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N9964T accident description

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Tail numberN9964T
Accident dateNovember 17, 2002
Aircraft typeCessna 182D
LocationNewphiladelphia, OH
Near 40.493611 N, -81.383056 W
Additional details: None

NTSB description


On November 17, 2002, about 1440 eastern standard time, a Cessna 182D, N9964T, was destroyed when it struck terrain during a missed approach in New Philadelphia, Ohio. The certificated private pilot and the passenger were fatally injured. Instrument meteorological conditions prevailed for the personal flight. An instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan had been filed for the flight that originated at Bloomington, Illinois, and was conducted under 14 CFR Part 91.

The pilot kept his airplane at Harry Clever Field, New Philadelphia. On November 15, 2002, he and his wife flew to Bloomington. While at Bloomington, the airplane was serviced with 37.4 gallons of fuel.

On November 17, the pilot contacted the Kankakee Flight Service Station (FSS) via telephone, and received two pre-departure weather briefings.

The first briefing occurred at 0920. The pilot requested an outlook as to what type of weather he could expect on the planned flight. He was told that instrument meteorological conditions prevailed for the area, and there were no pilot reports available. He was also told the forecast called for occasional moderate rime ice and mixed (rime and clear) icing in clouds or precipitation, when flying at or below 10,000 feet.

The second briefing occurred at 1103, at which time, the pilot received a full weather briefing. The briefing included reports of forecast icing conditions, pilot reports of icing conditions, and advisories of low clouds and instrument meteorological conditions over a wide area along the pilot's route of flight. The pilot filed an IFR flight plan during the briefing.

The pilot departed Bloomington about 1151. At 1307, while in communications with Fort Wayne, Indiana approach control, the pilot reported that he was just in the tops of the clouds, "picking up a little bit of ice." The pilot requested to climb to 11,000 feet and was handed off to Indianapolis air route traffic control center, who approved the climb at 1315.

At 1405, the pilot was issued a clearance to descend to 5,000 feet at pilot's discretion. About 1410, the pilot was transferred to Akron-Canton approach control. The airplane was initially at 5,000 feet and was descended to 4,000 feet, and then to 3,000 feet. The airplane was radar-vectored for the VOR-A Approach to Harry Clever Field.

At 1429, the pilot reported, "we're picking up moderate ice here, we got a pretty good load on it." When asked if he needed to change altitude and climb back to 4,000 feet. The pilot replied, "...I don't think it will make much difference, I'm not sure I could go up anyway." When asked about the type of icing, the pilot confirmed that he was picking up rime ice.

At 1431, when queried about the icing conditions, the pilot reported, "probably got about half to three inches of accumulation on the strut part control surface." The pilot was then cleared for the VOR-A Approach.

At 1433, when asked by the controller, the pilot reported that he had also picked up ice when flying at 4,000 feet.

At 1435, the controller told the pilot he was over the final approach fix, and asked if he was still picking up ice. The pilot replied, "...its not worse than it was before, but we got it on all over." The pilot was subsequently instructed to change to advisory frequency. The pilot reported that he was going to stay with approach control as he felt he probably would not get into New Philadelphia.

At 1438:09, the pilot transmitted, "akron canton approach, skylane six four tango, we're going to have to declare the missed [approach], we can't get into the airport, uh we'll need vectors up to akron canton."

At 1438:17, the approach controller replied, " six four tango roger fly heading zero two zero, climb and maintain three thousand two hundred [feet], [this will] be vectors to the i l s two three approach to akron canton."

At 1438:26, the pilot replied, "left to zero two zero, and up to three thousand two hundred [feet], six four tango"

No further transmissions were received from the pilot.

Two witnesses observed the accident. One witness reported:

"...I saw a small plane fall into the ground about 100 feet in front of us and about 30 feet from the road...It fell straight down and was spinning slowly...."

During a follow-up telephone interview, the witness reported that he saw the airplane come out of the overcast, in a steep nose down pitch attitude. He described the weather as drizzle and fog.

The other witness reported:

"...a Cessna plane crashed just feet in front of us...."

In a follow-up telephone interview, the witness reported that when the accident occurred, he observed what he thought was a "white powder" flying across the road ahead of him. He also described the weather as cold with drizzle, the sky was overcast and there were occasional sprits of snow and light rain. The wind was blowing about 10 to 15 mph, but he did not know the direction.

The accident occurred during the hours of daylight at north latitude 40 degrees, 29.610 minutes and west longitude 81 degrees, 22.997 minutes.


The pilot held a private pilot certificate with airplane single engine land, and instrument airplane ratings. According to his pilot logbook, which was current through November 15, 2002, he had accumulated a total flight experience of 1,210 hours. This included 1,132 hours as pilot-in-command, 1,056 hours in the Cessna 182, and 48 hours in the preceding 90 days, all in make and model. The pilot's last flight review occurred on November 11, 2002, in the accident airplane.

The pilot was last issued a third class FAA airman medical certificate on January 25, 2001


The airplane was a 1960 Cessna 182. The airplane was not certificated for flight in known icing conditions. The only anti-ice device on the airplane was a heated pitot tube. The airplane was not equipped with de-icing equipment.


The recorded weather from New Philadelphia, at 1353, included visibility 6 miles, mist, ceiling 700 feet overcast, winds from 320 degrees at 8 knots, temperature 1 degree Celsius, dewpoint 0 degree Celsius. The 1453 weather observation included visibility 5 miles, light rain and mist, ceiling 700 feet overcast, winds from 300 degrees at 7 knots, temperature 1 degree Celsius, dewpoint 0 degree Celsius.

The airport manager reported that about the time of the accident, the weather was 500 feet overcast, with visibility variable between 1/2 mile and 2 miles. The clouds and mist were variable, and the winds were from 310 degrees at 10 knots.


The airport elevation was 894 feet. The minimum descent altitude on the VOR-A Approach was 1,620 feet msl (mean sea level), or 726 feet agl (above ground level), for category A, B, and C airplanes.


Radar data was received from Akron Canton, Ohio. The airplane was identified by its beacon code of 0730. The pilot had originally been assigned the code 0731; however, according to communications between the pilot and approach control, the facility was receiving a zero in the last digit.

The radar data revealed the pilot initiated the approach from the north, and crossed over BARTE intersection, the final approach fix at 3,900 feet. The airplane continued its descent to 1,600 feet, and when the airplane was about 2 miles north of the airport, a climb was initiated. The airplane turned to the left (east), and climbed to 1,800 feet, prior to descending. From the last radar contact, the bearing to the accident site was 083 degrees, with a distance 0.4 nautical miles. From the last radar contact, the bearing to the airport was 234 degrees and a distance of 1.8 nautical miles.


The airplane had impacted in an open field with low saplings and high brush. Prior to the arrival of the Safety Board investigator, the wings were separated from the fuselage, and the aileron control cables were cut. While the airplane was still under the control of the Ohio State Police, it was moved to a secure storage site.

A trooper from the Ohio State Highway Patrol who provided the initial response to the accident site, reported that he observed ice accumulations on the top of the vertical fin in front of the anti-collision light. He described the ice as milky in appearance with a rough surface. In addition, there was a smell of aviation gasoline at the accident site. The airplane was about 30 degrees nose down in the dirt.

Examination of the airplane by the Safety Board, commenced on November 18, 2002.

The examination revealed that the skin on the underside of both wings was pushed rearward. The fuel caps on both wings were in place, and there was no evidence of fuel staining around the fuel caps.

Flight control continuity was verified to the elevator and rudder. The forward fuselage was crushed and the cables would not move. The aileron cables were attached at the aileron bellcranks.

The engine crankshaft was rotated and valve train continuity was confirmed. Thumb compression was attained in all cylinders. Spark was attained from all magneto leads. The spark plugs were gray in appearance with no evidence of fouling.

The carburetor was separated from the engine and the carburetor bowl was broken open. The main jet was absent of debris. The carburetor fuel filter was absent of debris, except for the end where the case was fractured, and which was impacted with dirt.


Autopsies were conducted on the occupants on November 18, 2002, by the Chief Deputy Coroner/Medical Examiner for Clark County, Ohio.

Toxicological testing, conducted by the FAA Toxicology Accident Research Laboratory, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, found diphenhydramine in the blood at a level of 0.073 ug/ml. It was also detected in his liver.


The following information was extracted from Advisory Circular 91-51A, dated July 17, 1996, and titled, EFFECT OF ICING ON AIRCRAFT CONTROL AND AIRPLANE DEICE AND ANTI-ICE SYSTEMS:

"For ice to form, there must be moisture present in the air and the air must be cooled to a temperature of 0° C (32° F) or less. Aerodynamic cooling can lower the temperature of an airfoil to 0° C even though the ambient temperature is a few degrees warmer. However, when the temperature reaches -40° C (-40° F) or less, it is generally too cold for ice to form. Ice is identified as clear, rime, or mixed. Rime ice forms if the droplets are small and freeze immediately when contacting the aircraft surface. This type of ice usually forms on areas such as the leading edges of wings or struts. It has a somewhat rough looking appearance and is a milky white color. Clear ice is usually formed from larger water droplets or freezing rain that can spread over a surface. This is the most dangerous type of ice since it is clear, hard to see, and can change the shape of the airfoil. Mixed ice is a mixture of clear ice and rime ice. It has the bad characteristics of both types and can form rapidly. Ice particles become imbedded in clear ice, building a very rough accumulation."

"There are two kinds of icing that are significant to aviation: structural icing and induction icing. Structural icing refers to the accumulation of ice on the exterior of the aircraft; induction icing affects the powerplant operation. Significant structural icing on an aircraft can cause aircraft control and performance problems. The formation of structural icing could create a situation from which the pilot might have difficulty recovering and, in some instances, may not be able to recover at all. To reduce the probability of ice buildup on the unprotected areas of the aircraft, a pilot should maintain at least the minimum airspeed for flight in sustained icing conditions. This airspeed will be listed in the airplane flight manual (AFM)."

"The most hazardous aspect of structural icing is its aerodynamic effects. Ice can alter the shape of an airfoil. This can cause control problems, change the angle of attack at which the aircraft stalls, and cause the aircraft to stall at a significantly higher airspeed. Ice can reduce the amount of lift that an airfoil will produce and increase drag several fold. Additionally, ice can partially block or limit control surfaces which will limit or make control movements ineffective. Also, if the extra weight caused by ice accumulation is too great, the aircraft may not be able to become airborne and, if in flight, the aircraft may not be able to maintain altitude. For this reason, Title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR) prohibits takeoff when snow, ice, or frost is adhering to wings, propellers, or control surfaces of an aircraft. This clean aircraft concept is essential to safe flight operations."

"Another hazard structural icing is the sailplane (empennage) stall. Sharp-edged surfaces are more susceptible to collecting ice than large blunt surfaces. For this reason, the sailplane may begin accumulating ice before the wings and can accumulate ice faster. Because the pilot cannot readily see the sailplane, the pilot may be unaware of the situation until the stall occurs. There have been reports of ice on the sailplane without any visible ice on the wing. This can occur if the sailplane has not or cannot be deiced."

When the Safety Board finished its on-scene investigation, there was no one available to release the airplane wreckage to. No items were retained, and the Ohio State Police were notified. The Safety Board investigator departed the area, and the wreckage remained in secure storage until it was signed for by a family member on January 3, 2003.

(c) 2009-2011 Lee C. Baker. For informational purposes only.