at 1611:50, the pilot established contact with the facility and advised the controller that the flight was at 9,000 feet. The controller did not answer the radio call from the pilot. At 1612:18, the pilot advised the controller, “Knoxville seven seven alpha romeo we gotta declare an emergency got a fire”; but he did not specify the location or magnitude of the fire. The controller asked the pilot if he was going to land at McGhee Tyson Airport (TYS), located in Knoxville, Tennessee. The pilot did not respond and there were no further recorded transmissions from the pilot.

According to a NTSB Radar Study that plotted radar targets and displayed key transmissions from the pilot and controller, after the pilot declared an emergency and advised he had a fire, a total of 7 transponder returns were noted. The transponder returns were between 1612:24, and 1612:48. During those 7 returns, the flight proceeded in a north-northeasterly direction with a decrease in altitude noted. The last 2 transponder returns did not have altitude report or had an erroneous altitude report. After the last secondary transponder return, 2 primary radar returns were noted. The second to last primary radar return was noted east-northeast of the last secondary transponder return, and the last primary radar return was located north of the previous primary return. The accident site was located approximately 061 degrees and 3,100 feet from the last primary radar return using straight line distance. No determination was made as to what flight path was made between the last primary radar return and the accident site. The last primary radar return at 1612:57, was located at 35 degrees 11.055 minutes North latitude and 084 degrees 09.7686 minutes West longitude.

A witness reported to a Federal Aviation Administration inspector he heard a twin-engine airplane flying overhead his location, and observed the airplane flying straight and level about 1,500 feet above the mountains in a northwesterly direction. The witness reported hearing the engines accelerate and the airplane continued briefly then the right wing dipped and the airplane pitched nose down. While in the nose-low attitude the witness heard the engines accelerate more. He lost sight of the airplane over the ridge and heard an explosion seconds later. He could not see the registration markings or individuals inside, but reported he did not notice any smoke or flames coming from the airplane before losing sight behind the ridge.

Another witness who was located at the Unaka Community Cemetery, and who was outside, reported first hearing the airplane. He reported the sound was loud which was what caught his attention and was consistent with a low flying airplane. He pointed out that the airplane was flying towards his position at the cemetery from the approximate location of the Hiwassee Dam Lake (approximately 060 degrees). He did not notice any extreme nose low or nose high pitch position. He noted that the airplane made a “sharp right turn” confirming the direction of the turn. The airplane then went behind trees and he heard an explosion much like a “sonic boom.” He then saw a puff of black smoke. Immediately after the explosion he looked at his watch noting the time of 1618 hours local. Another individual came to the cemetery, and they both went towards the area where they thought the airplane had crashed. They went down Joe Brown Highway, then turned onto Allen Bell Road. They drove to a house close to the crash site and hiked down to a creek. They went into the creek and about 50 to 60 yards downstream, saw smoke to their left. They saw a wing on the right side of the creek as they were walking. When they were about 25 yards from the crash site, he reported there was an explosion. The smoke was intense, and about that time, 1 acre of woods were on fire. He looked at his watch and noted the tine he arrived on-scene was about 1640. He reported the weather conditions were clear and sunny.

Still another witness who was located at his house near the crash site reported hearing a low flying airplane with engine surging. He then heard a loud explosion which rattled his windows. He initially thought lightning had struck the house. He went onto his deck, and saw smoke. He and several individuals went to the crash site area and were on-scene about 10 minutes after the crash. When they arrived he noted that the fuselage was on fire, which was not spreading fast. He did not notice anything on fire on his side of the creek. He heard an explosion on the side he was on. A noticed a lot of paperwork with no char marks. The witness reported that there was no rain or breeze at the time, and the clouds were scattered. About 30 minutes after the crash he noted a helicopter was overhead. He estimated the time of the accident about 1615.

PERSONNEL INFORMATION

The pilot, age 26, held commercial, airline transport pilot, and certified flight instructor (CFI) certificates. At the commercial level he had airplane single engine land rating, and at the airline transport pilot level he had airplane multi-engine land rating issued April 13, 2011. On the CFI, he had airplane single engine and instrument airplane ratings. He held a first class medical certificate with a limitation to wear corrective lenses issued July 12, 2010. On the application for his last medical certificate he listed 2,250 hours as his total flight time.

The pilot was hired by Friendship Flying Service, Inc., on March 1, 2009. Paperwork provided by the operator included the pilot’s resume on which he listed a total time of 2,469 hours, 2,370 hours as pilot-in-command, and 652 hours in multi-engine airplanes. The operator submitted a request to the FAA on July 21, 2010, in accordance with the Pilot Records Improvement Act of 1996. The reply to the operator dated August 16, 2010, indicated no legal enforcement actions resulting in a finding of a violation. On July 19, 2010, the pilot submitted to a pre-employment urine test; the results were negative.

On September 30, 2010, the pilot completed basic indoctrination, general operation, and aircraft systems training under 14 CFR Part 135. Additionally, on September 30, 2010, October 2, 2010, and on October 4, 2010, he completed flight training consisting of a total of 5.4 hours. During the training flights, abnormal and emergency procedures training was performed which included training for aircraft fires on September 30th and October 4th flights.

The pilot’s initial checkride in accordance with (IAW) 14 CFR Part 135.293, 14 CFR Part 135.297, and 14 CFR Part 135.299 occurred on October 5, 2010. The flight duration was recorded to be 1.9 hours and was performed in the accident airplane; the result was recorded to be “approved.” The pilot’s base month was October, and his next checkride IAW 14 CFR Part 135.297 occurred on April 13, 2011. The duration of the checkride and the results were recorded to be 2.2 hours and “approved”; respectively. That checkride was also flown in the accident airplane.

The pilot’s first logged flight with the operator occurred on October 7, 2010. The operator reported that in the last 90 days with respect to their records, he flew 153 hours, of which 121 were in the accident make and model airplane, and in the past 30 days, he flew 72 hours, of which 57 were in the accident make and model airplane.

AIRCRAFT INFORMATION

The airplane was certificated in the normal category in accordance with Civil Air Regulations Part 3 (CAM 3), titled, "Airplane Airworthiness Normal, Utility, and Acrobatic Category", as amended May 15, 1956, and 14 CFR Part 23.1385(c), 23.1387(a), and 23.1387(e) of Federal Aviation Regulations.

The airplane was manufactured in 1976 by Beech Aircraft Corporation (later becoming Hawker Beechcraft Corporation) as model 58, and designated serial number TH-757. At the time of the accident, it was powered by two 285 horsepower Continental Motors, Inc., IO-520-C engines, and equipped with Hartzell PHC-J3YF-2UF constant speed full manual feathering propellers with FC7663 propeller blades. Electrical wiring consisting of MIL-W-5086/1 of the single wire type was installed in the cockpit and cabin areas of airplane. It was also equipped with a fire extinguisher, and the maintenance records reflect that a hand pump for an inflatable cabin door seal was installed.

A combustion type heater was installed in the center of the nose section of the airplane. The fuel supply for the combustion heater is routed from the left fuel tank to the wing root, where it makes a 90 degree change in direction forward and is routed along the left fuselage sidewall. The fuel line continues into the nose section of the airplane, where it makes a 45 degree right turn and connects to the heater boost pump installed on the aft end of the heater. The fuel supply is then routed from the fuel pump to the left side of the heater.

A dual (left and right) direct reading fuel flow and pressure gauge calibrated to indicate fuel flow was installed in the instrument panel above the throttle quadrant to the left of the audio panel. The gauge receives fuel pressure from a restrictor fitting attached to the engine fuel injection system’s fuel manifold that is located on top of the engine; the restrictor fitting is designed to prevent the escape of excessive fluid or gas in case of line failure. The gauge is plumbed from the restrictor fitting at the fuel manifold to a fitting on the firewall by a fire shielded flexible hose, and then from the fitting on the aft side of the firewall via aluminum lines which are routed inside the leading edge of both wings to each wing root. Rigid 1/4 inch outside diameter aluminum tubing connects at a union located at each wing root, then is routed forward along the lower fuselage sidewall into the cockpit, where each line is routed up to behind the instrument panel. The tubing for the left and right fuel pressure lines traverse behind the instrumental panel and connect to fittings on the dual fuel gauge.

Direct reading combination oil pressure/oil temperature/cylinder temperature gauges were installed for each engine and are side by side in the middle portion of the co-pilot’s instrument panel. The pressure portion of the gauge receives oil pressure from a restrictor fitting in each oil cooler that is located on the engine; the restrictor fitting is designed to prevent the escape of excessive fluid or gas in case of line failure. The oil pressure side of each gauge is plumbed from the restrictor fitting at the oil cooler to a fitting on the firewall by a flexible fire shielded hose, and from the fitting on the aft side of the firewall via aluminum lines routed inside the leading edge of both wings to the each wing root. Rigid ¼ inch outside diameter aluminum tubing connects at a union located at each wing, then is routed forward along the lower fuselage sidewall into the cockpit, where it is then routed up behind the instrument panel. The tubing for the left and right oil pressure lines traverse behind the instrument panel and connect to fittings on the oil pressure gauge.

The airplane was inspected in accordance with (IAW) annual inspections, performed at 100-Hour intervals.

Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2004-21-05, with an effective date of November 19, 2004, pertaining to the model of the combustion heater installed in the airplane at the time of the accident was first complied with on December 10, 2004. The heater time since overhaul at that time was calculated to be approximately 1,483 hours. The AD specified in part that for the model of combustion heater installed upon the accumulation of 500 heater hours TIS, or within the next 100 hours TIS, to perform a pressure decay test of the combustion tube of the heater. The AD also specified a recurring pressure test of the combustion tube at intervals not-to-exceed 100 heater hours TIS or 24 calendar months, whichever occurs first.

The maintenance records reflect that the last annual inspection was performed on April 21, 2011. The airplane hour meter reading at that time was recorded to be approximately 3,197, and the airplane total time at that time was reported to be approximately 11,915 hours. Airworthiness Directive 2004-21-05 was recorded to be complied with at the last annual inspection and the heater hour meter at that time was recorded to be 872.9 hours; the next recurring inspection of the heater IAW AD 2004-21-05 was due at heater hour meter reading 972.9 hours.

The maintenance records further reflect that an overhauled combustion heater, model B4500, part number (P/N) 81D94-3EL, serial number (S/N) 11751144, was installed in the airplane on September 22, 2000. At that time the heater hour meter reading was 432.0 hours. There were no further entries indicating the heater was removed or replaced. On April 20, 2006, the heater hour meter was removed and replaced. The reading on the removed hour meter was 2271.7, and the reading on the new hour meter was 0000.0. At that time the heater had accrued approximately 1,840 hours since overhaul. On November 22, 2006, the heater hour meter was repaired, and on January 23, 2007, an entry in the airframe maintenance records indicates a new heater hour meter was installed; although, the entry did not specify the reading from the removed hour meter, nor the reading of the installed hour meter. An entry dated April 6, 2007, indicates that the heater hour meter was 90.1. Although the exact heater accrued time in service (TIS) since installation following overhaul could not be determined because of the inadequate record entry on January 23, 2007, the recorded logbook information suggest it had accrued as of the last annual inspection approximately 2,713 hours TIS since the last overhaul.

Documents provided by the combustion heater manufacturer specify that the heater is recommended to be overhauled every 1,500 heater hours TIS, or if the pressure decay test fails. The maintenance manual for the make and model airplane indicates that the type of combustion heater installed at the time of the accident (extended life) is required to be overhauled after 1,500 hours of heater operation.

The cockpit was equipped in part with circuit breaker toggle switches which were installed on the pilot’s side left lower sub panel.

Raytheon Aircraft Company Service Bulletin (SB) 24-3735, dated August 2005, with an effective code for the accident airplane by make, model, and serial number, announced replacement of circuit breaker toggle switches with improved internal is

NTSB Probable Cause

An in-flight fire that mostly likely occurred in the right front cockpit area behind the instrument panel and below the glare shield; the origin of the fire could not be determined because of the extensive fire damage.