NTSB Factual Report

HISTORY OF FLIGHT

On June 18, 2014, about 1635 central daylight time, a Piper PA 46-310P airplane, N2428Q, crashed in an open field ½ mile east of Lehman, Texas. The private pilot and two passengers were fatally injured. The airplane was substantially damaged. The airplane was registered to Flying Lazy T, LLC., and operated by a private individual under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 91 as a personal flight. Both visual and instrument meteorological conditions existed for the flight, which operated on an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan. The cross country flight originated from Aspen-Pitkin County Airport/Sardy Field (KASE), Aspen, Colorado, at 1326 mountain daylight time, and was en route to Brenham Municipal Airport (11R), Brenham, Texas.

At 1517 central daylight time, N2428Q checked in with the Albuquerque Air Route Traffic Control Center (ZAB) controller at Flight Level (FL) 270. Between 1523 and 1526 N2428Q's altitude indicated 300 feet to 400 feet higher than the assigned altitude of FL270 four times. At 1530, the ZAB controller issued a Fort Worth Center Weather Advisory (CWA). Five minutes later, the controller transferred control of N2428Q to the next ZAB controller. N2428Q checked in with that controller at FL270.

At 1549, the controller issued convective SIGMET (Significant Meteorological Information) 86C for Texas. Between 1552 and 1607, N2428Q's altitude indicated 300 feet to 400 feet above and 400 feet below the assigned altitude of FL270 eight times. After each altitude deviation, N2428Q leveled at FL270. At 1554, after the second altitude deviation, the controller queried the pilot about the altitude changes. N2428Q reported that they were having autopilot issues. At 1556, during the altitude deviations, N2428Q requested and was authorized to deviate to the east of course for weather avoidance, but then deviated to the west.

About this time, a flight of two F/A-18s, call sign Cowboy 31, passed below N2428Q's flight track from west to east at FL250 and, according to the flight lead, encountered moderate clear icing and requested and were approved to descend to FL190.

At 1607 the ZAB controller transferred N2428Q to the next ZAB controller and from 1608 to 1617 N2428Q's altitude indicated 400 feet to 1,000 feet below the assigned altitude of FL270 three times. At 1615 the controller transferred N2428Q to the Fort Worth Air Route Traffic Control (ZFW) controller.

At 1617, N2428Q checked in with the ZFW controller at FL260 climbing to FL270 and advised the controller that he was in a turn for weather avoidance.

At 1630, N2428Q started a left turn and a climb. The ZFW controller asked N2428Q if he was going north for weather. The pilot responded that he "was trying to go through a window." As the pilot continued his climb out of FL270, the controller asked the pilot if he needed a higher altitude of FL290. The pilot did not respond. The controller then advised N2428Q that radar showed that he was in the middle of moderate to extreme precipitation and asked the pilot if he needed a different altitude. The pilot did not respond. Thirty seconds later the controller again tried to establish communications with N2428Q without success. This was followed immediately by a single "mayday" transmission on the frequency. At 1632 the controller asked N2428Q to say altitude and the pilot responded with "nineteen."

There were several aircraft on the frequency in the vicinity of N2428Q. N656FP, an Eclipse jet en route from Albuquerque, New Mexico, to Shreveport, Louisiana, was at FL410. The pilot of N656FP heard the situation developing on the frequency and, after the mayday call, asked the ZFW controller if they had heard it. The ZFW controller acknowledged with "N28Q, go ahead" after which someone on the frequency stated "oh, they just called a mayday to you." American Airlines flight 1536, also in the area at the time, reported that they had also heard the mayday call. In the meantime, the controller continued to try to reestablish communication with N2428Q and asked Alaska Airlines flight 670 if they would try to contact N2428Q.

At 1635, N2428Q reported that he was spinning. N656FP, in an effort to assist, asked the pilot of N2428Q if he could see the ground or the horizon, but did not receive a response. The ZFW controller asked N2428Q if he could see the ground but did not get a response. A transmission from one of the pilots in the vicinity transmitted that the last call from N2428Q was that he was spinning and had said something about not being able to see the ground or horizon.

American Airlines flight 2394 advised the ZFW controller that they had also heard N2428Q report that he was spinning. In response to a query from the controller, the pilot of American Airlines flight 2461 stated that he had heard N2428Q's transmissions but the words were so short that it was unclear what was said. United Airlines flight 1604 volunteered that they had heard N2428Q say he was spinning and that he had lost sight of the ground or horizon.

At 1638, another attempt by the ZFW controller to reestablish communications with N2428Q was unsuccessful. (Additional details and figures are available in the Air Traffic Control Factual Report available in the public docket.)

The wreckage was located in an open field by the land owner.

According to a witness in the area at the time of the accident, there was a severe thunderstorm in the immediate vicinity of the accident. The witness described high winds, heavy rain, and low visibility.

PERSONNEL INFORMATION

The pilot, age 61, held a private pilot certificate with an airplane single engine land and instrument airplane ratings. His most recent third class airman medical certificate was issued on November 26, 2013. At that time, the pilot reported no chronic medical conditions and no medications. The certificate contained the limitation "Must wear lenses for distant, have glasses for near vision. Holder shall possess glasses for near/intermediate vision." At the time of medical certificate application, the pilot estimated his total time as 2,500 hours, 30 of which had been logged in the previous 6 months.

On August 3, 2006, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) issued a Notice of Proposed Certificate Action to the pilot due to a suspension of driving privileges in the state of Colorado in 2004. The pilot did not report this suspension on his medical certificate application and argued that he had refused a breath test. His lawyer had argued the driving under the influence case down to "driving while impaired" and the pilot stated that his driver's license had not been suspended or revoked. On June 18, 2007, the FAA issued an Order of Revocation, immediately revoking the pilot's third class medical certificate. It was re-issued six months later.

The pilot applied for and received his instrument airplane rating on March 31, 2008. At the time of application he reported 754.6 hours of cross-country time as pilot in command and 70 hours of simulated/actual instrument time. Prior to this application, he had previously applied for, and been disapproved for the same rating. The record did not indicate which areas were deficient but did state all areas of operation were to be retested.

One pilot logbook was located in the wreckage of the airplane. The logbook contained flight log entries dated between September 4, 2011, and January 5, 2014. No flights were logged between January 5, 2014, and the date of the accident. All of the flights contained in the flight log were conducted in the accident airplane.

The pilot noted in his logbook if he had flown an instrument approach and he would log his total flight time; however, his landings and his instrument flight times were not annotated for each flight. The pilot had carried over a total time of 2,241.8 hours on the last page of the flight log. The total flight time logged on the last page was 16.6 hours. The last instrument approach annotated in his logbook was on August 12, 2013 – a Localizer DME 15 approach into ASE. He also annotated an instrument checkride on March 15, 2012. There were no endorsements in the back of the logbook, nor did any of the entries contain notes indicating a flight review or instrument competency check had been completed. Investigators were unable to determine if the pilot met the flight review or currency requirements as outlined in 14 CFR Part 61.56 Flight Review and Part 61.57 Recent flight experience: Pilot in command.

AIRCRAFT INFORMATION

The accident airplane, a Piper PA 46-310P (serial number 46-8508088), was manufactured in 1985. It was registered with the FAA on a standard airworthiness certificate for normal operations. The airplane was originally certified by Piper with a Lycoming 350 horsepower reciprocating engine. A Pratt & Whitney PT6A-34 engine, with maximum continuous engine torque of 1,337 foot-pounds, powered the airplane at the time of the accident. The engine was equipped with a Hartzell (model HC-E4N-3I) 4-blade, variable pitch propeller.

The airplane was maintained under an annual inspection program. A review of the maintenance records indicated that an annual inspection had been completed on November 1, 2013, at an airframe total time of 4,735.5 hours (Hobbs 1,711.0 hours). The airplane had flown 64.4 hours between the last inspection and the accident and had a total airframe time of 4,799.9 hours.

The airplane had been equipped with the Supplemental Type Certificate ST00541SE in 1999. In the limitations section of the JetProp LLC Pilot Operating Handbook, flight above FL 270 was not approved. In addition, the altimeters in the airplane were only certified to 25,000 feet.

METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATION

The synoptic or large scale migratory weather systems influencing the accident area were documented using standard National Weather Service (NWS) charts issued by the National Center for Environmental Prediction (NCEP) and the Weather Prediction Center (WPC).

Surface Analysis

The south central section of the NWS Surface Analysis Chart for 1600 on June 18, 2014, centered over Texas depicted a low pressure system over Colorado at 1000-hectopascals (hPa) along a stationary front, with a dry line that extended southward from the low across southeast Colorado and into eastern New Mexico. Ahead or east of the dry line, the chart depicted a relatively warm moist airmass that flowed northward from the Gulf of Mexico into northwestern Texas. The station models over the Texas Panhandle depicted southerly wind, partly cloudy skies, with temperatures in the 90's degrees Fahrenheit (F), and dew point temperatures above 60° F. Over New Mexico behind the dry line temperatures were also in the 90's with dew point temperatures below 40° F. The accident site was located in an area of general confluent wind flow ahead of the dry line.

Weather Radar

The National Center for Atmospheric Research (NCAR) - Research Application Laboratory (RAL) regional radar mosaic image for 1635 depicted several bands of intense radar echoes oriented in a general north-northeast to south-southwest bands across western Texas. The accident site was located in the immediate vicinity of one of the intense echoes. Additional scattered echoes continued to the south-southwestward into southeastern New Mexico and extreme southwestern Texas.

The NOAA National Climatic Data Center (NCDC) National radar reflectivity mosaic image for the same period of 1635 depicted a large organized area of echoes directly over Lehman, Texas, and immediately south, which were associated with an area of strong to severe multicellular to supercell-type thunderstorms.

NWS Convective Outlook

The NWS Storm Prediction Center (SPC) Convective Outlook chart issued at 1440 indicated that general thunderstorm activity was expected over the general route of flight with a slight risk of severe thunderstorms over northwestern Texas.

Surface Observations

The closest official NWS reporting location to the accident site was from Lubbock Preston Smith International Airport (KLBB), Lubbock, Texas approximately 50 miles east of the accident site at an elevation of 3,282 feet. The airport had an Automated Surface Observation System (ASOS) and was augmented by certified NWS weather observer during the period. The following conditions were reported near the time of the accident.

Lubbock Preston Smith International Airport (KLBB) weather observation at 1553, wind from 160° at 8 knots, visibility unrestricted at 10 miles, a few clouds at 6,000 feet agl, scattered 18,000 feet, scattered at 30,000 feet, temperature 32° Celsius (C), dew point temperature 17° C, altimeter 29.91 inches of mercury (Hg). Remarks: automated observation system, sea level pressure 1006.7-hPa, cumulonimbus clouds (CB) distant south and southwest through northwest, moving northeast slowly, towering cumulus clouds (TCU) distant northeast, altocumulus castellanus (ACC) distant northwest, temperature 32.2° C, dew point 16.7° C, 3-hour pressure tendency fallen 1.6-hPa.

The observations indicated that while visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the surface at the airport, high based thunderstorms were reported in the distance or beyond 10 miles and intermittently at the station after the accident in which a peak wind gust of 33 knots was reported associated with a thunderstorm. While the peak wind was below the classification of a severe thunderstorm, it still suggested a strong outflow from the storm. There was also a period of blowing dust reported, also indicative of strong outflow winds and/or potential microburst activity. There was also a high frequency of lightning activity reported during the period with the cumulonimbus clouds, which varied from occasional, to frequent, and after the accident was reported as continuous lightning activity.

Upper Air Data

The closest upper air sounding or rawinsonde observation (RAOB) was from the NWS Amarillo (KAMA) Weather Service Forecast Office (WSFO), located approximately 107 miles northeast of the accident site. The 1900 sounding depicted a warm low-level environment with a surface temperature of 86.7° F (30.4° C), and a dew point temperature of 59.7° F (15.4° C), with a relative humidity of 40%. The sounding indicated expected bases of the clouds between 7,500 to 8,000 feet agl, with expected convective cloud tops to approximately 45,000 feet, with the tropopause at 46,300 feet. The freezing level was identified at 15,414 feet and supported icing in clouds above that level.

The stability parameters indicated a very unstable atmosphere. The Severe Weather Threat Index indicated a moderate risk of severe thunderstorm development. The maximum vertical velocity of the potential updrafts was calculated at 142 knots. The sounding also supported hail, heavy rain, and/or downbursts with the thunderstorms across the region. The sounding stability indices indicated a moderate to strong risk of severe multicellular type thunderstorm development across the region.

The sounding wind profile depicted southerly winds from the surface through 19,000 feet with wind veering to the southwest with height with increasing wind speeds. A low level jet stream was identified at 4,850 feet agl with wind from 185° at 20 knots, with the level of maximum wind at 225° at 65 knots located below the tropopause at 43,990 feet. The 18,000 feet wind was from 213° at 25 knots with the mean storm motion from 243° at 19 knots. At the accident airplane's cruising altitude of 27,000 feet the wind was identified from 240° at 32 knots, with a temperature of -25° C. The sounding supported potential clear to mixed icing at 27,000 feet, especially with the convective updrafts which would have likely increased the icing potential at altitude.

Satellite Data

The Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellite number 13 (GOES-13) infrared image for 1630 at 4X magnification with a standard MB temperature enhancement curve illustrated cloud tops associated with deep convection and high cirriform clouds. Also added to the image was the frontal and dry line boundaries identified at 1600 by the NWS. The last radar contact was identified on the southwestern side of a band of cumulonimbus clouds

NTSB Probable Cause

The pilot's improper decision to enter an area of known adverse weather, which resulted in the loss of airplane control. Contributing to the accident was the air traffic controller's failure to provide critical weather information to the pilot to help him avoid the storm, as required by Federal Aviation Administration directives.