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N7043G accident description

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Tail numberN7043G
Accident dateJune 12, 2006
Aircraft typeBeech 65-A90-1
LocationTampa, FL
Near 27.922223 N, -82.459166 W
Additional details: None

NTSB description


On June 12, 2006, about 1235 eastern daylight time, a Beech 65-A90-1 twin-engine, turboprop airplane, N7043G, registered to Dynamic AvLease, Inc., and operated by Dynamic Aviation Group, Inc., of Bridgewater, Virginia, contacted a taxiway then collided with a house during a forced landing at Peter O Knight Airport (TPF), Tampa, Florida. The flight was operating under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 91 as an other work use flight, and no flight plan was filed. Daylight marginal visual meteorological conditions prevailed in the area at the time of the accident for the local flight from Sarasota/Bradenton International Airport (SRQ), Sarasota, Florida. The airplane, house, and a vehicle parked there were destroyed by impact and a postcrash fire, and the captain was killed. The first officer/disperser (first officer) was seriously injured. The sole person in the house was not injured. The flight originated about 1130, from SRQ.

The purpose of the flight was to disperse sterile, Mediterranean fruit flies (fruit flies) under contract to the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), and was scheduled to return to SRQ after dispersing was completed. The flight duration was estimated to be slightly over 1 hour.

The first officer reported that the mission dispersing the fruit flies was uneventful, and while returning to SRQ, "...we got a light on the panel for the [propeller] governor. Possibly for the right engine first." The captain began trouble shooting the right propeller annunciation issue by manipulating the power and propeller controls, and was trying to keep up with it as the right propeller was changing pitch. The same annunciation from the left propeller occurred approximately 1 minute after the annunciation for the right propeller. The captain asked him to pull a circuit breaker (CB) located immediately adjacent to his control yoke on the lower instrument panel, but he (first officer) could not recall if this occurred after the first or second annunciation. He also did not recall what CB he pulled, but he pulled the same CB two times at the request of the captain, which had no effect. The captain was manipulating the power and propeller controls for both engines following the left propeller annunciation, but he (first officer) did not think the captain's actions were having any effect. At some point the first officer noticed TPF was off their right wingtip and suggested to the captain to proceed there.

The captain advised him to contact air traffic control (ATC) and then to declare an emergency. At 1232:39, the first officer contacted Tampa Approach Control (Tampa Approach) and advised that they wanted to fly direct to TPF. The controller advised the flight crew to proceed direct to TPF and advise when the airport is in sight. Radar data indicated that, about this time, the airplane was at an altitude of about 1,200 feet mean sea level (msl) and was located about 3.2 nautical miles (nm) east-southeast from TPF, or approximately 8.5 nm southeast from Tampa International Airport. At 1232:54, the first officer declared an emergency with Tampa Approach, and requested a direct vector to TPF. The controller instructed the flight crew that the vector uncorrected for wind was 304 degrees and 3 miles, provided the altimeter setting, and gave the wind as being from 090 degrees at 7 knots. Radar data indicated that from 1232:54 (time first officer declared an emergency) to 1233:40, the flight proceeded in a northwesterly direction towards TPF and descended from 1,300 to 500 feet msl.

At 1233:50, the first officer reported to Tampa Approach that the airport was in sight. The radar data indicated that, about this time, the airplane was flying in a westerly direction at an altitude of about 500 feet msl, and was located south-southeast of the approach end of runway 35. The controller asked if they needed assistance, to which the first officer responded at 1233:57, "no we're just going to try to land." No further communications were received from the flight crew.

The first officer did not recall any conversation between himself and the captain while on approach to land at TPF. The captain did not advise him to extend the flaps or landing gear, and he did not recall extending either for landing. They were on a short right base for runway 35, and turned onto final approach but were not lined up with it due to the angle approaching the airport. Radar data indicated that from 1234:00 to 1234:13 (last radar target), the airplane descended from 400 to 100 feet msl, and the groundspeed at the last recorded radar target was 155 knots. The first officer was not sure how far abeam the runway they were, did not recall the approach airspeed, and believed both propellers were rotating. After landing it did not feel rough nor did he feel "multiple hits." The airplane began skidding and he knew they were unable to stop. The airplane collided with a fence, and after stopping, he asked the captain if he was OK but there was no response. He (first officer) exited the wreckage and rolled onto the ground to extinguish the fire. He was helped to a vehicle by a nearby person, and passed out in an ambulance. The next memory he had was approximately 10 days later.

Numerous witnesses at TPF reported the airplane was not lined up with the runway while on approach, the landing gear was retracted, and only one engine was operating. Two pilot-rated witnesses reported the wind at the airport at the time of the accident was from the south. One was based on a personal observation, and the other was based on the TPF automated weather observation system (AWOS), which indicated the wind was from 150 degrees at 4 knots.

A pilot-rated witness located at TPF stated that she heard a strange sounding engine directly above her. As she looked up, she saw the accident airplane flying "extremely fast" at about 200 feet above ground level (agl). The witness further stated that the airplane was observed between runways 35 and 03 flying in a northerly direction, and flew over runway 03. The airplane then banked to the left, and it appeared to her that the left wing contacted the ground just off taxiway "F," which is located west of runway 35. The airplane flew through a fence, hit a house, and immediately became engulfed in flames and exploded. She further reported there was no communication by the flight crew on TPF common traffic advisory frequency (CTAF).

Another pilot-rated witness who was located on the north side of the airport immediately adjacent to the accident site, stated the airplane flew towards him about 5 feet agl with the landing gear retracted and yawing to the right. While airborne, the airplane collided with a fence on the north border of the airport, and then collided with trees, a car, and finally a residence. The witness ran to the wreckage and assisted the first officer who exited via the airstair door. The first officer advised him the captain was on-board, but fire prevented the witness from rescuing him. The witness asked the first officer what occurred and he initially responded that they had lost one engine, proceeded towards TPF, then lost the second engine. They were able to restart one engine, and then the propeller governor "ran away on us." The witness further asked the first officer if they had run out of fuel and he reported no, one engine quit and he did not know why.

Local fire rescue responded and extinguished the fire.


The captain, age 41, was hired by Dynamic Aviation Group, Inc., on March 30, 2004, as base maintenance manager/first officer, and upgraded to captain on March 13, 2005. He held a commercial pilot certificate with ratings airplane single and multi-engine land, instrument airplane, issued October 15, 2003. The captain's most recent Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) first-class airman medical certificate was issued on April 1, 2006, and contained the limitation that, "Holder shall wear correcting lenses while exercising the [privileges] of his/her airman certificate." The captain indicated on his last medical certificate application that his total time was 2,120 hours.

Dynamic Aviation Group, Inc., records indicate that at the date the captain began employment, he did not have any Beech "King Air 90" flight time. His total flight time at that time was 1,519 hours, of which 1,058.9 hours were as pilot-in-command (PIC), and 213 hours in multi-engine airplanes. At the time of the accident, his total time was 1,907 hours, and his total PIC time was 1,451 hours. He had 457 hours total time and 305 hours as PIC in the accident make and model airplane, respectively. His last flight review in accordance with 14 CFR Part 61.56 occurred on March 13, 2005, when he upgraded to captain. At that time, he "Satisfactory" demonstrated knowledge of "Secondary Low Pitch Stop system failure."

The first officer, age 25, was hired by Dynamic Aviation Group, Inc., on May 3, 2006. He holds a commercial pilot certificate with ratings airplane single and multi-engine land, instrument airplane, issued December 15, 2004. His most recent first-class medical certificate with no limitations was issued on March 14, 2006.

Dynamic Aviation Group, Inc., records indicate that at the time the first officer began employment, he did not have any Beech "King Air 90" flight time. His total flight time at that time was 1,123 hours, of which 900 hours were as PIC, and 23 hours were in multi-engine airplanes. The first officer's pilot logbook indicates that at the time of the accident, he logged 44 hours total time in the accident make and model airplane; of which, 15 hours were logged as PIC. His last logged flight occurred on June 9, 2006; the flight was in the accident make and model airplane. Dynamic Aviation Group, Inc., personnel reported the first officer did not have any official flight training or ground based systems training since employment, but he (first officer) reported he did "pick things up" while flying in the airplane. His last flight review in accordance with 14 CFR Part 61.56 occurred on December 15, 2004.

Dynamic Aviation Group, Inc., performs all pilot training in-house, with "flight reviews" occurring every 12-18 months. They train using a cockpit procedures trainer (CPT), and classroom instruction. With respect to training pertaining to the propeller secondary low pitch stop (SLPS), they use the CPT for location of the propeller governor idle stop circuit breaker and simulation of potential failure. With respect to the classroom instruction, they use a cockpit diagram, and Flight Safety software to describe the SLPS system, components, and normal and abnormal operation of the SLPS system. They utilize 2 to 3 hours of classroom time to discuss the propeller, which includes discussion of the SLPS system. The Flight Safety software provides "animated" schematics of the SLPS and related systems.


The airplane was manufactured in 1967 by Beechcraft, and entered U.S. military service as model U-21A, military serial number (S/N) 66-18036, manufacturer S/N LM-37. It was powered by two Pratt & Whitney PT6A-20 engines, and was equipped with two constant speed, manual and auto-feathering, full reversing, three-bladed Hartzell HC-B3TN-3B propellers. The airplane was removed from military service in 1996, purchased by Dynamic Aviation Group, Inc. (under previous company name) in the fall of 1996, and was assigned U.S. registration N7043G in December 1996. The aircraft was in storage until 1998, when it was overhauled.

In August 1998, an FAA standard airworthiness certificate in the normal category was issued; the airplane total time at that time was reported to be 10,690.7 hours. In October 1998, a standard airworthiness certificate in the restricted category was issued, with the listed purpose of "Agriculture and Pest Control." Between certification in 1998, and the accident date, Dynamic Aviation (or previous company names) continuously operated the airplane. The airplane had not been operated between January 24, 2006, and March 1, 2006, during which time extensive maintenance consisting of installation of serviceable propellers was performed.

The airplane was maintained in accordance with the operator's maintenance manual supplement, and an inspection cycle consists of a 100-Hour, and four phase inspections performed at 100-hour intervals. The airplane was last inspected in accordance with a 100-Hour inspection on April 20, 2006. The airplane total time at that time was 15,590.7 hours, and the time since overhaul for the left and right engines at that time was 6,658.2 and 2,591.3 hours, respectively. Including the accident flight, the airplane had accumulated approximately 80.6 hours since the last 100-Hour inspection.

Propeller blade angle is controlled by propeller controls on the throttle quadrant. The propeller blades change position to low pitch (high rpm) and reverse using engine oil increased in pressure by the primary propeller governor. Propeller blade low pitch position (high rpm) is a mechanically monitored hydraulic stop, which senses blade angle. The mechanical linkage closes a valve and prevents oil from entering the propeller dome, thereby stopping the propeller blades from moving past the low pitch stop. A back-up system (SLPS) prevents the propeller blades from going beyond the low pitch stop into reverse in the event of a malfunction of the primary low pitch stop. Activation of the SLPS system illuminates a red annunciator light located in an annunciator panel above the glare shield, which indicates the propeller has attempted to go past the primary low pitch stop, but the SLPS has prevented the propeller from doing so.

Operational testing of the SLPS is performed as indicated in the "Before Takeoff" checklist utilized by the operator. The operator provided documents indicating no pilot noted discrepancies of the SLPS tests during seven flights over the previous 13 days. A list containing the last 30 days of pilot discrepancies was in the airplane and not recovered.


A surface observation weather report (METAR) taken at the Peter O Knight Airport on the day of the accident at 1228, or approximately 7 minutes before the accident, indicates the wind was from 090 degrees at 5 knots, the visibility was 4 statute miles with rain, scattered clouds existed at 400 feet, broken clouds existed at 3,100 feet, and overcast clouds existed at 4,300 feet. The temperature and dewpoint were 23 and 21 degrees Celsius, respectively, and the altimeter setting was 29.97 inches of mercury.

The first officer later reported that during the flight, visual to marginal visual meteorological conditions prevailed; however, they remained in visual meteorological conditions from the point of the discrepancy to the time of the accident.


The flight crew was in contact with Tampa Approach; there were no reported communication difficulties.


The Peter O Knight airport is equipped with two runways designated 3/21 and 17/35. Runway 17/35 is asphalt and is 2,688 feet long and 75 feet wide, while runway 3/21 is 3,405 feet long and 100 feet wide. Taxiway "F" is 35 feet wide, parallels runway 17/35, and is located on the west side of the runway.


The airplane was not equipped with a cockpit voice recorder.


Runways 17/35 and 03/21, taxiway "F," and areas of the approach end of runway 17 at TPF were examined by National Transportation Safety Board, FAA, and airframe manufacturer personnel. Fourteen parallel ground scars were located near the west edge of taxiway "F," and north of the intersection of that taxiway and runway 03/21. That location was also near the departure end of runway 35. The 14 ground scars were oriented on a north-northwesterly heading, measured 35 feet 11 inches in length, and were consistent with contact by the left propeller. The distance between the first and second ground scar measured 28 inches. Several ground scars on grass between the west edge of taxiway "F" and an airport perimeter fence located on the north side of the airport were noted. One of the ground scars was a single arching scar, which was co

(c) 2009-2011 Lee C. Baker. For informational purposes only.