NTSB Factual Report

On February 12, 2016 about 1215 mountain standard time, a Piper PA-24-250 airplane, N6691P, impacted a light pole and terrain while executing a missed approach at the Sturgis Municipal Airport (49B) in Sturgis, South Dakota. The commercial pilot sustained minor injuries and the passenger sustained serious injuries. The airplane was registered to and operated by the pilot as a day, Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) personal flight under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91. Instrument Meteorological Conditions (IMC) prevailed at the time of the accident at the airport and an IFR flight plan was filed. The flight originated from the Jamestown Regional Airport (JMS) in Jamestown, North Dakota.

The pilot reported that he was conducting the RNAV (GPS) RWY 29 instrument approach procedure. During the descent to the Decision Altitude (DA), he said that the autopilot system was engaged and that he encountered light ice at 4700 feet mean sea level. He reported that he kept the needles centered to the DA of 3530 feet, and the passenger in the front right seat stated that "the runway was in front of us." The pilot reported he looked up from the instruments, he did not see the runway, and the passenger stated that "we were above the runway." The pilot said that he looked out the side window and did not see the runway, and while returning his view to the instruments he noted that his airspeed was stable at 120 knots and the wings were level.

The pilot reported that he referred to the altimeter but was unable to determine his altitude and told the passenger that he did not know where he was. The passenger stated that the "runway was to the left," and the pilot stated he went full throttle and began to climb. He reported at the moment of applying throttle and beginning to climb, the right wing impacted a light pole located on the airport. He said that the airplane immediately pitched down, and he held the ailerons neutral and used "severe" rudder movements to keep the wings as level as possible. He said there was a "severe" left bank tendency. Just prior to impact, he "yelled to brace and we both crossed our arms in front of our faces and pulled our feet back from the rudders." The airplane then impacted terrain, coming to rest in a ditch about 950 feet to the north of the departure end of the runway. The airplane sustained substantial damage to both wings and the fuselage.

The pilot verified that there were no preimpact mechanical failures or malfunctions with the airframe or engine that would have precluded normal operation.

As a safety recommendation, the pilot reported that "when the runway was not visible to the pilot in command at decision altitude, an immediate missed approach should have been executed." He also reported that "excessive head movement should be avoided at all times during the transition from instrument meteorological conditions to visual meteorological conditions."

METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATION

The closest weather reporting station to the accident site was Ellsworth Air Force Base (RCA), about 21 nautical miles to the southeast, which reported at the time of the accident that the wind was 7 knots from 140 degrees, visibility was 1 statue mile, and a 200 foot overcast ceiling. The weather station also reported the presence of light drizzle and moderate mist.

The pilot reported that the weather conditions at the accident site were a variable wind condition, visibility of 0.25 statue mile, and a 500 foot overcast ceiling. He also reported that fog was present along with light ice.

A photograph taken by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) aviation safety inspector at the accident site showed ice accumulation on the leading edge of the airplane's horizontal stabilizer in addition to fog present at the accident site.

WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATION

The airplane wreckage was located about 950 feet north of the departure end of runway 29. The initial impact point was a 50 foot light pole located in the north corner of a ramp located on the airport, about 1,180 feet behind the airplane's wreckage to the southeast. The bottom of the fuselage exhibited damage consistent with impacting terrain. The airplane's right wing leading edge had an impact mark about mid-span, which was consistent with impact marks found on the light pole. The impact marks on the light pole were about 39 feet above the ground. The airplane's left wing, about 6 feet inboard from the wing tip was partially separated, which was consistent with the pilot's statement about both wings striking fence posts.

The light pole was located in the north corner of a ramp, about 765 feet northeast of the departure end of the runway. An image is located in the public docket to illustrate the location of the light pole in relation to the runway.

SURVIVAL FACTORS

The pilot reported that both he and his passenger had 3-point restraint systems available in the airplane and that they both utilized a lap belt only. The pilot reported that he and his passenger sustained head lacerations and that the passenger sustained serious injuries to her neck.

The FAA has published Advisory Circular (AC) 21-34 Shoulder Harness – Safety Belt Installations (1993). This AC discusses the benefits of utilizing a shoulder harness and states in part:

Accident experience has provided substantial evidence that use of a shoulder harness in conjunction with a safety belt can reduce serious injuries to the head, neck, and upper torso of aircraft occupants and has the potential to reduce fatalities of occupants involved in an otherwise survivable accident.

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

Instrument Approach Procedure Minimums

The FAA has published FAA-H-8083-15B Instrument Flying Handbook (2012). This handbook discusses instrument approach procedure minimums and states in part:

Pilots may not operate an aircraft at any airport below the authorized minimum descent altitude (MDA) or continue an approach below the authorized decision altitude (DA)/decision height (DH) unless:

1. The aircraft is continuously in a position from which a descent to a landing on the intended runway can be made at a normal descent rate using normal maneuvers;

2. The flight visibility is not less than that prescribed for the approach procedure being used; and

3. At least one of the following visual references for the intended runway is visible and identifiable to the pilot: Approach light system, threshold, threshold markings, threshold lights, runway end identifier lights, visual approach slope indicator, touchdown zone or touchdown zone markings, touchdown zone lights, runway or runway markings, and runway lights.

Missed Approaches

FAA-H-8083-15B Instrument Flying Handbook also discusses missed approaches and states in part:

A missed approach point is formulated for each published instrument approach and allows the pilot to return to the airway structure while remaining clear of obstacles.

Pilots should immediately execute the missed approach point:

1. Whenever the requirements for operating below DA/DH or MDA are not met when the aircraft is below MDA, or upon arrival at the MAP and at any time after that until touchdown;

2. Whenever an identifiable part of the airport is not visible to the pilot during a circling maneuver at or

above MDA; or

3. When so directed by air traffic control.

NTSB Probable Cause

The pilot's failure to execute the published missed approach procedure in a timely manner, which resulted in collision with a light pole and subsequent impact with terrain.