NTSB Factual Report

On May 26, 2005, about 1500 central daylight time, a Pilatus PC-6, N346F, piloted by a commercial pilot, was substantially damaged when it impacted trees while approaching to land on runway 26R (2,343 feet by 120 feet, turf) at Sylvania Airport (C89), Sturtevant, Wisconsin. The airplane was engaged in skydiving activities and was approaching to land when it struck a parachutist. The airplane veered to the right and struck the trees. The flight was being conducted under 14 CFR Part 91 without a flight plan. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed. The pilot and parachutist sustained minor injuries. The local flight originated from C89 about 1445

In his written statement, the pilot reported that the skydiving jump run was conducted at 13,000 feet mean sea level (msl). He noted that after dropping the jumpers he initiated a descent at 120 knots with the engine "power back." He stated that on final approach for landing, about 600 feet above ground level (agl), one jumper had landed and two others were in sight. The pilot added: "I checked to make sure no one was on the runway and it was clear. At 30 - 50 [feet agl] and 50 [knots airspeed] . . . a [parachutist] made a rapid descent and accelerated from behind my right wing." The pilot reported the parachutist hit the right wing about 5 feet from the tip causing the airplane to enter a 45-degree banked turn to the right. He was unable to recover and the airplane struck trees north of the airport.

The parachutist struck during the accident sequence reported that he "couldn't quite make it to the landing area" because the "spot was a little long." He noted that as a result he intended to land in front of the hangar. He reported he checked for traffic and saw the other parachutists, but did not hear or see the jump plane. He stated that they were about 40 feet agl when they collided. The parachutist stated: "I have a very high performance canopy and I descended quickly over the [airfield]. I crossed the far north edge of the grass runway for only an instant. I came from above and when my canopy leveled out, I was in front of the right wing."

A second parachutist on the same jump was a witness to the accident. She noted that she and the parachutist involved in the accident were approaching the drop zone for landing. She reported that she was approximately 10 feet higher than the first parachutist when he was struck by the jump plane. She stated that the first parachutist had made his final turn prior to landing and was about 25 feet agl when he was struck. She recalled that the first parachutist was about 1/3 of the way down the runway at the time. She noted that the drop zone for experienced parachutists was located north of the turf runway and west of the hangar buildings. She added that the jump planes normally used the adjacent turf runway for landing.

A witness driving on a nearby interstate highway reported that he was approximately 1/2 mile from the airport and saw the events leading up to the accident. He stated that he saw the jump airplane flying from east to west approaching the airport, in a wings level attitude, at a "very low" altitude. He noted that there were two parachutists. One was about twice as high as the airplane and "dropping like a rock." He noted that the parachute canopy was nearly vertical. He estimated that the parachutist's body formed an approximate 10° - 20° angle with the horizon. The second parachutist was descending "normally."

The parachutist struck by the jump plane, and a second parachutist, were wearing helmet-mounted cameras, which recorded the accident sequence. The NTSB Vehicle Recorders Laboratory viewed the tapes and prepared a summary of each recording.

The camera worn by the parachutist struck by the jump plane included 10 separate jumps prior to the accident jump. On the accident jump, the struck parachutist exited the airplane and descended through a cloud about 21 seconds later. The parachutist deployed his canopy about 44 seconds after exiting the airplane. The accident airplane came into view of the camera and appeared to be on approach to the turf runway 26R. During this time, the parachutist was traveling along runway 26R toward the approaching airplane. The parachutist executed a left 180-degree turn and the airplane passed out of the camera's view. Four seconds later, sounds similar to an airplane engine are heard at an increasing level until the recording ends abruptly one second after that.

The camera worn by the second parachutist included only the accident jump. The second parachutist exited the jump plane and passed through a broken cloud layer about 18 seconds later. The second parachutist deployed her chute 46 seconds after exiting the airplane. The parachutist struck by the jump plane entered the field of view moving from left to right. The jump plane entered the camera's field of view from the lower left about 1/2 second later. The plane appeared to be aligned with runway 26R, with flaps down. Less than one second after the jump plane entered the camera's field of view, the right wing of the plane contacted the parachutist near the back of the neck. The parachutist was dragged for about 1/2 second before the canopy pulled him clear of the airplane. The jump plane yawed to the right and then entered what appeared to be a coordinated right turn, with the right wingtip nearly striking the ground. The airplane's bank angle increased until it disappeared behind a hangar.

Advisory Circular 90-66A, Recommended Standard Traffic Patterns and Practices for Aeronautical Operations at Airports without Operating Control Towers, was intended to call "attention to regulatory requirements and recommended procedures for aeronautical operations at airports without operating control towers." Concerning parachute operations, it stated: "When a drop zone has been established on an airport, parachutists are expected to land within the drop zone. . . . Pilots and parachutists should both be aware of the limited flight performance of parachutes and take steps to avoid any potential conflicts between aircraft and parachute operations."

Title 14 CFR 105.17, Flight visibility and clearance from cloud requirements, stated that parachute operations may not be conducted "into or through a cloud." In addition, the regulation stated that below 10,000 feet msl, a minimum horizontal distance of 2,000 feet and flight visibility of 3 statute miles (sm) must be maintained. For operations above 10,000 feet msl, one mile horizontal distance and 5 sm must be maintained.

NTSB Probable Cause

Failure of the jump plane pilot to maintain clearance from the parachutist descent area/drop zone until assured that all jumpers had landed, and the parachutist's failure to maintain an adequate visual lookout for the jump plane during all phases of the jump. Contributing factors were the inability of the pilot to maintain directional control of the airplane after collision with the parachutist, the airplane's low altitude at the time of the collision, the parachutist, and the trees. An additional factor was the proximity of the runway to the drop zone.