NTSB Factual Report

HISTORY OF FLIGHT

On December 31, 2016, about 1725 central standard time, a Piper PA-28R-200 airplane, N4407T, and a Luscombe 8A light sport airplane, N2889K, were destroyed when they collided in midair about 0.5 mile east of Aero Country Airport (T31), McKinney, Texas. The private pilot of the Piper and the commercial pilot and the passenger onboard the Luscombe were fatally injured. Both airplanes were owned by private individuals, and they were being operated by their respective pilots under Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 as personal flights. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed, and no flight plan was filed for either flight. The Luscombe had departed T31 just before the accident, and the Piper was returning to T31.

According to a pilot-rated witness who was outside his hangar near midfield at T31, the Luscombe departed on runway 17 and turned left onto the crosswind leg of the traffic pattern. The witness then noticed the Piper approaching the airport from the west. As the Luscombe turned left onto the downwind leg of the traffic pattern, the Piper continued eastbound crossing over the runway at midfield at what appeared to be pattern altitude. The Piper hit the aft fuselage section of the Luscombe. When the airplanes collided, the Luscombe was flying north, and the Piper was flying east. The witness saw no indication that either pilot saw the other airplane. After the collision, the Luscombe "spun around to the west and went nose down" as pieces of its tail separated and fluttered down in a slightly south direction.

Both airplanes were based at T31. The Piper departed T31 at an unknown time before returning to the airport.

A review of radar information revealed that the Piper approached the airport from the northwest before turning east over the airport at an altitude of 1,800 ft mean sea level (msl). A transponder signal was not received from the Luscombe; however, radar returns consistent with the Luscombe's flight path as reported by the pilot-rated witness revealed that the Luscombe departed runway 17, turned east, and then turned north consistent with a left traffic pattern.

A video of the accident was captured by a camera mounted in a police cruiser. The camera was pointed south and captured the Luscombe near the top center of the image as the Piper entered the frame from the right. The Piper continued toward the Luscombe until they collided. Both airplanes then spiraled downward in uncontrolled descents.

A Go-Pro camera in the cockpit of the Luscombe was recording during the flight, but the camera did not capture the midair collision. The National Transportation Safety Board's (NTSB's) Video Recorders Laboratory technician's report on the Go-Pro video is included in the docket for this accident..

PILOT INFORMATION

The pilot of the Luscombe held a commercial pilot certificate with ratings for airplane single- and multi-engine land with a centerline thrust limitation. The pilot's most recent second-class medical certificate was issued on May 22, 2003, with no limitations. At the time of the exam, the pilot listed a total flight experience of 325 hours and 6 hours in the previous 6-months. The pilot was reportedly a former US Air Force pilot; however, his military flight time was not available to investigators. The pilot was eligible to fly under the sport pilot medical rules, which required him to have a valid driver's license.

The pilot of the Piper held a private pilot certificate with ratings for airplane single-engine land and instrument airplane. The pilot's most recent second-class medical certificate was issued on May 25, 2016, with the limitation that he must wear corrective lenses. At the time of the exam, the pilot listed a total flight experience of 796.7 hours with 4 of those hours in the previous 6 months. A review of the pilot's logbook, which was located in the Piper's wreckage, revealed that he had a total flight experience of 815.3 hours with the last flight recorded on November 19, 2016.

AIRCRAFT INFORMATION

The Luscombe was a two-seat, high-wing, single-engine airplane with fixed landing gear. The airplane was powered by an 85-horsepower, reciprocating, four-cylinder Continental C-85 engine and a fixed-pitch propeller. The airplane was modified by the addition of an electrical system that included a radio; the airplane was not equipped with a transponder. The airplane qualified as a light-sport airplane. The last annual inspection was completed on November 25, 2016, at an airplane total time of 3,841.43 hours and an engine time since major overhaul of 485.56 hours.

The Piper was a four-seat, low-wing, single-engine airplane with retractable landing gear. The airplane was powered by a 200-horsepower, reciprocating, four-cylinder Lycoming IO-360-C1C engine and a constant-speed propeller. The last annual inspection was completed on February 1, 2016, at a tachometer time of 1,989.28 hours and an engine time since top overhaul of 91.28 hours.

Neither airplane was equipped with Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) equipment nor were they required to be.

METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATION

At 1653, the weather observation station located at the McKinney National Airport, about 8 miles east of the accident site, recorded wind from 200° at 3 knots, 10 miles visibility, clear sky, temperature 64°F, dew point 43°F, and an altimeter setting of 29.76 inches of mercury.

Astronomical data from the U.S. Navy Observatory for McKinney, Texas, recorded a sunrise at 0730, sunset at 1730, and the end of civil twilight at 1757.

COMMUNICATIONS

Neither pilot was in contact with an air traffic control facility nor were they required to be. Witnesses reported that they heard the pilot of the Luscombe on the airport's common traffic advisory frequency (CTAF). The witnesses added that there were other radio transmissions, but they were not sure if they were from the Piper pilot.

AIRPORT INFORMATION

T31 is a privately-owned, open to the public, non-towered airport, located 4 miles west of McKinney, Texas. Pilots use the CTAF for communications; the CTAF is not recorded. T31 has a single asphalt runway oriented 17/35 that is 4,352 ft long by 60 ft wide. The airport is at an elevation of 765 ft, and the traffic pattern altitude is 1,800 ft msl.

T31 is situated underneath the Dallas-Fort Worth International Airport (DFW), Dallas-Fort Worth, Texas class B airspace and inside the 30-nautical mile (transponder) mode C vail.

WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATION

The Luscombe impacted a residential street east of the airport and came to rest in a near vertical attitude. Evidence of fuel was present at the accident site, and there was no postcrash fire. Impact marks and paint/tire transfer marks found on the Luscombe's vertical stabilizer and left rear of the fuselage were attributed to the Piper. A piece of the Piper's wing skin was found among the Luscombe wreckage. The Luscombe's left stabilizer and elevator were not located during the on-scene portion of the investigation. The stabilizer and elevator were found near a fenced off dumpster and turned over to investigators on February 7, 2017.

The Piper impacted an open concrete area of a storage facility about 0.25 mile east of the Luscombe. The wreckage was scattered just beyond the initial ground impact point and came to rest near storage lockers. A postcrash fire consumed a portion of the wreckage. Impact and fire damage prevented verification of flight control continuity; examination of the flight control cables revealed overload failures and first responder cuts. The landing gear appeared to be extended. Several pieces of unidentified metal skin from the Luscombe were found with the Piper wreckage.

MEDICAL AND PATHOLOGICAL INFORMATION

The Office of the Collin County Medical Examiner, McKinney, Texas, conducted autopsies on the pilots. For each pilot, the cause of death was determined to be blunt force injuries.

The Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) Bioaeronautical Sciences Research Laboratory, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, conducted toxicological testing on both pilots. The specimens were not tested for cyanide and carbon monoxide. The tests were negative for ethanol and tested drugs.

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

FAA Advisory Circular (AC) 90-66B, Non -Towered Airport Flight Operations, addresses, in part, communications operational procedures and traffic patterns for aircraft operating at an airport without an operational control tower.

10.1 Recommended Traffic Advisory Practices. All traffic within a 10-mile radius of a non-towered airport or a part-time-towered airport when the control tower is not operating should continuously monitor and communicate, as appropriate, on the designated CTAF until leaving the area or until clear of the movement area. After first monitoring the frequency for other traffic present passing within 10 miles from the airport, self-announcing of your position and intentions should occur between 8 and 10 miles from the airport upon arrival. Departing aircraft should continuously monitor/communicate on the appropriate frequency from startup, during taxi, and until 10 miles from the airport, unless 14 CFR or local procedures require otherwise.

11.3 Traffic Pattern Entry. Arriving aircraft should be at traffic pattern altitude and allow for sufficient time to view the entire traffic pattern before entering. Entries into traffic patterns while descending may create collision hazards and should be avoided. Entry to the downwind leg should be at a 45-degree angle abeam the midpoint of the runway to be used for landing. The pilot may use discretion to choose an alternate type of entry, especially when intending to cross over midfield, based upon the traffic and communication at the time of arrival.

Note: Aircraft should always enter the pattern at pattern altitude, especially when flying over midfield and entering the downwind directly. A midfield crossing alternate pattern entry should not be used when the pattern is congested. Descending into the traffic pattern can be dangerous, as one aircraft could descend on top of another aircraft already in the pattern. All similar types of aircraft, including those entering on the 45-degree angle to downwind, should be at the same pattern altitude so that it is easier to visually acquire any traffic in the pattern.

AC 90-66B includes the following figure illustrating the recommended traffic pattern entry procedures.

Preferred Entry When Crossing Over Midfield Alternate Midfield Entry

NTSB Probable Cause

The pilot's use of an alternate traffic pattern entry procedure, which resulted in his inability to see and avoid the other airplane, which was flying the preferred traffic pattern, and the subsequent midair collision.