NTSB Factual Report

HISTORY OF FLIGHT

On September 27, 2014, about 1535 Pacific daylight time, an amateur-built experimental Tifft Kitfox III, N307KF, collided with the terrain following a loss of control during takeoff initial climb at the Frontier Airpark (WN53), Lake Stevens, Washington. The left seat pilot, who was receiving instruction, sustained fatal injuries, and the right seat certified flight instructor (CFI) sustained serious injuries. The airplane was registered to and operated by the pilot receiving instruction as a 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 instructional flight. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed for the proposed local flight, and no flight plan was filed. The flight was originating at the time of the accident.

In a written report submitted to the National Transportation Safety Board investigator-in-charge (IIC), the CFI reported that the pilot/owner receiving instruction had recently purchased the airplane, and lacking any conventional gear (tailwheel) experience, asked the CFI to check him out in the airplane. The CFI further reported that prior to the accident flight, he personally flew the airplane solo from the left seat to get a feel for the airplane, during which time he observed that the airplane had an inherent characteristic of pitching up and lifting off inadvertently, which required the pilot to hold full forward stick prior to the planned lift-off. The CFI stated that the airplane was not equipped with a full set of dual controls; the left seat pilot had access to a control stick and rudder pedals, while the right seat pilot position was equipped with rudder pedals only, and no control stick. The CFI further stated that prior to the day of the accident he provided the pilot/owner with taxi instruction in order for him to learn how to taxi a conventional gear airplane; the pilot owner occupied the left pilot seat where the sole set of flight controls was located. Additionally, the instructor cautioned the pilot/owner about the nose-up characteristic the airplane possessed on initial takeoff roll, to be aware of this tendency, and to keep the nose down on the takeoff roll until the desired airspeed was obtained. The CFI reported that on the day of the accident flight, his intention was to have the pilot/owner practice handling procedures on the runway, by adding takeoff power, getting the tail up and into the two-point position on the main landing gear while holding the control stick full forward to counter the nose-up, inadvertent lift-off tendency. He would then have the pilot/owner reduce power to get the tail down and back to the three-point position. However, on the initial practice run the airplane inadvertently took off, and the left seat pilot receiving instruction failed to keep the control stick full forward. The CFI opined that the airplane initially porpoised into the air, came back [in contact] with the ground, and then porpoised again. The CFI added that at this point he was unable to [take] control of the airplane from the left seat pilot, as he would not relinquish the control stick. The CFI added that the airplane eventually staggered into the air, but it stalled and [descended] nose first into the ground before he could take over control from the pilot/owner.

An eyewitness to the accident reported that during the airplane's initial climb it did not seem to be producing power, and at an altitude of about 200 feet above ground level (agl), the airplane drifted to the right of the runway. The witness further reported that as the airplane approached a stand of trees he observed it pitch up, the wings rocked back and forth from side to side, followed by the airplane descending to the right in a right-wing-low, nose down attitude; the witness lost sight of the airplane as it descended behind the stand of trees. Additionally, two other witnesses reported that the airplane's engine did not seem to be producing full power during the takeoff, and that it was side-slipping and losing altitude from about 200 feet agl. The reported wind at the time of the accident was from 310 degrees at 11 knots, with gusts to 16 knots.

The airplane was recovered to a secured location for further examination.

PERSONNEL INFORMATION

Pilot Giving Instruction (CFI)

The CFI, age 66, held a commercial pilot certificate for airplane single-engine land, instrument airplane, and a flight instructor rating for airplane single-engine. The CFI reported that at the time of the accident he had accumulated a total flight time of 1,488 hours, 155 as a certified flight instructor, and 5 hours in make and model, which was in the accident airplane. Additionally, the CFI reported that at the time of the accident he was operating under the provisions of a Sport pilot.

Pilot/Owner Receiving Instruction

The pilot/owner receiving instruction, age 80, possessed a private pilot certificate for airplane single-engine land. At the time of the accident the pilot was operating under the provisions of a Sport pilot, which required no medical certificate. It was revealed during the investigation by the CFI, that the pilot/owner had an estimated flight time of 250 hours, with no time in make and model as the accident airplane.

AIRCRAFT INFORMATION

The airplane, a Tifft Kitfox III, serial number 1040, was a high-wing, tailwheel equipped airplane, powered by a 65 horsepower Rotax 582 MOD 90 engine. The Federal Aviation Administration experimental amateur-built airworthiness certificate was issued for the airplane on December 9, 1994. The last condition inspection was performed on June 1, 2014, at a total airframe time of 138 hours. The airplane had flown 5.0 hours since the inspection. The airplane was not equipped with a full set of dual controls, in that the left seat pilot position had a control stick and rudder pedals, while the right seat pilot position was equipped with rudder pedals only.

METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATION

At 1535, the weather reporting facility at the Arlington Airport (AWO), located about 5 nautical miles northwest of the accident site, reported wind 310 at 11 knots, gusts to 16 knots, visibility 10 miles, sky clear, temperature 17 degrees C, dew point 13 degrees C, and an altimeter setting of 30.11 inches of mercury.

WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATION

A survey of the accident site by the National Transportation Safety Board investigator-in-charge revealed that the airplane impacted terrain about 2,925 feet from where it would have initiated its takeoff roll on Runway 34, and about 225 feet east of the runway. The airplane came to rest on its nose and left wing in a clearing surrounded by medium sized bushes and trees, with the fuselage oriented tail up at about a 45-degree angle; the at rest heading was measured at 243 degrees magnetic. All flight components necessary for flight were accounted for at the accident site.

First responders to the accident site reported that fuel was dripping, not flowing, from the airplane's left wing fuel tank, which was breached due to impact damage. The cabin/cockpit, engine, left wing, and aft fuselage areas sustained substantial damage.

The right wing remained intact and connected to the wing root at all attach points. The only discernable damage to the wing was some wrinkling on its upper surface. The right flaperon remained attached to the wing's trailing edge at all attach points. Control continuity was established from the flaperon to the left-seat pilot's control position. The wing's fuel tank remained intact, with the fuel cap in place and tight to movement.

The left wing remained attached to the wing root at all attach points. Additionally, the wing was observed to have sustained substantial impact damage, with significant deformation through its entire span. The flaperon was also observed to have remained attached to the wing's trailing edge at all attach points, but with only minimal damage. Control continuity was confirmed from the flaperon to the left-seat pilot's control position. The wing's fuel tank was observed to have been breached due to impact forces, with the fuel cap in place and tight to movement.

The aft fuselage, about midway back from the aft cabin bulkhead, was observed bent and twisted. The empennage, inclusive of the vertical stabilizer, both left and right horizontal stabilizers, rudder, and both left and right elevators were intact and remained connected at all attach points. No discernable damage was observed. Flight control continuity was established from the rudder and elevator forward to the cockpit control area.

The engine was observed to have remained attached to its mount but was substantially damaged due to impact forces. Two of the three propeller blades had separated from the propeller hub, with one blade still attached.

The examination of the airframe and engine revealed no evidence of mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation.

MEDICAL AND PATHOLOGICAL INFORMATION

An autopsy of the pilot/owner receiving instruction was performed on September 29, 2014, at the facilities of the Snohomish Medical Examiner's Office, Everett, Washington. The results of the autopsy revealed that the cause of death was attributed to "blunt force trauma."

Forensic toxicology was performed on specimens from the pilot receiving instruction by the FAA Civil Aerospace Medical Institute. The toxicology report stated: NO CARBON MONOXIDE detected in Blood (Cavity); testing for Cyanide NOT PERFORMED; NO ETHANOL detected in Blood (Cavity); Torsemide detected in Blood (Cavity); Warfarin detected in Blood (Cavity); Warfarin detected in liver.

Torsenmide is a diuretic used to reduce high blood pressure.

Warfarin is a blood thinner used to reduce the formation of blood clots.

TESTS AND RESEARCH

Under the supervision of the NTSB IIC, the engine was examined by a Rotax Aircraft Engines field representative on December 8, 2014. As a result of the examination, the field representative concluded that no anomalies or defects were observed during the examination of the engine and its components that would have precluded normal operation. (Refer to the Rotax Aircraft Engines Investigation Report, which is appended to the docket for this report.)

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

The Code of Federal Regulations, 14 CFR 91.109 states in part, "No person may operate a civil aircraft.....that is being used for flight instruction unless that aircraft has fully functioning dual controls..."

Stall and Spin Awareness Training – AC 61-67C

According to the Advisory Circular, "Although the distribution of weight has the most direct effect on stability, increased gross weight can also have an effect on an aircraft's flight characteristics, regardless of the CG position. As the weight of the airplane is increased, the stall speed increases. The increased weight requires a higher AOA to produce additional lift to support the weight."

NTSB Probable Cause

The pilot's failure to maintain airspeed during initial climb, which resulted in the airplane exceeding its critical angle of attack and experiencing an aerodynamic stall. Contributing to the accident was the inability of the flight instructor to take control of the airplane due to the lack of fully operational dual controls in the right-seat pilot position.