Crash location | Unknown |
Nearest city | Carrollton, OH
40.572840°N, 81.085653°W |
Tail number | N28817 |
---|---|
Accident date | 10 Sep 2000 |
Aircraft type | Grumman AA-5B |
Additional details: | None |
HISTORY OF FLIGHT
On September 10, 2000, at 1622 Eastern Daylight Time, a Grumman AA-5B, N28817, was substantially damaged after it collided with trees during an aborted landing at the Carroll County-Tolsen Airport (TSO), Carrollton, Ohio. The certificated private pilot sustained serious injuries, and the passenger was fatally injured. The flight departed Put-in-Bay (3W2) Airport, Put-in-Bay, Ohio, about 1530, destined for TSO. Instrument meteorological conditions prevailed and an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan was activated for the personal flight conducted under 14 CFR part 91.
A Safety Board investigator interviewed the pilot over the telephone. According to the investigator's record of conversation:
"According to the pilot, he departed 3W2 for TSO about 1440 EDT, and climbed to an enroute altitude of 3,000 feet msl. The pilot descended for his destination, and executed the GPS "A" approach. While on final, the airplane entered visual meteorological conditions (VMC) about 400 feet above approach minimums. With the airplane north of the airport and visibility 2 to 3 miles in haze, the pilot preformed a left circle to land on runway 7. The airplane touched down about 1/2 way down the wet 4,300-foot runway, with a ground speed 20 to 30 knots faster than normal. The pilot aborted the landing. He advanced the throttle, and the engine responded "normally." The pilot then entered right traffic to attempt another landing on runway 7. He chose not to land on runway 25 because of a thunderstorm about 5 miles northeast of the airport.
"The downwind leg for the second attempt was flown 500 to 600 feet agl. When the pilot turned base he slowed the airplane to 80 knots of indicated airspeed, which he maintained until touchdown. The airplane touched down 300 feet past the landing threshold, again faster than "normal." The pilot raised the flaps, and applied the brakes. The tires locked and the airplane started to skid. The pilot added that this surprised him, because he has never locked the brakes on the accident airplane in the past. The pilot reduced brake pressure, and the tires began to roll again. About 2/3 down the runway, the pilot realized he could not stop the airplane within the remaining runway. He advanced the throttle, and the engine responded "normally." He lowered the flaps to 10-degrees, and the airplane started to climb. At the end of the runway, he could see two hills. The taller of the two was on the extended centerline. The other was slightly to the right. Knowing the airplane would not clear the taller hill, the pilot turned right to fly over the smaller one. When the pilot realized the airplane would not even clear this hill, he elected to crash straight ahead, fearing a turn would stall the airplane.
"When asked what the winds were at the time of the accident, the pilot responded, 'I never got a good look at the windsock, but I think I was landing with a tailwind.'
An Ohio State Trooper interviewed the pilot at the hospital on the evening of the accident. According to the Trooper's record of conversation, the pilot said:
"I was clear[ed] to shoot the approach from Akron-Canton. By the time I spotted the airport, I did a circling approach for 07. Unfortunately, I had too much speed, and by the time I was 2/3 of the way down the runway, I realized I was not going to stop it, and I had too much speed. I applied my brakes to stop, but could not, so I decided to do a go-around at the 2/3 point. I gave it power, and I saw that the hill at the end is larger than the one of the right so I went to the right. I heard the stall horn as I was climbing and I realized that the rate I was climbing at was not going to clear the hill in front of me. At that point, we hit the trees and a crash occurred."
The pilot also stated that the weather was moderate rain, his speed on approach was around 80-90 knots, both fuel tanks were more than half full, and both occupants had used their seatbelts.
When the State Trooper asked the pilot what the main cause of the accident was, the pilot responded, "I came in a little too hot (fast)."
A witness was at the airport when she observed the airplane. In a written statement, she said:
"Pilot radioed in saying he was coming in on 07, was asked to repeat. Did not see plane on first attempt to land. (I) went to (the) back room to see out of (the) windows. There was no sign of him. I then (saw) him coming in again for Runway 07. I told (name) he wasn't going to make it. (The airplane) continued to slide to end of runway. At end of runway, he looked as if he took a nose dive."
A second witness was also at the airport when she first observed the airplane. In a written statement, she said:
"The pilot radioed in and we couldn't understand him, so I got on it and asked him to repeat himself. He said, 'coming in 07 runway.' I said, 'okay, I'm coming in now!!' We saw him try to come in the first time and we looked again and he was gone. He turned around to try and come in again, he was coming down very fast and near the middle of the runway, was going sideways, and not even slowing down. And we looked and he disappeared off the side of the runway near the end. He was gone. So, I called the police department and told them we had a plane down."
The accident occurred during the hours of daylight approximately 40 degrees, 34 minutes north latitude, and 81 degrees, 5 minutes west longitude.
PILOT INFORMATION
The pilot held a private pilot certificate for airplane single engine land, and instrument airplane.
The pilot reported 2,100 total flight hours, of which 1,400 hours were in make and model.
His most recent Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) third class medical certificate was issued on December 7, 1998.
AIRCRAFT INFORMATION
The airplane underwent an annual inspection on January 28, 2000, and had accrued 43.5 hours since that inspection.
METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATION
The pilot contacted the Cleveland Automated Flight Service Station (AFSS) 6 times between 0914 and 1339, and received weather briefings and Notices to Airmen (NOTAM) information. The pilot was informed during these briefings that VFR and IFR flight was not recommended on account of thunderstorm activity and extensive IFR conditions. During the last weather briefing at 1339, the pilot filed an IFR flight plan from 3W2 to TSO.
TSO did not have a weather reporting facility.
The closest weather reporting facility was at Harry Cleaver Field (PHD), New Philadelphia, Ohio, about 17 miles west of TSO. The automated weather observation at 1553 was reported as calm winds, visibility 3 miles in light rain and mist, ceiling broken at 1,100 feet, second broken layer at 5,500 feet, temperature and dewpoint were 22 degrees C, and the altimeter setting was 30.08 inHG. Remarks: lightning distant northeast through southeast, thunderstorm ended at 1526, sea level pressure 1018.1 mb, precipitation since last hour 0.009 inches, and 6-hour rainfall 0.71 inches.
Weather at Akron-Canton Regional Airport (CAK), Akron, Ohio, about 31 miles from TSO, at 1626, was reported as wind from 200 degrees at 5 knots, visibility 2.5 miles, light rain, mist, few clouds at 4,100 feet, ceiling broken at 5,000 feet, overcast at 7,000 feet, temperature and dewpoint were 22 degrees C, and the altimeter setting was 30.06 inHG.
Review of upper air and winds aloft data indicated the wind was from 250 degrees at 6 knots at the surface and increased to 31 knots at 2,700 feet, and 30 knots at 3,600 feet.
AIRPORT INFORMATION
The Carroll County-Tolson Airport, Carrollton, Ohio, had a single asphalt paved runway 07-25, which was 4,300 feet long and 75 feet wide, with non-precision markings. The runway was not grooved. The airport had a 2-light precision approach path indicator (PAPI) on each approach end of the runway.
COMMUNICATIONS
A review of air traffic control (ATC) transcripts revealed that the pilot received an IFR clearance at 1530 and was cleared for the VOR A approach into TSO at 1610. The pilot was informed by ATC that there was IFR weather in the vicinity of TSO.
At 1614, the pilot asked ATC if executing the GPS approach into TSO would "keep him south of the weather or was he now past the weather." ATC informed the pilot that the observed weather over "Kasse" appeared to have moved north of "Kasse", and if he proceeded straight in on the approach it should keep him south of the observed weather. The pilot was also told of another area of observed weather south of TSO. The pilot stated he saw lightning, but had no turbulence.
At 1617, ATC asked the pilot to state the flight conditions. The pilot reported that he was in heavy rain, but most of the bad weather was to his left. At that time, the pilot was instructed by ATC to change over to advisory frequency.
WRECKAGE INFORMATION
The airplane wreckage was examined at the accident site on September 11, 2000. The examination revealed that all major components of the airplane were accounted for at the scene. The airplane was located 1/10th of a mile southeast of Runway 07 on a heading of approximately 130 degrees. The length of the wreckage path was approximately 75 feet. The wreckage path was measured from the first point of contact with a tree and the final resting place of the fuselage. From the first point of contact to where the fuselage came to rest, there was a shallow upslope in the terrain.
At the beginning of the wreckage path, the tip of a tree had sheared away from the trunk. Approximately 30 feet beyond the initial impact point, fresh impact marks were noted on the trunk of another tree. At the base of this tree there were several broken branches, including the tip of a tree.
Approximately 40 feet beyond the initial impact point was the outboard section of the right wing. About 50 feet beyond the initial impact point was the inboard section of the right wing, and approximately 55 feet beyond the initial impact point was the left wing.
The airplane came to rest on its left side, wedged between two trees. The canopy was found separated, and the cockpit was exposed. The right side of the fuselage around the area of the right door was pushed aft. The tail section was twisted, and the rudder was found lying on its side. The right flap remained partially attached to the airframe. The left flap and aileron were found separated from the left wing in one section.
Control cable continuity was established from the cockpit to all of the tail control surfaces. The flap indicator was found between 1/3 and 2/3 extended position. The flap actuator jackscrew exposed 2 1/2-3 threads.
The airplane was recovered from the site and moved to a storage facility at TSO, where an examination of the engine and airplane was conducted on September 12, 2000.
The engine was attached to the airplane, and the propeller remained attached to the engine. One propeller blade appeared to be straight with a slight bend forward at the tip. The other propeller blade exhibited s-bending. Both blades exhibited leading edge chord wise scratches on both the front and back face of each blade.
Valve train continuity was confirmed and compression was obtained on all cylinders by manual rotation of the propeller. During the compression check, spark was produced on the #2 and #4 bottom spark plugs, and the #1 and #3 top spark plugs.
Examination of the fuel system revealed that both main fuel tanks were ruptured. The fuel boost pump inspection cap was removed and a slight amount of fuel drained from the pump. The fuel screen was found absent of debris. The carburetor was removed and disassembled. Approximately 2/3-cup of light blue fuel was found in the bowl, and was absent of debris and water. The fuel finger screen was also removed and found absent of debris.
Wheel fairings were installed on all three tires. The main tires rotated freely and appeared new.
The pilot reported that there were no mechanical deficiencies with the airplane or engine.
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
The airplane wreckage was released on September 12, 2000, to a representative at Lamp Aviation Service, Inc., Carrolton, Ohio.
Pilot's improper decision to delay the aborted landing, which resulted in an insufficient airspeed during climb and subsequent collision with terrain. A factor was the wet runway and tailwind.