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N11EX accident description

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Crash location Unknown
Nearest city Radnor, OH
40.368394°N, 83.147969°W
Tail number N11EX
Accident date 21 Oct 1997
Aircraft type Extra Flugzeugbau EA-200
Additional details: None

NTSB Factual Report

HISTORY OF FLIGHT

On October 21, 1997, about 1220 eastern daylight time, an Extra EA-200, an aerobatic airplane, N11EX, was destroyed when it impacted the ground while performing an aerobatic maneuver during the initial climb after takeoff from the Packer Airport (OH32), Radnor, Ohio. The certificated commercial pilot/owner was fatally injured. No flight plan was filed for the flight destined for Ohio State University Airport, Columbus, Ohio. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed for the personal flight conducted under 14 CFR Part 91.

A pilot/mechanic witnessed the accident. During an interview with the witness, he stated that the airplane departed runway 26 at OH32. When the airplane was about 30 feet above ground level (AGL), and at the departure end of the runway, the nose pitched up to a 45 degree angle. The airplane climbed to about 200 to 300 feet AGL, when it then rolled inverted to the right. The airplane continued to climb inverted at a 45 degree pitch attitude to about 600 feet AGL. The airplane was then observed to pitch to an inside loop in an attempt to transition to an upright attitude; however about 30 degrees nose down, the airplane impacted the ground. After impact, the airplane exploded. The witness stated that the airplane was refueled prior to departure, and that the pilot occupied the rear seat. Also, the witness heard the engine running until impact.

In a written statement by the witness, it stated in part, "...At approximately 500 feet AGL, maybe 6[00] to 700 feet, he pulled and did not have enough altitude to clear the ground."

The accident occurred during the hours of daylight at a latitude of 40 degrees, 26 minutes north, and a longitude of 83 degrees, 13 minutes west.

PILOT INFORMATION

The pilot held a commercial pilot certificate with ratings for airplane single engine land and glider aero tow. He also held a private pilot certificate with a rating for airplane multiengine land. According to pilot records received from the International Council of Air Shows, Inc. (ICAS), the pilot was issued a "statement of aerobatic competency" by the FAA for aerobatics in the Pitts S-2B, and Glider, with no restriction for altitude. Also, the pilot was designated as an Aerobatic Competency Evaluator (ACE), by ICAS, on December 8, 1996. The pilot was not issued a statement of aerobatic competency for the make and model accident airplane.

WRECKAGE DESCRIPTION

On October 22 and 23, 1997, the wreckage was examined at the accident site. The wreckage came to rest approximately 1/4 of a mile west of the departure end of runway 26, a 3,175 foot long, 100 foot wide, grass runway. The airplane was consumed by a post crash fire. A 330 foot fire debris field was oriented on a magnetic heading of 095 degrees. The flight control rigging system for the ailerons and elevators were push pull tubes and bell cranks. The push pull tubes were consumed by post crash fire which precluded a flight control continuity check; however, all bell cranks were located in the wreckage and intact. Flight control continuity was confirmed for the rudder through the rudder cable at the bell crank attach point on the rudder to the rudder pedals in the cockpit. The shoulder harness attach linkages were located in the locked position.

During the examination of the engine, compression was obtained on all four cylinders through thumb compression on the bottom spark plug holes. Valve train continuity was obtained by rotating the propeller by hand.

There was no evidence of pre-impact mechanical malfunctions during the examination of the wreckage.

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

The pilot had been previously named a United States National Glider Aerobatic Champion. A review of the pilot's logbook revealed the last entry was a Biennial Flight Review, conducted in a Beech 35-B33, dated May 17, 1997. The total time logged as of May 17, 1997, was 1,992.20 hours. Of the 1,992.20 hours logged: approximately 165 hours were in gliders; 40 hours were in a multiengine airplanes; 10 hours were in balloons; and the remaining 1,777 hours were in various single engine airplanes. Prior to the flight review, during the month of April, 1997, the pilot logged 272 flights in a Swift S-1 glider for a total of 113 hours. There was no time logged in the make and model accident airplane.

A review of the maintenance records revealed that the pilot purchased the airplane new from the manufacturer in June, 1997. At the time of the accident flight , the airplane had accumulated about 30 hours of flight time.

Interviews were conducted with two professional aerobatic pilots. During the interviews, both pilots indicated that the maneuver described on the accident flight was referred to as a "reverse half-Cuban eight". One of the pilots stated that with comparison to a Salto glider, the reverse half-Cuban eight would require approximately 500 feet AGL to complete successfully; however, he further stated that the altitude required would vary between different gliders. The other pilot stated that for the make and model accident airplane, their personal minimums were 800 feet AGL, and that an absolute bare minimum altitude would be 600 feet AGL depending on the conditions such as airspeed and density altitude.

TOXICOLOGICAL TESTING

On October 31, 1997, toxicology testing for drugs and alcohol were performed by the FAA Toxicology and Accident Research Laboratory, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. The results were negative for both alcohol and drugs.

WRECKAGE RELEASE

The wreckage was released to the pilot's family on October 22, 1997.

NTSB Probable Cause

The failure of the pilot to obtain the proper altitude/clearance above the terrain, to perform an aerobatic maneuver. A factor was the pilot's lack of total experience in make and model.

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