NTSB Factual Report

On August 4, 2001, about 1525 eastern daylight time, a homebuilt RotorWay Exec 162F helicopter, N113RD, was substantially damaged when it collided with terrain near Carrollton, Virginia. The certificated private pilot and passenger sustained serious injuries. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed and no flight plan was filed for the personal flight conducted under 14 CFR Part 91.

During a telephone interview, a witness, who was employed as a mechanic, said that he was in his home when he heard the sound of a helicopter pass overhead. He said his attention was drawn to the sound of the engine. According to the witness, "The engine wasn't sounding right. Then I heard three loud "pops" and ran outside. The helicopter was about 100 yards away, sitting upright in a ditch, but the skids were collapsed."

The witness said that he ran to the helicopter to assist the occupants. When he got there he observed gray and white smoke "pouring" from the engine compartment, and another neighbor used a hand-held fire extinguisher and suppressed the smoke. The witness did not see any flames, and described the odor of the smoke to be similar to an "engine that was really hot."

The witness stated that there were three freshly cut tree trunks about 5-inches in diameter located near the wreckage. He stated that the trees were originally 8-10 feet tall. According to the witness, "that popping noise I heard may have been the main rotors blades cutting the trees."

In a written statement, the pilot stated that he serviced the helicopter with fuel for a total of 17 gallons, and performed a preflight inspection. He completed the inspection, started the helicopter, and checked all systems. He then proceeded on several flights, and gave rides to different passengers. The accident occurred on the sixth flight. According to the pilot:

"..flew back home, hovered in yard for a few minutes, flew back over Nike Park, down Titus Creek, over to James River, 500-600 above ground level (agl). Came up to power lines, had engine failure, left yaw, went into auto[rotation] almost 180 degree to miss power lines then encountered power lines below at road. Banked hard right, flared, pulled collective and crashed into trees [approximately 1520 to 1530]."

During a telephone interview, the pilot stated that he was in cruise flight at 80-85 miles per hour (mph) about 550 feet agl heading southeast along the bank of the James River. The helicopter approached a set of powerlines about 300-feet tall, and the pilot planned to cross over them at a tower. As he approached the tower, the helicopter made a "very violent, violent yaw to the left." The pilot thought that the left yaw indicated a loss of engine power.

The pilot immediately entered an autorotation, and turned the helicopter toward a field. He said the rotor rpm dropped rapidly, which he felt was unusual for a 180-degree autorotation. The pilot was unable to make the field due to the low rpm and had to make a "hard right, almost inverted bank" to avoid another set of powerlines. He said he cleared the powerlines, tried to level the helicopter to land, when the main rotor blades began to clip trees.

The pilot reported that he lowered the collective to the full down position to enter the autorotation, and felt he had control of the helicopter throughout the maneuver. The pilot said that he did not use anti-torque pedals, and used the cyclic to turn the helicopter.

The pilot said that he did not recall seeing any warning lights or feeling any unusual vibrations.

A trooper with the Virginia State Police interviewed the pilot at the hospital. According to the Virginia State Police investigative summary, the pilot reported that he had re-fueled prior to taking off and had enough fuel for 1.5 hours of flight. He had taken off from his home, and this flight had been his eighth flight for the day. The pilot advised that he had left at approximately 1440 hours, and he was approximately 45 minutes into his flight when the accident occurred.

A Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) inspector performed an on-scene examination on August 4, 2001. According to the inspector, the main rotor blades had severed four trees. A 4-foot long section of one rotor blade had separated and was found lying in the ditch. The other rotor blade was found partially separated about 4-feet in from the blade tip.

The tubing cage, which supported the mast assembly, exhibited damage. Examination of the pitch controls revealed that they were functional and intact. The skids were bent aft and outwards.

The right fuel tank's bottom fitting was removed, and no appreciable fuel was observed. However, fuel was found under pressure at the main fuel filter.

All of the drive belts were intact, and the tail boom was separated at the point where it attached to the fuselage. The tail rotor gearbox and drive belt were intact.

Examination of the tail rotor system revealed that one blade was missing, but a section of the spar remained attached to the blade grip/pitch change mechanism. The blade was not located. The other blade was intact, but exhibited leading edge impact damage at the tip and was covered with dirt.

The fractured section of tail rotor spar was examined at the Safety Board's Materials Laboratory, Washington D.C., on August 24, 2001. According to a Safety Board metallurgist, examination of the fractured tail rotor spar revealed that the fracture was primarily transverse to the span wise direction and was on a 45-degree slant plane, typical of an overstress separation. There was no evidence of fatigue cracking, corrosion deterioration, or other type of defect associated with the fracture.

On August 21, 2001, the FAA inspector performed an engine exam. According to the inspector, the spark plugs were removed and appeared to have normal burn patterns. Power was supplied to the battery, and the engine was motored. Rotation and compression were established for each cylinder. When the Fadec 1 and 2 systems were powered on, the system established the high voltage source needed for ignition, and no error codes were noted.

On November 2, 2001, a RotorWay International representative downloaded data from the helicopter's engine control units under the supervision of a Safety Board investigator, and evaluated the data. According to RotorWay's written report:

"The engine was operating for a total 1 hr. 54 min. in last flights with no engine shut down. During that time the engine rpm, was reduced to an idle rpm six occasions after first start-up. Previous run time was approximately 19 min. Engine rpm decayed for the last 10-12 seconds of flight. All other monitored engine parameters seem normal. There were no errors or faults listed for the last flights."

Examination of the Exec 162F flight manual revealed that the helicopter had a fuel capacity of 17 gallons. According to the pilot, the helicopter consumed about 7.5 gallons per hour.

The pilot reported a total of about 195 total hours in helicopters, of which 46 hours were in make and model. He also reported that he had attended the RotorWay International flight training course in October, 2000.

Weather at Newport News/Williamsburg International Airport (PHF), 10 nautical miles northeast, at 1554, was reported as winds from 170 degrees at 9 knots, visibility 10 miles, sky clear, temperature 84 degrees F, dewpoint 68 degrees F, and altimeter setting 29.93 inches HG.

NTSB Probable Cause

pilot's inadequate fuel consumption calculations, which resulted in a loss of engine power due to fuel exhaustion.