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N777VG accident description

Georgia map... Georgia list
Crash location 33.529445°N, 82.499722°W
Nearest city Thomson, GA
33.470693°N, 82.504573°W
4.1 miles away
Tail number N777VG
Accident date 20 Feb 2013
Aircraft type Beech 390
Additional details: None

NTSB Factual Report

***This report was modified on August 25, 2014, and October 21, 2014. Please see the docket for this accident to view the original report.***

HISTORY OF FLIGHT

On February 20, 2013, about 2006 eastern standard time (EST), a Beechcraft Corporation 390 Premier (Premier IA), N777VG, collided with a utility pole, trees, and terrain following a go around at Thomson-McDuffie County Airport (HQU), Thomson, Georgia. The airline transport-rated pilot and copilot were seriously injured, and the five passengers were fatally injured. The airplane was registered to the Pavilion Group, LLC, and was operated under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 91 as a business flight. Night visual meteorological conditions prevailed, and an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan was filed. The flight originated at John C. Tune Airport (JWN), Nashville, Tennessee, about 1827 central standard time (1927 EST).

On the morning of the accident, the pilot and copilot left their respective homes in South Carolina about 0230 for the 1-hour drive to HQU (where the airplane was based) to fly five passengers, who were employees of Vein Guys®, to JWN. (The National Transportation Safety Board [NTSB] notes that while the copilot is referred to as such in this report, his role in the cockpit is not required by federal regulations.) The airplane departed HQU about 0406 and arrived at JWN about 0459. (Although JWN is located in the central time zone, all subsequent times in this report are in EST unless otherwise noted.) Both pilots stated in postaccident interviews that the flight to JWN was uneventful and the weather was good. They reported that at the JWN terminal, they slept in the crew break room, completed paperwork, and worked on the computer. They left for a late lunch about 1500 and returned to the airport about 1630.

According to security camera footage from the JWN terminal, both pilots were observed walking toward the airplane about 1913, and about 1918, the five passengers were seen walking toward the airplane while one crewmember performed an external walk-around inspection. About 1923, the airplane taxied from the parking area and departed JWN at 1927. The pilot was the pilot flying and was in the left cockpit seat.

About 1927, the flight crew contacted departure control while climbing through 3,500 ft mean sea level (msl) and requested an IFR clearance to HQU. About 1930, the flight crew contacted the Memphis air route traffic control center (ARTCC) while climbing through 14,000 ft msl, and about 1933, the flight was cleared to climb and maintain a cruising altitude of flight level (FL) 270. According to flight crew interviews, the en route weather was good, and a tailwind in excess of 70 knots was observed.

About 1948, the flight crew contacted the Atlanta ARTCC and was cleared to descend to FL240. About 1953, the flight crew was given a further descent clearance to 11,000 ft msl along with the Athens, Georgia, altimeter setting. About the same time, the copilot tuned in the HQU automated weather observation system (AWOS) to receive the most current weather at the destination airport. The AWOS at 1935 reported calm wind, temperature 10 degrees C, 10 statute miles visibility or greater, scattered clouds at 12,000 ft, and an altimeter setting of 30.13 inches of mercury. The pilot then set up the flight management guidance system for a visual approach to runway 10 at HQU with a 3.4-degree descent to the runway from a 5-mile final approach. The copilot tuned the instrument landing system for runway 10 as a backup.

About 1956, the flight crew advised the Atlanta ARTCC that they were descending through 18,500 ft, and 2 minutes later, they cancelled their IFR flight plan. About 1958, the copilot stated to the pilot, "ten thousand comin' up captain and you blowin' through." About 1959, the copilot told the pilot to adjust his altimeter. The pilot responded, "say, I'm kinda out of the loop or something. I don't know what happened to me there but I appreciate you lookin' after me there." The flight crew was then directed to contact Augusta approach control, and about 2000, the flight crew contacted Augusta approach control and advised that they were descending out of 8,400 ft and had HQU in sight. About 2002, the flight crew advised Augusta approach control that they would switch to the local HQU advisory frequency.

Concurrently, the pilot began to perform an "S" turn along the final approach path to the runway. About 1 minute later, the enhanced ground proximity warning system (EGPWS) aural alert announced that the airplane was 1,000 ft above the ground, and the pilot lowered the landing gear. According to the cockpit voice recorder (CVR), after the landing gear was lowered, about 2004, the copilot noted that the "ANTI SKID FAIL" annunciator light illuminated. The pilot continued the approach, and, about 2005, the airplane touched down on runway 10. Witnesses reported that after the airplane touched down, they heard or saw it go around. According to the CVR, the takeoff warning horn sounded about 0.3 seconds before the pilot stated that he was performing a go-around. The airplane lifted off near the departure end of the runway. The copilot directed the pilot to increase pitch. According to EGPWS data, as the airplane climbed to an altitude of about 63 ft above the ground, about 9 seconds after liftoff, the left wing struck a utility pole located about 0.25 miles east of the departure end of the runway. The airplane continued about 925 ft before colliding with trees and terrain. It was destroyed by impact forces and a postcrash fire.

During a postaccident interview, when asked about the approach, landing, and go-around at HQU, the pilot recalled checking the airplane's landing light switches to prepare for the landing. The next thing he remembered was waking up in the hospital on February 24, 2013. He did not recall any additional details about the approach, landing, or go-around or any airplane system anomalies, including any antiskid problems, during the flight.

In postaccident interviews, the copilot did not recall anything unusual about the glidepath and recalled being about 1 or 2 knots above reference speed. The copilot thought that the airplane touched down on runway 10 within 200 ft of the 1,000-ft runway marker. As he began to reference the after landing checklist, he heard the pilot announce a go-around, but the copilot did not know the reason for the go-around. He stated that he began to monitor the airspeed indicator, saw that they were at 105 knots approaching the end of the runway, and thought "it was going to be close." The engines sounded like they always did on a normal takeoff. He thought something hit the airplane on his side and recalled seeing trees in the windshield. The next thing he remembered was seeing someone with a flashlight at the accident scene. He did not recall any alarm or aural caution before the go-around and indicated that everything looked normal.

PERSONNEL INFORMATION

The Pilot

The pilot, age 56, held an airline transport pilot (ATP) certificate with a single pilot type rating on the Premier IA. (The 390 Premier is the same as the Premier I/IA series.) He also held a flight instructor certificate with airplane single engine land, airplane multiengine land, and instrument airplane privileges. He was the director of operations for Sky's the Limit, doing business as Executive Shuttle, a 14 CFR Part 135 operator based in Greenwood, South Carolina. He was hired by the Pavilion Group to provide private pilot services for their Premier IA under the provisions of 14 CFR Part 91. The pilot reported 13,319 hours total flying time, including 12,609 hours as pilot-in-command (PIC). He reported 198 hours, all as PIC, in the Premier IA. The pilot held a second-class Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) medical certificate, issued October 29, 2012, with a limitation to possess glasses for near/intermediate vision.

According to interviews and training records, the pilot attended the FlightSafety Premier I Series (RA-390) initial training course at the FlightSafety Wichita Learning Center, Wichita, Kansas, from June 7, 2012, through June 22, 2012. The ground instruction consisted of 58 hours of ground training and 11.5 hours of briefing/debriefing. The pilot also attended flight simulator training, which consisted of 15 hours of simulator training. He was type rated on the Premier IA on June 22, 2012, following a 2.2-hour simulator session and a 2.5-hour oral/written examination.

The pilot also attended the FlightSafety Premier I Series (RA-390) recurrent PIC course at the FlightSafety Greater Philadelphia/Wilmington Learning Center, Wilmington, Delaware, from January 3, 2013, through January 5, 2013. The ground instruction consisted of 12 hours of training and 4.5 hours of briefing/debriefing. The simulator portion of the training consisted of 7 hours of simulator time.

A copilot who previously flew with the pilot stated that the pilot was experienced, professional, and possessed good flying skills. Both copilots who flew with the pilot, including the accident copilot, stated that they did not have a specific role on the flights they flew with him in the Premier IA.

On February 15, the pilot flew the owner of Vein Guys® and his family to Orlando, Florida, and remained in Orlando until Monday, February 18. He did not use a copilot for the Orlando trip. On February 18, he flew the family to HQU and then drove to his residence, going to bed about 2100. On February 19, he awoke about 0500 for a 0930 flight to Olive Branch, Mississippi, with the accident copilot and Vein Guys® staff. The return flight landed at HQU about 1700 that evening. He arrived at his residence about 1820 and went to bed about 2100.

On the day of the accident, the pilot awoke about 0200 and arrived at HQU about 0330 for the 0400 flight to JWN. He described February 20 as a "tough, tough day" because of the early departure time. After arriving at JWN, he slept for about 4 hours in a chair in the pilot lounge. He did not sleep again that day. A review of the pilot's cell phone records revealed three outgoing calls were made during his 4-hour sleep break. The pilot indicated that he normally slept about 8 hours per night and that he typically awoke about 0600.

The Copilot

The copilot, age 40, held an ATP certificate. He possessed no type ratings. He was employed by and flew charters for Executive Shuttle, which was owned by the accident pilot. He accompanied the accident pilot on the Premier IA flights at the pilot's request and estimated that he had about 45 flight hours in the Premier IA. He reported 2,932 hours total time, including 2,613 hours as PIC. The copilot held a second-class FAA medical certificate, issued February 12, 2013, with no limitations.

The copilot received no simulator training in the Premier IA before the accident and did not complete formal training courses in the Premier IA. He received a 14 CFR 61.55 logbook endorsement on October 10, 2012, from the accident pilot, stating that he demonstrated the skill and knowledge required for safe operation of the Premier IA as second-in-command.

On Monday, February 18, the copilot was at home and awoke between 0600 and 0630 and went to bed about 2200. On Tuesday, February 19, he awoke between about 0530 and 0600 and flew with the captain to Olive Branch. After returning to HQU, the copilot made the 1-hour drive to his home but was not certain what time he went to bed or fell asleep. The last cell phone activity that day occurred about 2148. On Wednesday, February 20, the copilot awoke between about 0200 and 0215 and drove with the accident captain to HQU for the flight to JWN. The copilot told investigators he was able to sleep for about 4 to 5 hours in the pilot lounge (awakening about 1000 central time).

AIRCRAFT INFORMATION

The Premier IA was a carbon fiber composite fuselage, metal low-wing airplane powered by two Williams FJ44-2A turbofan engines mounted on the aft fuselage each rated at 2,300 lbs of thrust.

The Premier IA was not equipped with reverse thrust, and wheel braking was the primary means of stopping the airplane after landing. (The lift dump assists in putting weight on the wheels, which makes braking more effective.) The airplane was equipped with an electrically controlled antiskid system. According to the manufacturer, the system offered protection from skids and could provide consistently shorter landing rolls for all runway conditions. The ANTI SKID FAIL annunciator would illuminate if a malfunction existed in the system when the ANTI SKID switch was in the NORM (normal) position.

Activation of the lift dump switch extended the three spoiler panels on each wing and overrode normal spoiler operation. A placard was located on the cockpit pedestal immediately aft of the lift dump switch that read, "WARNING DO NOT EXTEND IN FLIGHT." In addition, the Hawker Beechcraft Premier I/IA Model 390 Airplane Flight Manual (AFM), Section 3A—Abnormal Procedures, page A-25, states, "Do not extend lift dump in flight." Section 3A of the AFM (Abnormal Procedures) included the following warning: "Extending lift dump in flight could result in loss of airplane control leading to airplane damage and injury to personnel. Continued safe flight with lift dump extended has not been demonstrated."

The airframe and engine maintenance logbooks were not located after the accident. Pavilion Group used CAMP Systems as their maintenance management provider, and the Hawker Beechcraft Service Center, Atlanta, Georgia, also provided maintenance services.

The most recent record of maintenance performed on the airplane occurred on January 29, 2013, at Aeronautical Services, Greenwood, South Carolina. The maintenance included replacement of the left and right main tires, touching up exterior paint, and a battery capacity check. The total time on the airplane was not recorded at that time.

The most recent maintenance record indicating aircraft total time was on January 4, 2013, when the airframe total time was 635.4 hours. The most recent comprehensive airframe and engine inspection was recorded on June 15, 2012. The 600-hour Schedule A inspection was accomplished at 503.3 hours total time and 565 total airframe cycles.

METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATION

The National Weather Service (NWS) reported no significant weather and no precipitation over the region. The area forecast applicable for HQU expected light wind and scattered to broken high cirrus clouds, with visibility unrestricted. The NWS also issued an airmen's meteorological information that was current at the time of the accident for moderate turbulence below 8,000 ft over the area.

HQU was equipped with an AWOS that issued observations every 20 minutes. The HQU 1955 observation reported calm wind, visibility 10 miles or greater, sky clear, temperature 9 degrees C, dew point -4 degrees C, and altimeter setting 30.12 inches of mercury. The HQU 2015 observation reported wind from 240 degrees at 6 knots, visibility 10 miles or greater, broken ceiling at 12,000 ft above ground level (agl), temperature 11 degrees C, dew point -3 degrees C, and altimeter setting 30.15 inches of mercury.

AIRPORT INFORMATION

General

HQU was a general aviation airport with one asphalt runway (runway 10-28) measuring 5,503 ft long and 100 ft wide, with precision instrument markings on both ends. The runway had high-intensity runway edge lights that changed from white to amber for the last 2,000 ft in both directions. Both ends had red threshold lights and green approach lights. Adjacent to the touchdown zone for both ends of the runway was a two-unit precision approach path indicator (PAPI) system set at 3 degrees. (As later discussed, following an aeronautical study after the accident, the FAA changed the glidepath angle for the runway 28 PAPI to 3.5 degrees.) Postaccident tests and inspections of the airport lighting systems indicated that the lighting system was operating normally at the time of the tests.

The runway and taxiway lights were pilot-adjustable to low, medium, and high settings and would remain on for 15 minutes after activation. The PAPIs would not activate when the runway lights were

NTSB Probable Cause

The pilot's failure to follow airplane flight manual procedures for an antiskid failure in flight and his failure to immediately retract the lift dump after he elected to attempt a go-around on the runway. Contributing to the accident were the pilot's lack of systems knowledge and his fatigue due to acute sleep loss and his ineffective use of time between flights to obtain sleep.

Member Sumwalt filed a concurring statement that can be found in the public docket for this accident. Member Weener joined the statement.

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