NTSB Factual Report

HISTORY OF FLIGHT

On May 23, 2008, about 1133 eastern daylight time, an experimental light sport weight-shift aircraft, Aviate Raptor, N74TK, collided with a tree then the ground near Bealeton, Virginia. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time and no flight plan was filed for the 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 91 personal, local flight, from Warrenton Air Park (7VG0), Warrenton, Virginia. The airplane was substantially damaged and the commercial certificated pilot, the sole occupant, was killed. The flight originated about 1120, from 7VG0.

One witness reported hearing what she thought was the engine “…not getting the fuel properly – it was missing and popping – spitting & sputtering and then silence.” The witness looked up and reported seeing the airplane descending straight down. She noted a parachute that did not appear to be open above the wreckage. The witness drew a depiction of the aircraft with the wings in their proper orientation. Another witness who saw the aircraft collide with trees reported hearing a sound similar to gunfire on impact. She called 911 to report the accident. Still another witness reported seeing an aircraft “spinning out of control….” The witness reported hearing a small explosion.

The aircraft crashed during daylight hours.

PERSONNEL INFORMATION

The pilot, age 43, held a commercial pilot certificate with airplane single engine land, and instrument airplane ratings issued March 18, 2004, and also was the holder of a sport pilot certificate with weight shift control land privilege issued November 8, 2007. He held a third class medical certificate issued August 6, 2007, with no medical restrictions, and his last flight review was on November 8, 2007.

Review of his pilot logbook that begins with an entry dated January 16, 1997, to the last entry dated May 5, 2008, revealed he logged a total time of approximately 329 hours, of which approximately 263 hours were as pilot-in-command. Since October 6, 2006, he logged approximately 7 hours in the accident aircraft.

AIRCRAFT INFORMATION

The pilot reportedly built the weight-shift aircraft in 1998, as model Raptor, and was designated serial number AR00037. It was powered by a Rotax 503 DCDI 50-horsepower engine and equipped with a Warp Drive two-bladed ground adjustable propeller. The aircraft was also equipped with a ballistic recovery system (BRS) BRS-5 Model 900 parachute. The pilot registered the aircraft with the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) on July 10, 2007.

The aircraft was last inspected in accordance with a condition inspection on August 27, 2007. At that time, the aircraft total time was approximately 132.0 hours. The aircraft had accumulated approximately 10 hours since the inspection at the time of the accident.

METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATION

A surface observation weather report taken at Culpeper Regional Airport (CJR) Culpeper, Virginia, at 1120, or approximately 11 minutes before the accident indicates the wind was from 290 degrees at 4 knots, the visibility was 10 statute miles, clear skies existed, the temperature and dew point were 19 and 08 degrees Celsius, respectively, and the altimeter setting was 30.03 inches of Mercury. The accident site was located approximately 6 nautical miles and 066 degrees from CJR.

WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATION

Examination of the accident site by the FAA inspector-in-charge (FAA-IIC) revealed the crash site was located along a tree line which was approximately 5.6 nautical miles southeast from the departure point. The wing remained suspended in a tree and the majority of the wreckage was located at the base of the tree. The ballistic parachute (green and orange in color) was deployed and came to rest on the ground next to the wreckage. The engine had separated from its mount and was located a short distance away.

During recovery of the wing which remained suspended in the tree, one individual reported that the nose wires were not connected to the attach point (tang) of the nose hinge. The individual reported that a shackle and clevis pin secured by safety wire remained attached to the ends of the nose wires near the nose hinge, but a snap hook used to secure the nose wires with attached shackle to the tang of the nose hinge was not located. The shackle and clevis pin were not located following recovery of the wreckage.

Following recovery, friends of the pilot familiar with the aircraft examined the wreckage and showed the FAA-IIC their findings. The findings supported by photographs indicated impact damage to all major structural components. The stainless steel nose hinge attach point tang was not fractured. Additional information indicates the backhaul cables which connect to the rear of the crossbar hinge and rear of the keel were fractured close to the crossbar hinge. Gouges on both left and right portions of the crossbar hinge were consistent with the fracture location of the backhaul cables. Both upper side wires and both tail wires were fractured. The backstay was fractured near the kingpost attach point. Both lower side wires that connected the control frame to the cross bar were not fractured. The ballistic recovery system (BRS) parachute handle was armed, but not activated; however, the firing cable appeared to be pulled adjacent to the rocket motor. A portable global positioning system (GPS) receiver was retained for further examination.

Examination of the engine by a representative of the engine manufacturer with FAA oversight revealed crankshaft continuity during hand rotation. Suction and compression were noted in each cylinder during rotation of the engine. The spark plugs were only finger tight and the electrode gaps measured 0.028 inch (specification is 0.020 inch). Examination of the carburetors revealed one was set too high; no other fuel system anomalies were noted. Examination of the propeller which remained attached to the engine revealed one blade was fractured 16 inches from the hub, and the other was fractured 6 inches from the hub.

MEDICAL AND PATHOLOGICAL INFORMATION

A postmortem examination of the pilot was performed by the Office of Chief Medical Examiner Northern Region, Fairfax, Virginia. The cause of death was listed as “traumatic injuries.”

Forensic toxicology was performed on specimens of the pilot by the FAA Bioaeronautical Sciences Research Laboratory, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. The toxicology report stated the results were negative for carbon monoxide, cyanide, volatiles, and tested drugs. Forensic toxicology was also performed on specimens of the pilot by the Commonwealth of Virginia Department of Forensic Science. The results were negative in the submitted blood specimen for ethanol and tested drugs, and also negative in the submitted Vitreous Humor specimen for methanol, acetone, and isopropanol.

TESTS AND RESEARCH

Readout of the GPS receiver was performed by the Safety Board’s Vehicle Recorders Division. The GPS recorded data associated with the accident flight from takeoff to a point within .01 nautical mile (approximately 61 feet) from the accident site coordinates. The data revealed that the flight departed 7VG0 to the northwest, made a left turn, then proceeded in a southeasterly direction until 1121:19, when the data indicates a left 280 degree turn, followed by a right 374 degree turn. The data then indicated a left 720 degree turn, and between 1127:43 and 1132:57 (last GPS data), the flight proceeded in a southeasterly direction. Further review of the GPS recorded data revealed that between 1131:50 and 1132:51, the heading and ground speeds remained consistent. Between 1132:51 and 1132:57, the ground speed slowed from 51 to 15 miles-per-hour.

According to a representative of the aircraft designer, if the snap hook used to secure the nose wires to the nose hinge plate separated in-flight, the “A” frame would fold back and the side cables would pull the wings down (anhedral) causing tremendous compression loads on the crossbar and hinge (also called spreader bar). As a result, the center of gravity would be “very far forward” causing the aircraft to go into an unrecoverable dive. NTSB review of provided pictures of the crossbar and hinge or spreader bar revealed no evidence of appreciable damage. Service Bulletin 22005/1 which in part called for installation of a nose catch safety cable at the nose hinge no later than May 31, 2005, was not installed on the accident aircraft. The representative stated the Service Bulletin was in response to an accident in South Africa involving another make of Trike where it was not conclusively proven the nose wires separated. They (manufacturer) had used the same type nose cable attachment as the accident airplane had for many years and had never had any failure of the attachment. The nose attachment system was changed in later years because it was difficult to clip the snap hook into the tang when the wing was under tension as the keel tube was double sleeved in the Trike and only a single tube in hang glider type aircraft.

NTSB Probable Cause

An in-flight loss of control for undetermined reasons.