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N71BM accident description

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Crash location 39.370278°N, 75.076111°W
Nearest city Millville, NJ
39.402060°N, 75.039344°W
2.9 miles away
Tail number N71BM
Accident date 29 Aug 2012
Aircraft type Beech 95-A55
Additional details: None

NTSB Factual Report


On August 29, 2012, about 1445 eastern daylight time, a Beech 95-A55, N71BM, impacted the ground while landing at Millville Municipal Airport (MIV), Millville, New Jersey. The certificated flight instructor (CFI) sustained serious injuries, and the certificated private pilot receiving instruction was fatally injured. The airplane sustained substantial damage to the fuselage and all flight control surfaces. The airplane was registered to the pilot receiving instruction and was operated under the provisions of Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 as an instructional flight. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed, and no flight plan was filed.

Several eyewitnesses reported that the airplane appeared to have touched down on the runway before it veered to the left and "cart-wheeled" prior to coming to rest about 500 feet from the edge of the runway. Other witnesses reported that the airplane was approximately 20 feet above ground level, rolled to the left, climbed, then nosed over, impacted the ground, and "cart-wheeled." One eyewitness reported hearing the "engines power up," and then observed the airplane pitch up and to the left prior to impacting the ground in a nose-low attitude.

According to a written statement by the CFI, the pilot receiving instruction was conducting a simulated engine-out emergency landing with the left engine at idle power when the accident occurred. However, the CFI at the time of this writing had no memory of the accident sequence. He stated that his last recollection of the accident was being over the runway threshold in the simulated engine-out landing configuration.


Flight Instructor

The CFI, age 69, held a commercial pilot certificate with ratings for airplane single- and multiengine land and instrument airplane. He also held a flight instructor certificate with ratings for airplane single- and, multi-engine, and instrument airplane; as well as a flight engineer certificate with a rating for jet. His most recent Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) second-class medical certificate was issued September 1, 2011. He reported 2,729.9 total hours of flight experience, of which 35.8 hours were in the accident airplane make and model. His most recent flight review was conducted on July 24, 2011.

Pilot Receiving Instruction

The pilot receiving instruction, age 60, held a private pilot certificate with a rating for airplane single-engine land. His most recent FAA third-class medical certificate was issued August 25, 2010, and was not valid for any class after. The pilot's logbook was recovered and indicated 216.9 total hours of flight experience, of which 11.9 hours were in the accident airplane make and model. His most recent flight review was conducted on August 23, 2012.


The airplane was a low-wing, multiengine, retractable tricycle gear airplane. It was equipped with two Continental Motors IO-470-L, 260-hp engines, and two Hartzell 2-bladed propellers. According to FAA and airplane maintenance records, the airplane was manufactured in 1962 and registered to the owner on December 15, 2011. The airplane's most recent annual inspection was dated on July 1, 2012. At the time of the inspection, the reported aircraft total time was 3,813.8 hours. At the time of the inspection, the right engine had 1,771.8 hours since major overhaul and the left engine had 761.0 hours since major overhaul.


The 1454 recorded weather observation at MIV included wind from 290 degrees at 5 knots, 10 miles visibility, clear skies, temperature 27 degrees C, dew point 13 degrees C; barometric altimeter 29.97 inches of mercury.


At 1426:59, one of the pilots made initial contact with Millville Radio, which was monitored by personnel at Lockheed Martin Flight Service. The pilot subsequently reported that the airplane was 5 miles to the southwest of MIV, and was inbound for landing. At 1429:16, the pilot reported entering the downwind leg of the traffic pattern for runway 32. The final transmission recorded from the accident flight was at 1431:52, when the pilot stated "seven one bravo mike wilco we're uh simulate an engine out."


MIV was a publicly-owned airport and at the time of the accident did not have an operating air traffic control tower; however, a flight service station was located on the airport at the time of the accident. The airport was equipped with two runways, designated as runway 10/28 and 14/32. The runways were reported as "in good condition" at the time of the accident. Runway 10/28 was 6,003-foot-long by 150-foot-wide and runway 14/32 was 5,058-foot-long by 150-foot-wide. The airport was 85 feet above mean sea level.


Initial examination by an FAA inspector revealed that the initial ground scars were located approximately 115 feet from the side edge of the runway and the airplane came to rest about 300 feet from the ground scars and facing back to the direction of travel. One engine was located approximately 30 feet from the wreckage and the other engine was located under the airplane, both had been detached from the firewall. The left wingtip was bent in the positive direction, and the right wing exhibited crush damage. Flight control continuity was confirmed to all surfaces.

During recovery of the airplane, approximately 62 gallons of fuel was removed from the fuel tanks.


An autopsy was performed on the pilot receiving instruction on August 31, 2012, by the City of Philadelphia Office of the Medical Examiners, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. The autopsy findings listed the cause of death as "multiple blunt impact injuries" and the report listed the specific injuries.

Toxicological testing was performed post mortem at the FAA Bioaeronautical Sciences Research Laboratory, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. The tests were negative for carbon monoxide, cyanide, and ethanol. The following drugs were detected in the specimens submitted for testing:

- Atropine was detected in the Urine; however, was not detected in the Blood (Heart)

- Clopidogrel was detected in the Urine; however, was not detected in the Blood (Heart)

- Desmethylsildenafil was detected in the Urine and the Blood (Heart)

- Etomidate was detected in the liver and the Blood (Heart)

- Lorazepam was detected in the Muscle and the Blood (Heart)

- Salicylate was detected in the Urine

- Sildenafil was detectyed in the Blood (Heart) and the Urine

- Trimethoprim was detected in the Blood (Heart) and the Urine.

The toxicology results include some medications administered intravenously during hospital interventions: atropine (a Cardiac stimulant) and etomidate (a sedative/hypnotic). Oral medications ingested prior to the crash include clopidogrel (an antiplatelet medication used to prevent heart attacks and strokes), salicylate (also known as aspirin, an antiplatelet medication used to prevent heart attacks and strokes), and trimethoprim (an antibiotic used to prevent urinary tract infections after kidney transplant).

The toxicological report also identified Lorazepam (a hypnotic benzodiazepine); however, it is unclear from the records if this was an oral medication administered prior to the accident, or given in the hospital.


Engine Examination

Both engines were sent to the manufacturer's facility in Mobile, Alabama for further examination. Both engines were mounted in a test stand and operated at varying power settings. During the tests, neither engine exhibited any signs of hesitations, malfunctions, or anomalies. A detailed examination report for both engines is located in the docket that accompanies this accident report.

Airplane Flying Handbook (FAA-H-8083-3A)

According to FAA publication FAA-H-8083-3A, Airplane Flying Handbook, Chapter 12, "Transition to Multiengine Airplanes" which states in part "Engine Inoperative Approach and Landing: The approach and landing with one engine inoperative is essentially the same as a two-engine approach and landing…the differences will be the reduced power available and the fact that the remaining thrust is asymmetrical…large, sudden power applications or reductions should also be avoided…the pilot must be prepared, however, for a rudder trim change as the power of the operating engine is reduced to idle in the roundout just prior to touchdown…"

FAA Advisory Circular 61-21A

FAA Advisory Circular 61-21A, states in part "Due to variations in performance, limitations, etc., of many light twins, no specific flightpath or procedure can be proposed that would be adequate in all engine-out approaches. In most light twins, however, a single-engine approach can be accomplished with the flight path and procedures almost identical to a normal approach and landing."

NTSB Probable Cause

The pilot receiving instruction failed to maintain airplane control during the simulated engine-out landing. Contributing to the accident was the flight instructor's failure to take timely remedial action.

© 2009-2020 Lee C. Baker / Crosswind Software, LLC. For informational purposes only.