Crash location | 29.809444°N, 95.668889°W
Reported location is a long distance from the NTSB's reported nearest city. This often means that the location has a typo, or is incorrect. |
Nearest city | Houston, TX
29.763284°N, 95.363271°W 18.6 miles away |
Tail number | N452CS |
---|---|
Accident date | 31 Aug 2015 |
Aircraft type | Cessna T240 |
Additional details: | None |
On August 31, 2015, about 1230 central daylight time, a Cessna T240 airplane, N452CS, made a forced landing after departure from the West Houston Airport (IWS), Houston, Texas. The flight instructor and private pilot receiving instruction were not injured. The airplane sustained substantial damage. The airplane was registered to H2 Aviation LLC and operated by the West Houston Airport under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 as an instructional flight. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed and an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan was filed. The local flight was departing at the time of the accident.
According to the flight instructor, they were conducting an instructional flight which included IFR training procedures. After the IFR training was completed, they returned to IWS and performed three full stop landings. On the final takeoff from IWS, they were about 300 ft above ground level when the engine experienced a total loss of power. The flight instructor took control and conducted a forced landing to a field beyond the departure end of the runway. The airplane landed and continued into trees where it came to rest upright with the right main landing gear collapsed. The instructor secured the airplane and called for assistance using a handheld radio. He reported that before the flight began, the fuel tanks were filled to capacity, which was 102 usable gallons. During the preflight inspection, the fuel quantity was verified and there were no contaminants observed. During the flight, both pilots switched the fuel selector in order to maintain fuel balance in the left and right tanks. Before the final takeoff, the fuel quantity gauges reportedly indicated 20 gallons on the left and 21 gallons on the right. Prior to the loss of power there were no digital or aural warnings noted from the crew-alerting system (CAS). He reported that the flight only lasted 1.81 hours and the average fuel consumption was 30 gallons per hour (gph); the airplane would have consumed about 54 of the 102 available gallons, leaving 48 gallons remaining.
Several law enforcement officers arrived shortly after the accident and secured the scene. It was reported that fuel was leaking from the right wing fuel vent at the accident site. A plug was placed in the vent and no other fuel leakage was reportedly observed. The amount of fuel that leaked from the right tank was unknown.
The responding Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) inspector reported that after the accident, the fuel selector knob was on the left OFF position and the emergency fuel pump was ON. The investigation could not determine when the emergency fuel pump was switched to ON.
According to the FAA air traffic control (ATC) report, the airplane departed about 0953, the IFR flight plan was canceled at 1151 and the accident occurred about 39 minutes later. The flight was about 2.5 hours total. Using the pilot's average fuel consumption number (30 gph), the airplane would have consumed about 75 of the 102 available gallons, leaving 27 gallons remaining.
On September 10, 2015, three engine test runs were conducted under the supervision of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) inspector. The Continental Motors engine remained attached to the airframe with no significant damage noted. The accident propeller had been replaced with another propeller for the test runs. The engine oil level was noted at 5 quarts. The airplane master switch was turned ON and the left fuel quantity gauge indicated 0 gallons, the right fuel quantity gauge indicated 25 gallons. All three test runs were conducted with the remaining fuel in the right tank. During the first engine run, the engine was warmed up at idle and a magneto check was completed in accordance with the checklist. No anomalies were noted. The engine power was then increased to 25 inches of mercury (in.hg) manifold pressure (MAP) and the engine was allowed to stabilize. The throttle was then advanced to the full forward position. Due to the condition of the engine mounts, it had been predetermined that after full power was reached the throttle would be reduced back to 25 in.hg MAP. As the throttle was reduced, a propeller pitch oscillation was noted. The engine was subsequently allowed to stabilize and cool down at idle before it was shut down in accordance with the checklist. Due to the pitch oscillation, a second engine run was conducted. During this run, a magneto check was again completed and the propeller was cycled. The engine was again advanced to maximum power. No propeller oscillation was heard during the throttle reduction. The engine power was set to 25 in.hg MAP and the electric boost pump was actuated. The engine subsequently experienced a total loss of power. A third engine run was conducted. With the engine at 25 in.hg MAP, the fuel selector was moved to the LEFT tank position; within one minute the engine experienced a total loss of power. The digital instruments and CAS functioned normally during the engine runs. The engine examination did not reveal any anomalies that would have precluded normal operation.
As stated pilot's operating handbook, if the emergency fuel pump switch is switched to the ON position with the engine-driven fuel pump operating normally, total loss of engine power may occur. The engine manufacturer stated that when the engine is producing high power and the emergency fuel pump is ON, the engine can generally handle the extra fuel and the engine won't lose power. If the engine is at a lower power setting and the emergency fuel pump is ON, the engine is more likely to lose power.
The total loss of engine power due to fuel starvation, which resulted from the pilot’s inadequate fuel management and the flight instructor’s failure to verify the fuel level and fuel selector position in flight.