NTSB Factual Report

HISTORY OF FLIGHT

On November 6, 2014, about 1800 eastern standard time, a Cirrus Design Corporation SR22 airplane, N811CD, impacted a farm field near Grover Hill, Ohio, and a post impact fire occurred. The pilot, a pilot-rated passenger, and another passenger sustained fatal injuries. The airplane was destroyed by the impact and subsequent fire. The airplane was registered to and operated by Orthopedic Aviation Services LLC under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 as a personal flight. Night instrument flight rules (IFR) conditions prevailed in the area of the accident. The flight operated on an activated IFR flight plan. The flight originated about 1545 from the Washington Municipal Airport (AWG), near Washington, Iowa, and was destined for the Findlay Airport (FDY), near Findlay, Ohio.

A fueling receipt from AWG showed that N811CD was serviced with 26.67 gallons of 100 low lead aviation gasoline at 1519. The AWG airport manager indicated that he was at the airport at 1530 and he talked to three people who flew in N811CD. There were two men and a woman of the same age. He reported that they said they were flying east and would be back on Sunday as part of their return flight. Witnesses reported to the airport manager that they thought the woman was seated in the front right seat. The manager indicated that from 300 feet away, the airplane looked very clean. He was outside when they took off and the engine start-up sounded normal as did the engine run-up. The manager said that the takeoff appeared to be under full power and they climbed at a normal rate of climb.

According to records from the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), the accident airplane communicated with the Terminal Radar Approach Control (TRACON) located near Ft. Wayne, Indiana. About 1729, the pilot requested a climb to 10 or 11 thousand feet above mean seal level (MSL) because he was "picking up a little ice". The air traffic controller cleared the flight to 10,000 feet MSL, and asked for more details. The pilot reported that the windshield was picking up a little ice, and the outside air temperature was minus six degrees. About 1746, the pilot reported that the cloud tops were ragged between 9,500 and 10,300 feet MSL. About 1749, the pilot requested a lower altitude and the controller cleared the flight to 5,000 feet MSL. About 1751, the controller handed the flight off to Toledo TRACON.

About 1752, the pilot checked on with Toledo TRACON and indicated that he was on descent to 5,000 feet. The controller asked if the pilot had the current FDY weather. About 1754, the pilot reported that he had the current FDY weather and requested the RNAV [Area Navigation] Runway 25 approach to FDY. The controller advised the pilot to expect that RNAV approach. The last radio transmission from the airplane restated that the RNAV Runway 25 approach was requested and that transmission was received about 1754. The last transponder reply was about 1757, which indicated the airplane was at 3,600 feet MSL. That transponder reply showed the airplane was located to the south and east of the intersection of Route 60 and Town Road 137, near Grover Hill, Ohio.

A witness was driving in her car eastbound on Route 60 and was approaching Town Road 117. This intersection was about three miles west of the accident site. She indicated that she was driving about 45 to 50 mph. It was dark at the time and "spit" rain was coming down. She said that she could see through the car's windshield. She stated that above woods just south of Route 60, she saw a light coming down slowly. She described it as looking similar to a comet. The descent angle she physically gestured while being interviewed was about 35 to 45 degrees downward in the direction of the accident site. She said she saw the descending light for about two seconds. She subsequently saw an explosion, which was orange in color.

Another witness was in a house about a third of a mile northwest of the accident site. She indicated that a heavy wind or tornado sound is what got her attention. She also heard a sound she vocally described as "NEEEEER." She saw a reflection of light in a mirror. An explosion occurred when the NEEEEER sound stopped. She said that the conditions at that time were windy, dark, and rainy.

PERSONNEL INFORMATION

The 59-year-old pilot held a FAA private pilot certificate with an airplane single-engine land and instrument ratings. He had been issued a FAA third-class medical certificate on October 15, 2014, with a limitation that he must have available glasses for near vision. The pilot reported on the application for that medical certificate that he had accumulated 987 hours of total flight time and 150 hours of flight time in the six months before that application.

The last entry in the pilot's logbook was dated November 5, 2014. The pilot recorded that he had accumulated 1,000.3 hours of total flight time, 151.5 hours of flight time during night conditions, 127.8 hours of flight time in SR22 airplanes, and 19.3 hours of flight time in actual instrument conditions. A certified flight instructor's endorsement in the pilot's logbook showed that the pilot received a flight review on August 16, 2014.

The 65-year-old pilot rated passenger held a FAA commercial pilot certificate with airplane single-engine land, airplane multiengine land, and instrument airplane ratings. He also held a FAA flight instructor certificate with airplane single-engine and instrument airplane ratings. He had been issued a FAA second-class medical certificate on April 21, 2014. This medical certificate was issued to the pilot rated passenger as a Time-limited Special Issuance Second Class Medical Certificate with the following limitation(s): "Not Valid for Any Class After 04/30/2015" and "Must wear corrective lenses for near and distant vision." He reported on the application for that special issuance medical certificate that he had accumulated 5,016 hours of total flight time and 160 hours of flight time in the six months prior to that application.

AIRCRAFT INFORMATION

N811CD, a 2001 model Cirrus Design Corporation SR22, serial number 0120, was a four-place single engine low-wing airplane powered by a six-cylinder, 310-horsepower, Continental Motors model IO-550-N7B engine, with serial number 686224, that drove a three-bladed Hartzell constant speed propeller. According to airplane logbook entries, an annual inspection was completed on October 8, 2014. The airplane accumulated 1806.2 hours of total flight time at the time of that inspection.

A FAA Inspector reported that the airplane was modified with a LoPresti Aviation BoomBeam landing light system in November of 2013. The installed 60-watt BoomBeam bulb emitted a 2,990 lumen output.

The airplane was fitted with a Cirrus Airframe Parachute System (CAPS) designed to recover the airplane and its occupants to the ground in the event of an in-flight emergency. The CAPS contains a parachute (within a deployment bag) located within a fiberglass CAPS enclosure compartment, a solid-propellant rocket contained within a launch tube to deploy the parachute, a pick-up collar assembly and attached Teflon-coated steel cable lanyard and incremental bridle, a rocket activation system that consisted of an activation T-handle, an activation cable, and a rocket igniter, and a harness assembly which attached the parachute to the fuselage.

The accident airplane was not equipped nor certified for flight in icing conditions.

METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATION

A National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) senior meteorologist collected factual weather data in reference to the accident flight and produced a group chairman's factual weather report. The report showed that the accident pilot was provided weather information from Lockheed-Martin Flight Service through the ForeFlight.com website. He also filed an IFR flight plan for a direct flight from AWG to FDY. The pilot also requested a standard text weather briefing format. Standard weather information for the accident flight, to include the airmen's meteorological information (AIRMETs), area forecast (FA), meteorological terminal air reports (METARs), terminal aerodrome forecasts (TAFs), and pilot reports (PIREPs), was contained in the text weather briefing package. Meteorological Impact Statements (MIS) were not contained in the weather briefing information package. There is no record of any additional weather briefing information the accident pilot received.

A review of the 1900 surface analysis chart showed that it depicted a surface trough stretching from central New York westward across northern Pennsylvania, northern Ohio, and central Indiana. Constant pressure charts depicted a low-level trough over or just to the northwest of the accident site around the accident time with temperatures below freezing.

At 1753, the recorded weather about 38 miles and 93 degrees from the accident site at FDY was: Wind 260 degrees at 10 knots; visibility 3 statute miles; present weather mist; sky condition overcast clouds at 600 feet; temperature 7 degrees C; dew point 6 degrees C; altimeter 29.81 inches of mercury.

At 1753, the recorded weather about 18 miles and 10 degrees from the accident site at the Defiance Memorial Airport, near Defiance, Ohio, (DFI) was: Wind 280 degrees at 8 knots: visibility 6 statute miles; present weather light rain, mist; sky condition overcast ceiling at 1,000 feet; temperature 8 degrees C; dew point 6 degrees C; altimeter 29.81 inches of mercury.

At 1853, the recorded weather at DFI was: Wind 320 degrees at 15 knots with gusts to 20 knots; visibility 9 statute miles; present weather light rain; sky condition overcast ceiling at 1,100 feet; temperature 8 degrees C; dew point 6 degrees C; altimeter setting 29.87 inches of mercury.

The 1900 Wilmington, Ohio, (KILN) upper air sounding was plotted. The plotted sounding depicted the lifted condensation level at 1,502 feet, a convective condensation level of 2,554 feet, and a level of free convection at 1,675 feet. The freezing level was located at 3,829 feet. The precipitable water value was 0.54 inches.

The sounding indicated a relatively moist vertical environment from the surface through 12,000 feet MSL with several layers of conditional instability. This environment would have been conducive of cloud formation from the surface to 12,000 feet and icing (clear, rime, and mixed) between 4,000 and 12,000 feet MSL. Additionally, the sounding was close to saturation between 0 degrees C and -11 degrees C (between 4,000 and 12,000 feet MSL) which, according to articles in professional meteorology journals, is considered a temperature range supportive of the growth of supercooled liquid water droplets (SLD).

Visible and infrared data from the Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellite number 13 (GOES-13) was obtained and plotted. GOES-13 imagery at a wavelength of 0.65 microns (µm) and 10.7 µm depicted brightness temperatures for the scene and imagery surrounding the time of the accident, from 1400 through 2000 at approximately 15-minute intervals, were reviewed. The review revealed a general northwest to southeast movement of the clouds over the accident site about the accident time. Based on the brightness temperatures above the accident site and the vertical temperature profile provided by the 1900 KILN sounding, the approximate cloud-top heights over the accident site were 13,000 feet at 1800.

Fort Wayne, Indiana, (KIWX) Weather Surveillance Radar-1988, Doppler (WSR-88D), was located about 57 miles west-northwest of the accident site. Archive radar data was plotted with the airplane's radar track. Plotted base reflectivity values are located over and along the route of flight with the precipitation targets moving from north to south between 1755 and 1757. These reflectivity values correspond to very light precipitation targets. There were no lightning strikes near the accident site at the accident time.

KIWX WSR-88D dual-polarization (dual-pol) archived radar data was obtained and plotted. About 1750, radar data showed the accident flight began a descent from 10,000 feet and dual-pol depicted conditions near the aircraft location at the precipitation targets indicated small hydrometeor sizes, and/or a small amount of hydrometeors in the beam, hydrometeors that were much more horizontally shaped as they fell than spherical, and all the hydrometeors in the scan had very similar characteristics. These shape characteristics are similar to the freezing drizzle and supercooled liquid water characteristics described in articles in professional meteorology journals.

PIREPs, two hours before and after the accident and within 300 miles of the accident site, were reviewed. A portion of the PIREPS reported light or moderate icing conditions to include one report of severe clear icing at 4,000 feet MSL at 1900 about 180 degrees and 175 miles south of the accident site.

There was no issued significant meteorological information valid for the area of the accident site at the accident time.

There was no issued Center Weather Service Unit (CWSU) advisory valid for the area of the accident site at the accident time.

There was a MIS issued at 1344 by the CWSU near Cleveland, Ohio, valid for the accident site at the accident time. The MIS discussed patchy light to moderate icing conditions with bases at 4,500 feet in the northern half of Cleveland's airspace, with the icing base at 7,500 feet across the southern half of Cleveland's airspace. The top of the icing was forecast to be at 16,000 feet with patchy instrument conditions in the precipitation.

AIRMET Zulu was issued at 1545 and was valid at the accident time. It was the only AIRMET valid for the accident site, at the accident time, and the accident flight level. AIRMET Zulu forecasted moderate icing conditions between the freezing level and flight level (FL)180 with the forecasted freezing level between 2,000 and 7,000 feet within the AIRMET airspace.

A corrected FA issued at 1540, valid at the accident time, forecasted an overcast ceiling from 1,500 to 2,500 feet MSL with tops to FL240, visibility between 3 and 5 miles, scattered light rain showers, and mist.

The Ft Wayne, Indiana, TAF, valid at the time of the accident, was issued at 1235 and was valid for a 24-hour period beginning at 1300. The TAF forecast for the time period surrounding the accident was for wind from 300 degrees at 16 knots with gusts to 26 knots, 6 miles visibility, light rain shower, and an overcast ceiling at 2,000 feet.

The current icing potential (CIP) supplements other icing advisories. The CIP icing probabilities, icing severity, and SLD potential, valid at 1700 and 1800 EST at 10,000, 9,000, 8,000, 7,000, and 6,000 feet MSL were reviewed. The CIP icing probabilities depicted 50 to above 85 percent probability of icing at every flight level between 10,000 and 6,000 feet around the accident site around the time of the accident. The highest probabilities for icing were located between 8,000 and 6,000 feet with the tongue of greater than 85 percent probability of icing stretching westward from the accident time into northern Indiana. In addition to the CIP indicating greater than 85 percent probability of icing, the CIP indicated that the icing severity around the accident site was between light and moderate. Below 8,000 feet, the icing severity around the accident site was depicted as mostly moderate icing at both 1700 and 1800. SLD potential was also calculated by CIP. Around the accident site at the accident time, where the SLD potential was calculated as "unknown", the SLD potential was between 40 and 70 percent with the highest probability of SLD between 9,000 and 6,000 feet.

WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATION

The main sections of the airplane fuselage and empennage were found impacted and buried in soft terrain about 199 degrees and 907 feet from the intersection of Route 60 and Town Road 137. The airplane's resting heading was about 77 degrees. The airplane's airframe was found fragmented with its heavier components north of the main wreckage and its lighter components east of the main wreckage. The observed debris field of components extended about 124 feet north and about 187 feet east of

NTSB Probable Cause

The airplane's encounter with supercooled large droplet (SLD) icing, which resulted in a loss of lift and a subsequent uncontrolled descent into terrain. Also causal was the pilot's preflight and in-flight decision to fly in known icing conditions in an airplane that was not certified to do so.