NTSB Factual Report

HISTORY OF FLIGHT

On December 5, 2010, at 1758 mountain standard time, a Cessna T210M, N77CF, collided with a power pole and some trees about one-half mile short of the approach end of runway 03 at Ogden-Hinckley Airport, Ogden, Utah. The instrument rated private pilot, who was the sole occupant, received serious injuries, and the airplane, which was owned and operated by CK Aviation LLC, sustained substantial damage during the accident sequence and ensuing fire. The 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 personal transportation flight departed General Stout Airport, Hurricane, Utah, about an hour and 35 minutes prior to the accident. While en route, the pilot filed and activated an Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) flight plan. At the time of the accident, the airplane was being operated in Instrument Meteorological Condition (IMC).

While en route in visual meteorological conditions (VMC), and about 20 minutes south of Tooele, Utah, the pilot contacted Cedar City Radio in order to find out what the then current conditions where at Ogden. The technician advised him that Ogden was reporting marginal visual flight rules (VFR), calm winds, a visibility of 4 miles due to haze, clear below 12,000 feet, with a temperature of 3 degrees C, and a dew point of 2 degrees C. He also advised him that Salt Lake City International, which is located about 30 miles south of Ogden, was operating under IFR, with 1/8 mile visibility, fog, an indefinite ceiling, and with both the temperature and dew point at 1 degree C. He then further advised the pilot that VFR flight was not recommended in northern Utah, and that it appeared that the area around Salt Lake City was "socked in." He also told the pilot that the area was under an AIRMET (Airman's Meteorological Information) that forecast IFR conditions with obscured sky conditions, ceiling less than 1,000 feet, and visibilities less than 3 miles until 0300 Zulu (2000 local). In response, the pilot stated that he might have to file an IFR flight plan from Tooele to Ogden, and that he would continue to monitor the Cedar City Radio frequency until he reached Tooele, which he estimated would take him about 15 minutes.

Although the pilot stated that he did not remember anything beyond the fact that he was concerned about the dropping visibility at Ogden, and therefore had contacted Salt Lake Center in order to get an IFR clearance, recorded Air Traffic Control communications revealed the content of those communications. When the pilot was just north of Delta, Utah, which is about 130 miles south of Ogden, he contacted Cedar City Radio and advised the technician that he was putting together an IFR flight plan, and that when he got established on the VICTOR Airway he would make contact again to file the flight plan. A short time later, the pilot contacted Cedar City Radio and filed an IFR flight plan to Ogden, to begin at VERNE intersection, which is located about 40 miles west of Provo, Utah. He advised the technician that his estimated time en route was 30 minutes, that he had 3 hours of fuel onboard, that his alternate airport would be Heber City, Utah, and that his requested altitude would be 13,500 feet. The technician advised the pilot he would submit the flight plan as stated (with an IFR appropriate cruise altitude of 13,000 foot). He then asked the pilot for his home base, which was Ogden, and then had the pilot confirm the flight plan information he was submitting.

As he approached VERNE intersection, the pilot contacted Salt Lake Center, whereupon he was cleared direct to STACO intersection, then direct to JOSIF intersection, which is the Initial Approach Fix (IAF) for the ILS (Instrument Landing System) approach to Runway 03 at Ogden, and from there to the Ogden Airport. As the pilot passed abeam Fairfield, Utah, about 1933, he was directed to climb to 15,000 feet, and was then handed off to the Stockton Sector of Salt Lake Approach Control. When he checked in with Salt Lake Approach, the pilot said that he was passing through 14,000 feet for 15,000 feet, and confirmed that he had Information Sierra (Automatic Terminal Information Service Sierra). The controller then told him to fly his present heading, which was 345 degrees, for vectors to the ILS approach. About 5 minutes later he was handed off to the Lake Sector of Salt Lake Approach, where upon he was directed to descend to and maintain 12,000 feet. About 20 seconds after being cleared to 12,000 feet, the controller advised the pilot that the visibility at Ogden was down to one-half mile, and that Ogden Information Tango was then current. About 50 seconds later, the controller asked the pilot to advise him when he had Information Tango, and the pilot responded that he was in the process of getting it. About 45 seconds after that, the pilot informed the controller that he had Information Tango, and the controller then handed him off to the Bear Sector of Salt Lake Approach. Upon checking in with the Bear Sector controller, the pilot stated that he was passing through 13,000 feet, and he was then told to expect vectors to the ILS for Runway 03. The controller also advised him that the visibility was "getting down" at Ogden, and that another aircraft, a Cessna Citation, was just coming back off of an approach to Ogden and going down to Provo. Almost immediately thereafter, the pilot of the Citation, who was climbing out of Ogden on a missed approach, came up on the same radio frequency to receive instructions from the controller. The controller cleared him to 6,000 feet, and asked him what his intensions were. The Citation pilot replied that he would like to go to Provo, whereupon the controller advised him that Provo was reporting clear skies with a visibility of 7 miles. A few seconds later, the controller cleared the accident pilot to descend to 9,000 feet, and about 2 minutes later directed him to turn right to a heading of 080 degrees. About 1 minute after that, the controller cleared the pilot to 7,000 feet, and 40 seconds later he cleared him to 6,500 feet, with a request to expedite the descent. The pilot responded to that request by advising that he could make a descent at a rate of 1,000 feet per minute, and the controller told him that "would work." About 2 minutes after asking for the expedited descent, the controller directed the pilot to fly a heading of 060 degrees to intercept the runway 03 localizer. About 10 seconds later, the controller advised the pilot that he was 4 miles from WULFE (the location of the outer marker), to maintain 6,000 feet until established on the localizer, and that he was cleared for the ILS to Runway 03. About 1 minute after clearing him for the approach, the controller advised the pilot that he, "appeared slightly right of course," and asked him to verify that he was correcting. The pilot responded that he was correcting, and that he was a little below 6,000 feet. At that time the controller asked, "Can you make the approach alright into there," and the pilot responded with, "It's going to be a challenge. We may have to go to Provo." The controller then wished him luck, told him that radar service was terminated, and directed him to contact Ogden Tower. The controller also advised the pilot that it would not be any problem if he needed to divert to Provo.

The pilot then contacted the tower, advising the controller that he was on the ILS for runway 03, and that he had information Tango. The tower controller immediately informed the pilot that Information Uniform was then current, and then told him that the wind was 290 at 3 knots, the altimeter was 30.26, the visibility was 1/4 mile with haze, and that there was an overcast ceiling at 400 feet. The controller then cleared him to land, and the pilot acknowledged the clearance. A few seconds later, the controller transmitted that the airplane was not in sight, and asked the pilot what his position was. There was no answer to that radio call, or to any of the other follow-up calls that the controller made.

PESONNELL INFORMATION

The pilot was a 46 year old male, who held a private pilot certificate with an Airplane Single-Engine Land rating and an Airplane Instrument rating. His last FAA airman's medical certificate, a Class 2, was issued on March 28, 2009, with the limitations that he must wear corrective lenses and must have glasses available for near vision. As of the time of the accident, he had accumulated 50 hours of night flight time, 75 hours of simulated instrument flight time, and 10 hours of actual instrument flight time.

AIRCRAFT INFORMATION

The airplane was a 1978 Cessna T210M, with a Teledyne Continental Motors TSIO-520-R engine. At the time of its last annual inspection, on October 28, 2010, the airframe had accumulated 4,210 hours, and the engine had accumulated 1,284 hours since a major overhaul.

METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATION

The weather conditions at Ogden Airport had deteriorated steadily throughout the late afternoon. The 1653 aviation weather surface observation (METAR) indicated calm winds, 4 miles visibility, haze, clear skies, and an altimeter setting of 30.26. The 1709 METAR indicated 2 ½ miles visibility, haze, and scattered clouds at 600 feet. The 1713 METAR indicated 1 ¾ miles visibility, haze, and a broken ceiling at 600 feet. The 1721 METAR indicated 1 mile visibility, haze, and broken clouds at 400 feet. The 1736 METAR indicated ½ mile visibility, haze, and an overcast ceiling at 400 feet. The 1753 METAR indicated ¼ mile visibility (1/2 mile below the approach visibility minimum of 3/4 mile), haze, an overcast ceiling at 400 feet, with both a temperature and dew point of 2 degrees C.

Likewise, the weather conditions at Brigham City Airport, which is located about 22 miles north of Ogden, had deteriorated steadily throughout the late afternoon. The 1636 METAR at Brigham City indicated ¾ miles visibility, mist, an overcast ceiling at 400 feet, a temperature of 1 degree C, and a dew point of 0 degrees C. The 1733 METAR indicated ½ mile visibility, fog, an overcast ceiling at 200 feet, and both a temperature and dew point of 1 degree C. By the time the 1751 METAR was recorded the visibility had dropped to ¼ mile, with fog and a 100 foot vertical visibility into the obscuration (fog), and with both the temperature and dew point at 1 degree C.

A review of the Ogden tower recorded audio also disclosed that an airport employee arrived at the approach end of the runway about 1 minute after the controller's last contact with the pilot. He was instructed to determine if he could see the airplane anywhere in that area, but he could not. After reporting that he did not see the airplane in that location, he was instructed to check the remainder of the runway. The employee responded that he was just beginning to do that, and then advised the tower controller that, "The fog is not good out here."

Emergency personnel who responded to the crash site reported that at ground level there was a thick fog with a visibility that they estimated to be less than 1/4 mile.

WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATIONS

The airplane's initial impact with a utility pole and some trees occurred near the corner of 2175 West and 4400 South, near the north edge of Sandridge Park in Roy, Utah, about 1/2 mile from the end of the runway. From there it continued north about 700 feet before impacting a group of trees between two houses on the south side of the T-intersection at 2075 West and 4300 South. The majority of the airplane's structure came to rest in the roadway between the houses, with parts scattered over a distance of about one block. Some portions of the airplane, including the engine and one of the doors, came to rest in the front yards of a couple of residences. Immediately after the impact a large fuel fed fire broke out, which ultimately consumed or severely damaged the majority of the airplane's structure. Two of the homes near the impact site caught on fire and sustained significant damage. The pilot was found lying in the street near a portion of the airplane's structure, and for his safety he was moved a short distance away from the wreckage by individuals who lived in the neighborhood. There were no ground injuries.

The airplane was recovered to the facilities of Air Transport in Phoenix, Arizona, where the airframe and the engine underwent a further teardown inspection. That inspection revealed that the majority of the airplane's structure had incurred heavy impact damage, and that it was extensively burned and heavily fragmented. All portions of the wing assembly had sustained massive fire damage, along with significant amounts of crushing and bending impact damage. The left wing fragments contained impact damage consistent with leading edge collision with the utility pole and multiple tree limb strikes. All flight control surfaces were located, and flight control cable continuity was established to each flight control, except where the cables had failed in overload or had been cut by personnel recovering the airplane. The flap actuator was located and measured at 4 ½ inches extended, which equates to zero degrees of flaps (full up position). The elevators remained attached to the horizontal stabilizers, which themselves had separated from the airframe. The majority of the vertical stabilizer and rudder were consumed by the post-impact fire, and had separated from the tail cone. The elevator electric trim bridal cables were intact. The trim jack screw read about 1 3/8 inches extended; however, the trim setting could not be reliably calculated due to the trim chain being pulled off of the sprocket during the accident sequence. Due to the extent of the impact and fire damage to the landing gear, the gear actuators, and the landing gear cockpit switch, the in-flight position of the landing gear could not be determined.

The cockpit area and instrument panel had been almost entirely destroyed by impact forces and fire, with the altimeter and airspeed indicator being the only readable instruments recovered. The airspeed indicator read zero knots, and although the altimeter indicator needles were not present, the setting in its Kollsman window was 30.25 inches of mercury. Extensive impact and fire damage also prevented the evaluation of the engine instruments and the engine control positions.

The engine itself, which separated from the airframe during the accident sequence, had suffered impact damage, but had not sustained any thermal damage from the past-crash fire. The propeller hub remained attached to the crankshaft propeller flange, but the propeller assembly had suffered impact damage, and all three blades had separated from the propeller hub. One blade, which was designated A for inspection purposes, remained straight from its root to about 1/2 of its span. From that point outward it was curved gently aft about 15 degrees, with a slight amount of longitudinal twisting. Just outboard of ½ of its span, there was a 12 inch section of leading edge that had been abraded away to a depth of about 1/8 inch. Near the middle of that abraded section was a 1/4 inch diameter rounded indentation in the leading edge. Aft of that indentation on the blade's cambered face, for about 1 1/2 inch, was a chord-wise scar about 3/16 of an inch wide. There was also a series of chord-wise scratches on the outboard most 6 inches of the flat surface of the blade, and a series of chord-wise scratches along an 8-inch section of the same face. A second blade, which was designated B for inspection purposes, was curved gently aft about 30 degrees, starting at a point just inboard of half of its span. The outboard 10 inches of the blade was curved gently forward to the extent where the tip was nearly in the same plain as the root. The leading edge of the blade had several small indentations along the most outboard 8 inches of its span, and an abraded area to a depth of about 1/8 inch along a 5-inch section of the leading edge near its mid-span. Near the center of the abraded area was an indentation about 1/4 inch in diameter, and about 1/4 inch deep. The paint on the inboard 1/3 of the cambered face was burnished in a chord-wise direction, and there were numerous chord-wise scratches extending about 2 inches back from the leading edge along the outboard 1/3 of the

NTSB Probable Cause

The pilot did not maintain clearance from obstacles after descending below the published approach decision height when visibility was less than published approach minimums due to heavy ground fog and he did not execute a missed approach after failing to establish a stabilized approach inside of the final approach fix.